Politics

​And this, as we say, is living happily and finely. Therefore, the political association must be assumed to exist for the sake of fine actions, and not for the sake of living together. Wherefore, those who contribute most to such an association have a greater share in the city than those who are equal or superior in freedom and birth but unequal in political virtue, or those who surpass in wealth but are surpassed in virtue. It is manifest, therefore, from what has been said, that all who dispute about constitutions speak of some part of justice. But there is a difficulty as to what ought to be the sovereign of the city. For indeed it must be either the multitude, or the wealthy, or the respectable, or the one best of all, or a tyrant. But all of these appear to involve difficulty. For what indeed? If the poor, because they are more numerous, divide among themselves the property of the wealthy, is this not unjust? “No, by Zeus, for it seemed just to the sovereign.” What then must we call the extreme of injustice? And again, when everything is taken, if the majority divide the property of the minority, it is manifest that they destroy the city. Yet virtue does not destroy that which possesses it, nor is justice destructive of a city; so it is clear that this law also cannot be just. Moreover, all the actions that a tyrant performs must also necessarily be just; for he uses force, being stronger, just as the multitude does against the wealthy. But is it just for the minority and the wealthy to rule? If they then do these same things, and plunder and take away the possessions of the multitude, is this just? Then the other must be so too. It is manifest, then, that all these things are bad and not just. But ought the respectable to rule and be sovereign of all? In that case, it is necessary for all the others to be deprived of honor, not being honored with political offices; for we say that offices are honors, and if the same persons always rule, the others must necessarily be deprived of honor. But is it better for the one most excellent to rule? But this is still more oligarchical; for those deprived of honor are more numerous. But perhaps someone might say that it is a bad thing for a human being in general, rather than law, to be sovereign, since he at any rate possesses the passions that happen to affect the soul. If, then, there is indeed law, but it is either oligarchical or democratic, what difference will it make regarding the difficulties that have been raised? For the things said before will happen in the same way. Now concerning the other cases let there be some other discussion; but that the multitude ought to be sovereign rather than the few who are best, would seem to be resolved and to present some difficulty, and perhaps even some truth. For the many, of whom each is not an excellent man,