Rhetoric

​Since it is possible that one thing is a real syllogism and another is not, but only appears to be so, it must also be that one enthymeme is a real one, and another is not a real enthymeme but only appears to be, since the enthymeme is a species of syllogism.

Of the topoi of apparent enthymemes, one is that based on verbal expression. Of this, one part, as in Dialectic, is when one has not drawn a syllogism but states the final conclusion as if it were a deduction, saying “Therefore, not this and that, but this and that must be so.” In enthymemes, stating things in a compressed and antithetical manner appears to be an enthymeme (for such expression is the domain of the enthymeme); and such a case seems to arise from the form of the expression. To speak syllogistically through verbal expression, it is also useful to state the headings of many syllogisms, such as “Some he saved, others he avenged, and the Greeks he set free.” For each of these was proved from other sources, but when they are put together, it appears that something further is produced from them as well. Another part is based on homonymy, as in saying that a mouse (μῦς) is noble, since from it comes the most honored of all initiations; for the mysteries (μυστήρια) are the most honored initiation of all. Or if someone, in praising a dog, should include the one in the heavens (Sirius), or Pan, because Pindar said: “O blessed one, whom the Olympians call the all-shaped dog of the great goddess,” or because the non-existence of any dog is most dishonorable, so that a dog is clearly honorable. And to say that Hermes is the most sharing of the gods; for he alone is called “common Hermes.” And to say that speech/reason (λόγος) is most noble, because good men are worthy not of wealth but of λόγος (esteem); for “worthy of λόγος” is not said in a single sense.

​Another topic is to speak by combining what is divided, or dividing what is combined. Since what is not the same often seems to be the same, one must do whichever is more useful. This is like the argument of Euthydemus, such as knowing that a trireme is in Piraeus; for one knows each (of the elements). And that he who knows the letters knows the verse (ἔπος); for the verse is the same thing. And since twice as much is diseased, to say that even the single amount is not healthy; for it is absurd if two good things make one bad thing. Used in this way, it is refutative, but in the following way it is demonstrative: “for one good thing does not make two bad things”; but the whole topic is fallacious. Again, the saying of Polycrates against Thrasybulus, that he put down thirty tyrants; for he combines them. Or the passage in the *Orestes* of Theodectes; for it is from division: “It is just, whoever kills her husband,” that she should die, and that the son should avenge his father; therefore, these things too which have been done are just. For when combined, they are perhaps no longer just. It might also be due to omission; for it leaves out “by whom” she is killed.

​Another topic is to establish or refute by exaggeration (arousing indignation). This is when, without having shown that the person did or did not do the deed, one amplifies the matter; for it makes it appear either as though he did not do it, when the accused amplifies, or as though he did it, when the accuser amplifies. Thus it is not an enthymeme; for the listener fallaciously concludes that the person did or did not do it, when it has not been proved.

​Another is from a sign; for this also is non-syllogistic. For instance, if someone should say: “Lovers are advantageous to cities; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus,” or if someone should say that Dionysius is a thief, for he is a wicked man; for this indeed is non-syllogistic, since not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man.