- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press,1959 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg038.humanitext-grc2:2.25.1-2.25.14
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Aristotle introduces the methods of refutation (refuting by counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection of four types: from itself, the contrary, the similar, or prior judgments) and explains how to properly address probabilities, signs, examples, and necessary signs in rhetorical disputes.
καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων, καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων, εἴρηται, περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογισάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα.
And concerning enthymemes, both real and apparent, has been discussed; next in order after what has been said is to speak of refutation. It is possible to refute either by a counter-syllogism or by bringing an objection.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλλογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δοκοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν·
Now, as for counter-syllogizing, it is clear that it can be done from the same topics; for syllogisms are formed from accepted opinions, and many opinions that seem contrary to one another exist.
αἱ δʼ ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς, τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ1 ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων.
But objections are brought, just as in the *Topics*, in four ways: either from the argument itself, or from the similar, or from the contrary, or from what has been decided.
λέγω δὲ ἀφʼ ἑαυτοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπουδαῖος, ἡ ἔνστασις διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ἐλέγετο Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες.
I mean “from the argument itself,” for instance, if the enthymeme should be about love, to the effect that it is good, the objection may be made in two ways: either by saying universally that “every lack is evil,” or particularly that “there would not be the term ‘Caunian love’ if there were not also evil loves.”
ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον, εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς.
An objection is brought from the contrary, for instance, if the enthymeme was that “the good man does good to all his friends,” the objection is: “but neither does the wicked man do evil to all of his.”
ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὁμοίου, οἷον, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν, ὅτι ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν.
From the similar, for instance, if the enthymeme was that “those who have been badly treated always hate,” the objection is: “but neither do those who have been well treated always love.”
αἱ δὲ κρίσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἷον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύουσι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἁμαρτάνουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἐάν τις μεθύων ἁμαρτάνῃ.
And judgments from well-known men, for instance, if someone said as an enthymeme that “one should show indulgence to those who are drunk, for they err in ignorance,” the objection is: “then Pittacus is not to be praised; for otherwise he would not have legislated greater penalties if someone errs while drunk.”
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν, εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἢ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἐπαγωγῆς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου, ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἶτα συλλογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ διὰ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀεὶ ὄντος διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἐάν τε ὂν ἐάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν, ἡ δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεί· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός λύει ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον·2
Since enthymemes are said to be derived from four sources, and these four are probability, example, necessary sign, and sign, and those enthymemes drawn from what happens for the most part, or seems to do so, are from probabilities; those by induction from the similar, whether one or more, when one takes the universal and then syllogizes the particular, are by example; those through the necessary and ever-existing are through necessary signs; and those through the universal existing in the particular, whether it exists or not, are through signs; and since probability is not what is always but what is for the most part, it is clear that it is always possible to refute such enthymemes by bringing an objection. But the refutation is apparent and not always true; for the objector does not refute by showing that it is not probable, but that it is not necessary.
διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν διὰ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταὐτὸ λῦσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ δʼ ἔχει ἔνστασιν3 τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμʼ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον), ὁ δὲ κριτὴς οἴεται, ἂν οὕτω λυθῇ, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὑτῷ κριτέον, παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν), οὔκουν ἱκανὸν ἂν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός.
Therefore, it is always possible to have an advantage in defending rather than in accusing because of this paralogism; for since the accuser proves by means of probabilities, and it is not the same thing to refute on the ground that it is not probable or that it is not necessary, and what is for the most part always admits of an objection (for otherwise, if it were not always probable, it would also always be necessary), the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this way, either that it is not probable or that he must not judge, being deceived by the paralogism as we said (for he must not judge only from necessary things, but also from probabilities; for this is what it means to judge “according to the best opinion”); therefore, it is not sufficient if one refutes by showing that it is not necessary, but one must refute by showing that it is not probable.
τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται ἐὰν ᾖ ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν, κυριώτατα δὲ εἰ ἀμφοῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλείω καὶ πλεονάκις οὕτως, τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον.
And this will happen if the objection is more for the most part. Such an objection can be so in two ways, either in respect to time or in respect to facts, and most authoritatively if in both; for if things are more so and more often so, this is more probable.
λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, κἂν ᾖ ὑπάρχοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· ὅτι γὰρ ἀσυλλόγιστόν ἐστιν πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν.
And signs and enthymemes stated through signs are also refuted, even if they are existing facts, as was said in the first books; for that every sign is unsyllogistic is clear to us from the *Analytics*.
πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις καὶ τὰ εἰκότα· ἐάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἕν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως, ἐάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ πλεονάκις οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει.
Against examples, the same refutation applies as to probabilities; for if we have some one instance which is not so, it is refuted on the ground that it is not necessary, even if the majority of cases or more frequently they are otherwise; and if the majority and more frequently are so, we must fight either on the ground that the present case is not similar, or not in a similar way, or at least has some difference.
τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον οὐκ ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν), λείπεται δʼ ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι τεκμήριον, ἄλυτον ἤδη γίγνεται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ γίγνεται ἀπόδειξις ἤδη φανερά.
But necessary signs and enthymemes based on them cannot be refuted on the ground of being unsyllogistic (and this also is clear to us from the *Analytics*); there remains only to show that what is stated does not exist. But if it is clear both that it exists and that it is a necessary sign, it becomes irrefutable; for everything then becomes a clear demonstration.
- 1402a35ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ
Meaning "from itself." In this context, it refers to deriving an objection from the opponent's argument itself or from the very definition of the subject-matter under discussion. Although it is sometimes interpreted as "from the objector's own resources," the subsequent example (§2.25.4), which uses the inherent duality of the definition of love (ἔρως) to refute the thesis, supports the view that it means drawing an objection from the nature of the subject itself.
- 1402b20οὐ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ ἅμʼ ἀεὶ εἰκός, ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον
A construction using the subjunctive with ἄν (ἂν ᾖ) to express a general or hypothetical condition. Although some manuscripts read ἂν εἴη (optative), it expresses the negation of a simultaneous condition: "for if it were not the case that what is probable is at the same time always necessary." It provides the logical basis: since "for the most part" (τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ) is not simultaneously and always necessary, it always leaves room for an objection.
- 1402b25ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων... φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἔνστασιν
This passage features a long subordinate clause introduced by the causal conjunction ἐπεί (ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται... διὰ σημείων), followed by a clarifying definition (τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς... ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), which finally leads to the main clause φανερὸν ὅτι... Aristotle classifies the four elements constituting enthymemes, concluding that those based on "probability" (and likewise on examples or signs) are always open to refutation by bringing an objection because they lack necessity (οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον).