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Politics

§3.1281b

Collective Wisdom of the Many and the Objection from Expertise

Aristotle argues for 'collective wisdom,' showing how a multitude can judge better as a whole than the best few individually, which justifies giving them sovereign power over elections and audits; however, he immediately introduces a challenge to this view based on the analogy of the specialized doctor.

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§3.1281b

ὅμως ἐνδέχεται συνελθόντας εἶναι βελτίους ἐκείνων, οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστον ἀλλʼ ὡς σύμπαντας, οἷον τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα τῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων·1 πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων2 ἕκαστον μόριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας ὥσπερ ἕνα ἄνθρωπον τὸ πλῆθος, πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντʼ αἰσθήσεις, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ καὶ κρίνουσιν ἄμεινον οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ τῆς μουσικῆς ἔργα καὶ τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν· ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μόριον, πάντα δὲ πάντες. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρουσιν οἱ σπουδαῖοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἑκάστου τῶν πολλῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοὺς καλούς φασι, καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀληθινῶν, τῷ συνῆχθαι3 τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρὶς εἰς ἕν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε4 κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τουδὶ μὲν τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἑτέρου δέ τινος ἕτερον μόριον. εἰ μὲν οὖν περὶ πάντα δῆμον καὶ περὶ πᾶν πλῆθος ἐνδέχεται ταύτην εἶναι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πολλῶν πρὸς τοὺς ὀλίγους σπουδαίους, ἄδηλον, ἴσως δὲ νὴ Δία δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἂν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἁρμόσειε λόγος· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ἔνιοι τῶν θηρίων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν;)· ἀλλὰ περὶ τὶ πλῆθος οὐδὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὸ λεχθὲν ἀληθές. διὸ καὶ τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν λύσειεν ἄν τις διὰ τούτων καὶ τὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς,5 τίνων δεῖ κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν. τοιοῦτοι δʼ εἰσὶν ὅσοι μήτε πλούσιοι μήτε ἀξίωμα ἔχουσιν ἀρετῆς μηδὲ ἕν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ μετέχειν αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀρχῶν τῶν μεγίστων οὐκ ἀσφαλές (διά τε γὰρ ἀδικίαν καὶ διʼ ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδικεῖν ἀνάγκη τὰ δʼ ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτούς)· τὸ δὲ μὴ μεταδιδόναι μηδὲ μετέχειν φοβερόν (ὅταν γὰρ ἄτιμοι πολλοὶ καὶ πένητες ὑπάρχωσι, πολεμίων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πλήρη τὴν πόλιν ταύτην). λείπεται δὴ τοῦ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ κρίνειν μετέχειν αὐτούς. διόπερ καὶ Σόλων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τινὲς νομοθετῶν τάττουσιν ἐπί τε τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας καὶ τὰς εὐθύνας τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἄρχειν δὲ κατὰ μόνας οὐκ ἐῶσιν. πάντες μὲν γὰρ ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἱκανὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ μιγνύμενοι τοῖς βελτίοσι τὰς πόλεις ὠφελοῦσιν, καθάπερ ἡ μὴ καθαρὰ τροφὴ μετὰ τῆς καθαρᾶς τὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης·6 χωρὶς δʼ ἕκαστος ἀτελὴς περὶ τὸ κρίνειν ἐστίν. ἔχει δʼ ἡ τάξις αὕτη τῆς πολιτείας ἀπορίαν πρώτην μὲν ὅτι δόξειεν ἂν τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὸ κρῖναι τίς ὀρθῶς ἰάτρευκεν, οὗπερ καὶ τὸ ἰατρεῦσαι καὶ ποιῆσαι ὑγιᾶ τὸν κάμνοντα τῆς νόσου τῆς παρούσης· οὗτος δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ ἰατρός.

​Nevertheless, it is possible that the many, when they come together, are better than those few, not individually but as a whole, just as dinner parties to which many contribute are better than those provided at one person’s expense. For since they are many, each has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they come together, the multitude becomes like a single human being with many feet, many hands, and many senses, and so too regarding their characters and intellect. This is why the many also judge better both the works of music and those of the poets; for some judge one part, and all of them together judge the whole. But excellent men differ from each of the many in this very respect, just as beautiful people are said to differ from those who are not beautiful, and as things painted by art differ from real things, by the fact that what is scattered separately is gathered into one; since, if they are taken separately, the eye of this particular painted figure, or some other part of someone else, might be more beautiful than the painting. Whether, therefore, this difference between the many and the few excellent men can exist in the case of every populace and every multitude is not clear; but, by Zeus, it is clear that in some cases it is impossible (for the same argument would apply even to beasts; and yet, what do some people differ from beasts, so to speak?). Nevertheless, concerning a certain multitude, nothing prevents what has been said from being true. Therefore, by these means, one might resolve both the difficulty mentioned before and the one that follows it: namely, over what things the free people and the multitude of citizens ought to be sovereign. Such are those who are neither wealthy nor have any single evaluation of virtue. For their participating in the greatest offices is not safe (since, because of injustice and folly, they must on the one hand act unjustly and on the other hand make errors); yet to give them no share and not to let them participate is fearsome (for when there are many who are deprived of honor and are poor, this city must necessarily be full of enemies). It remains, then, for them to participate in deliberating and judging. Wherefore, both Solon and some of the other legislators appoint them to the election of magistrates and the audit of the rulers, but do not allow them to rule alone. For all of them, when they come together, have sufficient perception, and by mixing with the better they benefit the cities, just as impure food mixed with pure food makes the whole more useful than the small amount of pure food; but each individual on his own is imperfect regarding judgment. But this arrangement of the constitution has a first difficulty: namely, that it would seem to belong to the same person to judge who has treated a patient correctly as to treat them and make the sick person healthy from the present disease; and this person is the doctor.

Syntax notes6 items
  1. 3.1281bτῶν ἐκ μιᾶς δαπάνης χορηγηθέντων

    Genitive of comparison depending on the comparative adjective βελτίους. The neuter plural noun δείπνων is omitted in contrast with the preceding τὰ συμφορητὰ δεῖπνα, and the participle χορηγηθέντων modifies this omitted noun.

  2. 3.1281bπολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων

    Genitive absolute expressing cause. The logical subject refers to the individual people (πολλοί) who make up the multitude (τὸ πλῆθος), which is the subject of the following main clause.

  3. 3.1281bτῷ συνῆχθαι

    Articular infinitive in the dative case (perfect passive), expressing means or cause ('by the fact that...').

  4. 3.1281bἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε

    κεχωρισμένων [ὄντων] is a genitive absolute expressing condition. The subjects of the main infinitive clause κάλλιον ἔχειν ('to be more beautiful') are τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ('the eye') and ἕτερον μόριον ('another part'), which are compared with the genitive of comparison τοῦ γεγραμμένου ('the painted figure').

  5. 3.1281bτὴν ἐχομένην αὐτῆς

    The participle ἐχομένην is the present middle/passive participle of ἔχομαι ('to border on', 'to follow'), modifying an omitted [ἀπορίαν] in apposition to the preceding τὴν πρότερον εἰρημένην ἀπορίαν. The genitive pronoun αὐτῆς is governed by this participle and refers back to the prior difficulty.

  6. 3.1281bτὴν πᾶσαν ποιεῖ χρησιμωτέραν τῆς ὀλίγης

    The object of ποιεῖ is τὴν πᾶσαν [τροφήν] ('the whole food'), and its object complement is the comparative adjective χρησιμωτέραν. The genitive of comparison τῆς ὀλίγης [καθαρᾶς τροφῆς] refers to 'the small amount of pure food'.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg035.humanitext-grc2:3.1281b