Rhetoric

​Another is due to the accidental circumstance, for instance, what Polycrates says of the mice, that they rendered assistance by gnawing through the bowstrings; or if someone should say that being invited to dinner is most honorable; for it was because of not being invited that Achilles was angry with the Achaians at Tenedos; but he was angry as one who was being dishonored, and this happened to occur because of his not being invited.

Another is that based on the consequence, for instance, in the *Alexander*, that he is magnanimous; for having despised the company of many, he spent his time by himself on Mount Ida; for because the magnanimous are of this character, he too would seem to be magnanimous. And since he is a dandy and wanders at night, he is an adulterer; for such people are like this. And it is similar also that in temples the poor both sing and dance, and that exiles are permitted to live wherever they wish; for because these things belong to those who seem to be happy, those to whom these things belong would also seem to be happy. But it differs in the “how”; wherefore it also falls under the fallacy of omission.

​Another is based on taking the non-cause as cause, for instance, because of something happening at the same time or after it; for they take what is after this as being because of this, and especially those in politics, as Demades said that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all evils; for after it the war occurred.

​Another is based on the omission of “when” and “how”, for instance, that Alexander justly took Helen; for a choice was given to her by her father. For it was not always, perhaps, but at first; for the father’s authority lasted only until then. Or if someone should say that striking free men is an outrage; for it is not so in every case, but only when one begins the unjust violence.

​Furthermore, just as in eristic arguments a fallacious syllogism arises from what is absolute and not absolute, but particular, as in Dialectic that “non-being is”, for non-being is non-being, and that “the unknown is known”, for the unknown is known to be unknown—so also in Rhetoric there is an apparent enthymeme from what is not absolutely probable but particularly probable. And this is not universal, just as Agathon also says: “Perhaps someone might say this very thing is probable, that many improbable things happen to mortals.” For what is against probability happens, so that what is against probability is also probable, and if so, the improbable will be probable. But not absolutely, but just as in eristic arguments the omission of “in what respect”, “in relation to what”, and “in what way” produces the sophistry, so here too it is because of the probability being not absolute but particular.

​And the *Art* of Corax is composed of this topic; for whether the accused is not liable to the charge, for instance, being weak he is prosecuted for assault (for it is not probable), or whether he is liable, for instance, being strong (for it is not probable, because it was bound to seem probable). And similarly in other cases; for one must be either liable or not liable to the charge; both then appear probable, but the one is really probable, and the other not absolutely but in the way described; and this is “to make the worse argument appear the better.” And hence men were justly displeased at the promise of Protagoras; for it is a lie, and not true but apparent probability, and exists in no other art than Rhetoric and Eristic.