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Physics

§8.5#2

Division of the Self-Mover into Mover and Moved

If the mover is itself moved of necessity, this cannot go on to infinity because the kinds of motion are finite, leading to the necessity of a self-mover or an unmoved mover. Furthermore, a self-mover cannot move itself as a whole, but must be divided into a part that moves and a part that is moved.

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§8.5#2

ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης κινεῖται τὸ κινοῦν, εἰ δὲ μὴ κινοῖτο, οὐκ ἂν κινοίη, ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν, κινεῖται, ἤτοι1 οὕτω κινεῖσθαι ὥς γε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος τῆς κινήσεως, ἢ καθʼ ἕτερον. λέγω δʼ ἤτοι τὸ θερμαῖνον καὶ αὐτὸ θερμαίνεσθαι καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζον ὑγιάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ φέρον φέρεσθαι, ἢ τὸ ὑγιάζον φέρεσθαι, τὸ δὲ φέρον αὐξάνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ φανερὸν ὅτι ἀδύνατον· δεῖ γὰρ μέχρι τῶν ἀτόμων διαιροῦντα λέγειν, οἷον εἴ τι διδάσκει γεωμετρεῖν, τοῦτο διδάσκεσθαι γεωμετρεῖν τὸ αὐτό, ἢ εἰ ῥιπτεῖ, ῥιπτεῖσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῆς ῥίψεως· ἢ οὕτως μὲν μή, ἄλλο δʼ ἐξ ἄλλου γένους, οἷον τὸ φέρον μὲν αὔξανεσθαι, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο αὖξον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ὑπʼ ἄλλου, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ἀλλοιοῦν ἑτέραν τινὰ κινεῖσθαι κίνησιν. ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη στῆναι· πεπερασμέναι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις. τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἀνακάμπτειν καὶ τὸ ἀλλοιοῦν φάναι φέρεσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ποιεῖν ἐστὶ κἂν εἰ εὐθὺς ἔφη τὸ φέρον φέρεσθαι καὶ διδάσκεσθαι τὸ διδάσκον (δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κινεῖται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνωτέρω κινοῦντος τὸ κινούμενον πᾶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ προτέρου τῶν κινούντων. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἀδύνατον· τὸ διδάσκον γὰρ συμβαίνει μανθάνειν, ὧν τὰ μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην2 ἀναγκαῖον. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τούτων ἄλογον, ὅτι συμβαίνει πᾶν τὸ κινητικὸν κινητόν, εἴπερ ἅπαν ὑπὸ κινουμένου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον· ἔσται γὰρ κινητόν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι πᾶν τὸ ὑγιαστικὸν ὑγιαστὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ οἰκοδομητικὸν οἰκοδομητόν, ἢ εὐθὺς ἢ διὰ πλειόνων· λέγω δʼ οἶον εἰ κινητὸν μὲν ὑπʼ ἄλλου πᾶν τὸ κινητικόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ ταύτην τὴν κίνησιν κινητὸν ἣν κινεῖ τὸ πλησίον, ἀλλʼ ἑτέραν, οἷον τὸ ὑγιαστικὸν μαθητικόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐπαναβαῖνον ἥξει3 ποτὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν πρότερον. τὸ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀδύνατον, τὸ δὲ πλασματῶδες· ἄτοπον γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἀλλοιωτικὸν αὐξητὸν εἶναι. οὐκ ἄρα ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον ὑπʼ ἄλλου, καὶ τούτου κινουμένου· στήσεται ἄρα. ὥστε ἤτοι ὑπὸ ἠρεμοῦντος κινήσεται τὸ κινούμενον πρῶτον, ἢ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινήσει. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἴ γε δέοι σκοπεῖν πότερον αἴτιον κινήσεως καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν ἢ τὸ ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινούμενον, ἐκεῖνο πᾶς ἂν θείη· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ὃν ἀεὶ πρότερον αἴτιον τοῦ καθʼ ἕτερον καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. ὥστε τοῦτο σκεπτέον λαβοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀρχήν, εἴ τι κινεῖ αὐτὸ αὐτό, πῶς κινεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ τὸ κινούμενον ἅπαν εἶναι διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά· τοῦτο γὰρ δέδεικται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς καθόλου τοῖς περὶ φύσεως, ὅτι πᾶν τὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ κινούμενον συνεχές. ἀδύνατον δὴ τὸ αὑτὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν πάντῃ κινεῖν αὐτὸ αὐτό· φέροιτο γὰρ ἂν ὅλον καὶ φέροι τὴν αὐτὴν φοράν, ἓν ὂν καὶ ἄτομον τῷ εἴδει, καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ ἀλλοιοῖ, ὥστε διδάσκοι ἂν καὶ μανθάνοι ἅμα, καὶ ὑγιάζοι καὶ ὑγιάζοιτο τὴν αὐτὴν ὑγίειαν. ἔτι διώρισται ὅτι κινεῖται τὸ κινητόν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν δυνάμει κινούμενον, οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει εἰς ἐντελέχειαν βαδίζει, ἔστιν δʼ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής. τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν, οἷον θερμαίνει τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ὅλως γεννᾷ τὸ ἔχον τὸ εἶδος. ὥσθʼ ἅμα τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θερμὸν ἔσται καὶ οὐ θερμόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὅσων τὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸ συνώνυμον.4 τὸ μὲν ἄρα κινεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦντος. ὅτι δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν οὕτως ὥσθʼ ἑκάτερον ὑφ᾿ ἑκατέρου κινεῖσθαι, ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν. οὔτε γὰρ ἔσται πρῶτον κινοῦν οὐδέν, εἴ γε αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινήσει ἑκάτερον (τὸ γὰρ πρότερον αἰτιώτερον τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ ἐχομένου καὶ κινήσει μᾶλλον· διχῶς γὰρ κινεῖν ἦν, τὸ μὲν τὸ ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινούμενον αὐτό, τὸ δʼ αὑτῶ· ἐγγύτερον δὲ τὸ πορρώτερον τοῦ κινουμένου τῆς ἀρχῆς ἢ τὸ μεταξύ)· ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι εἰ μὴ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἄρα ἀντικινεῖ θάτερον. ἔλαβον τοίνυν ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ κινεῖν· ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ μὲν κινούμενον τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἀκίνητον. ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν ἀντικινεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἢ ἀκίνητόν γέ τι κινεῖν ἀνάγκη ἢ αὐτὸ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ κινούμενον, εἴπερ ἀνάγκη ἀεὶ κίνησιν εἶναι. ἔτι ἣν κινεῖ κίνησιν, κινοῖτʼ ἄν, ὥστε τὸ θερμαῖνον θερμαίνεται.

But indeed, if the mover is moved not accidentally but of necessity, and if it were not moved, it would not move, then the mover, since it is moved, must either be moved in such a way that it is according to the same species of motion, or according to another. I mean: either that which heats is itself heated, and that which heals is healed, and that which carries is carried; or that which heals is carried, and that which carries is increased. But it is clear that this is impossible. For one must speak dividing down to the individuals, for example, if something teaches geometry, this same thing is taught geometry, or if it throws, it is thrown in the same manner of throwing. Or if not in this way, but one thing [of one genus] from another genus, for example, that which carries is increased, and that which increases this is altered by another, and that which alters this is moved with some other motion. But it must stop; for the motions are finite. And to turn back again and say that that which alters is carried is to do the same as if one had said straightway that that which carries is carried and that which teaches is taught. (For it is clear that every moved thing is moved also by the higher mover, and more so by the prior of the movers. But indeed this is impossible; for it would turn out that the teacher is learning, of which things it is necessary that the one does not possess knowledge, while the other possesses it.) Moreover, what is even more unreasonable than these things is that it follows that everything capable of causing motion is movable, if indeed everything that is moved is moved by something that is itself moved; for it will be movable, just as if one were to say that everything capable of healing is healable, and that which is capable of building is buildable, either immediately or through several intermediates. I mean, for example, if everything capable of causing motion is movable by another, but not movable with respect to that motion which the adjacent thing moves, but another—for example, that which is capable of healing is capable of learning—but this, when ascending, will eventually arrive at the same species, as we said before. Therefore, the one of these is impossible, and the other is fictitious; for it is absurd that of necessity that which is capable of altering is capable of being increased. Therefore, it is not necessary that that which is moved by another is always moved, and that this [mover] is moved; therefore it will stop. So that either the first moved thing will be moved by something which is at rest, or it will move itself. But indeed, if we had to consider which is the cause and starting-point of motion, that which moves itself or that which is moved by another, everyone would place the former; for that which is cause in virtue of itself is always prior to that which is cause in virtue of another and is itself [a cause]. So we must consider this, taking another starting-point, if something moves itself, how it moves and in what manner. Indeed, everything that is moved must be divisible into parts that are always divisible; for this has been shown before in the general treatises on nature, that everything that is moved in virtue of itself is continuous. It is impossible, then, for that which moves itself to move itself in its entirety; for it would be carried as a whole and would cause the same locomotion, being one and indivisible in species, and it would be altered and cause alteration, so that it would teach and learn at the same time, and heal and be healed with respect to the same health. Furthermore, it has been determined that the movable is moved; and this is potentially moved, not in actuality, and that which is potential proceeds to actuality, and motion is the incomplete actuality of the movable. But that which moves is already in actuality, for example, the hot heats and, in general, that which possesses the form generates. So that at the same time the same thing in the same respect will be hot and not hot. And similarly for each of the other cases, where it is necessary for the mover to possess the synonymous. Therefore, one part moves and the other is moved in that which moves itself. But that it is not possible for a self-mover to move itself in such a way that each part is moved by the other is clear from the following. For there will be no first mover, if indeed each moves the other (for that which is prior is more causal of the being-moved than that which follows, and will cause motion more; for there were two ways of moving: the one by that which is itself moved by another, and the other by itself; and that which is further from the moved is closer to the starting-point than the intermediate); furthermore, there is no necessity for the mover to be moved unless by itself; therefore, the other part moves it in return accidentally. I have assumed, then, that it is possible for it not to move; therefore, there is one part moved and the other mover unmoved. Furthermore, there is no necessity for the mover to be moved in return, but it is necessary either that some unmoved thing moves, or that which is itself moved by itself, if indeed it is necessary that motion always exist. Furthermore, it would be moved with the motion which it causes, so that that which heats would be heated.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 256b30ἀνάγκη τὸ κινοῦν, κινεῖται, ἤτοι

    The structure around κινεῖται can be interpreted either by supplying a relative pronoun ὅ before it (defining 'the mover which is moved') or as an elliptical conditional clause (if it is moved). Based on the immediate context of 'not accidentally but of necessity,' it is best understood as a restrictive relative clause referring to 'the mover that is itself being moved.'

  2. 257a14ὧν τὰ μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τὸ δὲ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην

    The relative pronoun ὧν is a genitive plural referring to teaching and learning (or the teacher and the learner). The accusatives τὰ μὲν ... τὸ δὲ ... serve as the subjects of the infinitive ἔχειν, forming a double accusative-and-infinitive construction governed by ἀναγκαῖον, meaning 'it is necessary that one of them [the learner] does not possess knowledge, while the other [the teacher] possesses it.'

  3. 257a20ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐπαναβαῖνον ἥξει

    The present participle ἐπαναβαῖνον is used circumstantially to denote condition ('if it ascends/goes upwards'). Even if the chain of movers switches to different species of motion, since the total number of species of motion is finite, by tracing upwards (ἐπαναβαῖνον) one will inevitably return to the same species of motion at some point.

  4. 257b12ὅσων τὸ κινοῦν ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸ συνώνυμον

    The genitive relative pronoun ὅσων modifies the preceding 'each of the others' (τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον). With an implied infinitive (e.g. εἶναι) after ἀνάγκη, the phrase means 'in the case of all those other things where it is necessary for the mover to possess the synonymous [property].' This refers to the Aristotelian physical principle that a mover must already actually possess the form it transmits to the moved.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-11-04)
  • 2026-11-04 Curator — source 2
  • 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:8.5#2