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Politics

§3.1280b

Limits of Mere Alliances and the Polis as Aiming at Living Well

Aristotle clarifies that mere trade agreements, geographical proximity, or defensive alliances do not make a "city" (polis); rather, a true city is an association of households and families aimed at moral virtue and "living well."

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§3.1280b

ἀλλʼ ἕτεραι παρʼ ἑκατέροις, οὔτε τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ1 φροντίζουσιν ἅτεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους, οὐδʼ ὅπως μηδεὶς ἄδικος ἔσται τῶν ὑπὸ τὰς συνθήκας μηδὲ μοχθηρίαν ἕξει μηδεμίαν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅπως μηδὲν ἀδικήσουσιν ἀλλήλους. περὶ δʼ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας πολιτικῆς διασκοποῦσιν ὅσοι φροντίζουσιν εὐνομίας. ᾗ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι τῇ γʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένῃ πόλει,2 μὴ λόγου χάριν. γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία, τῶν ἄλλων τόπῳ διαφέρουσα μόνον, τῶν ἄπωθεν συμμάχων. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλʼ οὐχ οἷος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν. εἰ γάρ τις καὶ συναγάγοι τοὺς τόπους εἰς ἕν, ὥστε ἅπτεσθαι τὴν Μεγαρέων πόλιν καὶ Κορινθίων τοῖς τείχεσιν, ὅμως οὐ μία πόλις· οὐδʼ εἰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπιγαμίας ποιήσαιντο· καίτοι τοῦτο τῶν ἰδίων ταῖς πόλεσι κοινωνημάτων ἐστίν. ὁμοίως δʼ οὐδʼ εἴ τινες οἰκοῖεν χωρὶς μέν, μὴ μέντοι τοσοῦτον ἄπωθεν ὥστε μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀλλʼ εἴησαν αὐτοῖς νόμοι τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν3 περὶ τὰς μεταδόσεις, οἷον εἰ ὁ μὲν εἴη τέκτων ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ δὲ σκυτοτόμος ὁ δʼ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον, καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἶεν μύριοι, μὴ μέντοι κοινωνοῖεν ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων, οἷον ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδʼ οὕτω πω πόλις. διὰ τίνα δή ποτʼ αἰτίαν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύνεγγυς τῆς κοινωνίας. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνέλθοιεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες (ἕκαστος μέντοι χρῷτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ὥσπερ πόλει) καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπιμαχίας οὔσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας μόνον, οὐδʼ οὕτως ἂν εἶναι δόξειεν πόλις τοῖς ἀκριβῶς θεωροῦσιν, εἴπερ ὁμοίως ὁμιλοῖεν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τόπου, καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταδόσεως χάριν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἴπερ ἔσται πόλις, οὐ μὴν οὐδʼ ὑπαρχόντων τούτων ἁπάντων ἤδη πόλις, ἀλλʼ ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία4 καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γένεσι, ζωῆς τελείας χάριν καὶ αὐτάρκους. οὐκ ἔσται μέντοι τοῦτο μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἕνα κατοικούντων τόπον καὶ χρωμένων ἐπιγαμίαις. διὸ κηδεῖαί τʼ ἐγένοντο κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ φατρίαι καὶ θυσίαι καὶ διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν. τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον φιλίας ἔργον· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ συζῆν προαίρεσις φιλία. τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους,

​But offices are different for each of them, and the ones do not care what sort of character the others should have, nor how no one under the treaties will be unjust or have any wickedness, but only how they will not wrong one another. But all who care for good order examine political virtue and vice. Whence it is also manifest that a city truly so called, and not merely for the sake of speech, must be concerned with virtue. For otherwise the association becomes an alliance, differing only in place from other alliances of those who are far away. And the law becomes a treaty and, as the sophist Lycophron said, a guarantor of rights to one another, but not such as to make the citizens good and just. And that this is the case is manifest. For if one were even to bring the sites together into one, so that the city of the Megarians and that of the Corinthians touched with their walls, yet it is not one city; nor if they made intermarriage with one another, although this is one of the associations characteristic of cities. Similarly, if some were to dwell apart, yet not so far away as not to associate, but they had laws against wronging one another in their exchanges—for example, if one were a carpenter, another a farmer, another a shoemaker, and another some other such thing, and they were ten thousand in number, yet they associated in nothing else than such things as exchange and alliance, not even so would there yet be a city. For what cause, indeed? Surely not because of the lack of proximity of association. For even if they came together while associating in this way (each, however, using his own household as if it were a city) and helping one another against those who wrong them only, as if there were a defensive alliance, not even so would it seem to be a city to those who examine the matter accurately, if indeed they associated similarly when coming together as when apart. It is manifest, therefore, that the city is not an association in a place, nor for the sake of not wronging one another and of exchange; though these things must necessarily exist if there is to be a city, yet not even when all these exist is it yet a city, but it is the association in living well, both of households and of families, for the sake of a complete and self-sufficient life. This, however, will not be possible unless they inhabit the same and single place and use intermarriage. Which is why marriage connections arose in cities, and phratries, and sacrifices, and pastimes of living together. And this sort of thing is the work of friendship; for the choice of living together is friendship. Therefore, the end of the city is living well, and these things are for the sake of the end. And a city is the association of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life,

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 1280b1τοῦ ποίους τινὰς εἶναι δεῖ

    The genitive articular infinitive clause functions as the object of the verb φροντίζουσιν (to care for), describing the moral character of the citizens. It highlights the failure of mere alliances to show concern for the virtue of their members.

  2. 1280b8τῇ γʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀνομαζομένῃ πόλει

    A dative of reference governed by the impersonal construction δεῖ ... ἐπιμελὲς εἶναι (it is necessary to care for). It signifies: 'for the city truly so called, there must be a care for virtue.'

  3. 1280b18τοῦ μὴ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀδικεῖν

    An articular infinitive clause in the genitive modifying the noun νόμοι, serving as a genitive of purpose or apposition: 'laws for the purpose of not wronging one another.'

  4. 1280b32ἡ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν κοινωνία

    The genitive articular infinitive τοῦ εὖ ζῆν (living well) modifies the noun κοινωνία (association), directly expressing the Aristotelian definition of a city's essence: 'the association for the sake of living well.'

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:3.1280b