- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:8.5#1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
The author presents two ways in which the first mover causes motion (either directly or through mediators), arguing from the finiteness of instrumental motion that there must be a self-mover and ultimately an unmoved mover.
Τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ οὐ δʼ αὐτὸ1 τὸ κινοῦν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἕτερον ὃ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν, ἢ διʼ αὐτό, καὶ τοῦτο ἢ πρῶτον μετὰ τὸ ἔσχατον ἢ διὰ πλειόνων, οἶον ἡ βακτηρία κινεῖ τὸν λίθον καὶ κινεῖται ὑπὸ τῆς χειρὸς κινουμένης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὗτος δʼ οὐκέτι τῷ ὑπʼ ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι. ἄμφω δὴ κινεῖν φαμέν, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν κινούντῶν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ πρῶτον· ἐκεῖνο γὰρ κινεῖ τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον, καὶ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου τὸ τελευταῖον οὐ κινήσει, ἐκεῖνο δʼ ἄνευ τούτου, οἶον ἡ βακτηρία οὐ κινήσει μὴ κινοῦντος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. εἰ δὴ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινός τε κινεῖσθαι, καὶ ἢ ὑπὸ κινουμένου ὑπʼ ἄλλου ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπʼ ἄλλου, ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι κινοῦν ὃ οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου πρῶτον, εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη θάτερον2 (ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι τὸ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον ὑπʼ ἄλλου αὐτό· τῶν γὰρ ἀπείρων οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν πρῶτον—εἰ οὖν ἅπαν μὲν τὸ κινούμενον ὑπό τινος κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον κινοῦν κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου δέ, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ κινεῖσθαι. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδε τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον ἔστιν ἐπελθεῖν. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν τίτε κινεῖ καὶ τινί. ἢ γὰρ αὐτῷ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν ἢ ἄλλῳ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ τῇ βακτηρίᾳ, καὶ ὁ ἄνεμος κατέβαλεν ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ ὁ λίθος ὃν ἔωσεν. ἀδύνατον δὲ κινεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ κινοῦντος τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ·3 ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν αὐτὸ αὐτῷ κινεῖ, οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἄλλο εἶναι ᾧ κινεῖ, ἂν δὲ ᾖ ἕτερον τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἔστιν τι ὃ κινήσει οὐ τινὶ ἀλλʼ αὐτῷ, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν. εἰ οὖν κινούμενόν τι κινεῖ, ἀνάγκη στῆναι καὶ μὴ εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι· εἰ γὰρ ἡ βακτηρία κινεῖ τῷ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς χειρός, ἡ χεὶρ κινεῖ τὴν βακτηρίαν· εἰ δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ ἄλλο κινεῖ, καὶ ταύτην ἕτερόν τι τὸ κινοῦν. ὅταν δή τινι κινῇ ἀεὶ ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη εἶναι πρότερον τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ κινοῦν. εἰ οὖν κινεῖται μὲν τοῦτο, μὴ ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κινοῦν αὐτό, ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν· ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἤτοι εὐθὺς τὸ κινούμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ αὐτὸ κινοῦντος κινεῖται, ἢ ἔρχεταί ποτε εἰς τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ὧδε σκοποῦσι ταὐτὰ συμβήσεται ταῦτα, εἰ γὰρ ὑπὸ κινουμένου κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον πᾶν, ἤτοι τοῦτο ὑπάρχει τοῖς πράγμασιν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥστε κινεῖν μὲν κινούμενον, οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτό, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτό. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινοῦν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δῆλον ὡς ἐνδέχεταί ποτε μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων· οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλʼ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. ἐὰν οὖν θῶμεν τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβήσεται, ψεῦδος δʼ ἴσως. ἀλλὰ τὸ κίνησιν μὴ εἶναι ἀδύνατον· δέδεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἀνάγκη κίνησιν ἀεὶ εἶναι. καὶ εὐλόγως δὲ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. τρία γὰρ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τό τε κινούμενον καὶ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ. τὸ μὲν οὖν κινούμενον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, κινεῖν δʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη· τὸ δʼ ᾧ κινεῖ, καὶ κινεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι (συμμεταβάλλει γὰρ τοῦτο ἃμα καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ κινουμένῳ ὄν· δῆλον δʼ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τόπον κινούντων· ἄπτεσθαι γὰρ ἀλλήλων ἀνάγκη μέχρι τινός)· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οῦτως ὥστʼ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκίνητον.4 ἐπεὶ δʼ ὁρῶμεν τὸ ἔσχατον, ὃ κινεῖσθαι μὲν δύναται, κινήσεως δʼ ἀρχὴν οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ὃ κινεῖται μέν, οὐχ ὑπʼ ἄλλου δὲ ἀλλʼ ὑφʼ αὑτοῦ, εὔλογον, ἵνα μὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἴπωμεν, καὶ τὸ τρίτον εἶναι ὃ κινεῖ ἀκίνητον ὄν. διὸ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὀρθῶς λέγει, τὸν νοῦν ἀπαθῆ φάσκων καὶ ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ἐπειδή γε κινήσεως ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι ποιεῖ· οὕτω γὰρ μόνως ἂν κινοίη ἀκίνητος ὢν καὶ κρατοίη ἀμιγὴς ὤν.
This happens in two ways: for either it is not through itself that the mover moves, but through something else which moves the mover, or it is through itself; and this latter either immediately after the last or through several mediators, for example, the staff moves the stone and is moved by the hand which is moved by the man, and this last no longer by being moved by something else. We say indeed that both move, both the last and the first of the movers, but rather the first; for that moves the last, but not this the first, and without the first the last will not move, but that without this, for example, the staff will not move unless the man moves it. If, then, it is necessary that everything that is moved is moved by something, and either by something moved by another or not, and if indeed by another, there must be some first mover which is not moved by another, but if the first is such, the other is not necessary (for it is impossible for the mover and that which is itself moved by another to go on to infinity; for of infinite things there is no first—if, therefore, everything that is moved is moved by something, and the first mover is moved indeed, but not by another, it must be moved by itself). Furthermore, one can also approach this same argument in the following way. For everything that moves moves something and with something. For either the mover moves by itself or by something else, for example, a man either himself or with the staff, and the wind threw down something either itself or the stone which it pushed. But it is impossible for that with which it moves to move without that which moves by itself; and if indeed it moves by itself, there is no necessity for there to be another thing with which it moves; but if there is another thing with which it moves, there is something which will move not with something but by itself, or else it will go to infinity. If, therefore, something moves while being moved, it must stop and not go to infinity; for if the staff moves by being moved by the hand, the hand moves the staff; and if indeed some other thing moves this too, there is some other thing moving this as well. Whenever, then, one thing always moves with something, there must be prior to it that which moves by itself. If, then, this is indeed moved, but there is no other thing moving it, it must move itself; so that also according to this argument either that which is moved is immediately moved by that which moves itself, or it eventually arrives at something of this sort. In addition to what has been said, to those who consider it in the following way, these same results will follow. For if every moved thing is moved by something which is itself moved, either this belongs to things accidentally, so that it moves while being moved, yet not because of its being itself moved, or not, but essentially. First, then, if it is accidentally, it is not necessary for the mover to be moved. And if this is so, it is clear that it is possible for nothing among beings to be moved at some time; for the accidental is not necessary, but is capable of not being. If, then, we assume that which is possible to be the case, nothing impossible will follow, though perhaps something false will. But for there to be no motion is impossible; for it has been shown before that it is necessary for motion to exist always. And this has happened reasonably. For there must be three things: that which is moved, the mover, and that with which it moves. Now that which is moved must be moved, but it is not necessary for it to move other things; while that with which it moves must both move and be moved (for this changes along with it, being at the same time and in the same respect as the moved; and this is clear in the case of things moving in place, for they must touch each other up to a certain point); and the mover in such a way that it is not that with which it moves, must be unmoved. And since we see the last, which is capable of being moved but does not have a starting-point of motion, and that which is moved indeed, but not by another but by itself, it is reasonable, if we do not say “necessary”, that there is also the third, which moves while being unmoved. Therefore Anaxagoras also speaks correctly when he says that Intellect is impassive and unmixed, since indeed he makes it a starting-point of motion; for only in this way could it cause motion while being unmoved, and rule while being unmixed.
- 256a5Τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ οὐ δʼ αὐτὸ τὸ κινοῦν, ἀλλὰ διʼ ἕτερον ὃ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν, ἢ διʼ αυτό...
This explains two ways in which a mover (τὸ κινοῦν) causes motion: either not through itself but through another thing that moves the mover (διʼ ἕτερον ὃ κινεῖ τὸ κινοῦν), or through itself (διʼ αὑτό), which latter is further subdivided into moving immediately or through several mediators.
- 256a15εἰ δὲ τοιοῦτο τὸ πῶτον, οὐκ ἀνάγκη θάτερον
An elliptical expression meaning that if the first mover is of such a kind (i.e., not moved by another, τοιοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον), 'the other' (θάτερον), namely the infinite regress of movers moved by others, is not necessary. It marks a logical consequence of the previous dilemma.
- 256a25ἀδύνατον δὲ κινεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ κινοῦντος τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ
The preposition ἄνευ governs the genitive participial phrase τοῦ αὐτὸ αὑτῷ κινοῦντος ('that which moves by itself'), while the accusative phrase τὸ ᾧ κινεῖ ('the instrument with which it moves') acts as the subject of the infinitive κινεῖν. The word order is inverted and requires careful parsing.
- 256b15τὸ δὲ κινοῦν οὕτως ὥστʼ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ κινεῖ, ἀκίνητον
The subject is τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ('the mover'), modified by the clause οὕτως ὥστʼ εἶναι μὴ ᾧ κινεῖ ('in such a way that it is not that with which it moves'). The predicate adjective ἀκίνητον ('unmoved') implicitly requires the ellipsis of an expression of necessity like ἀνάγκη εἶναι ('must be').
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (4, latest 2026-11-04)
- 2026-11-04 Curator — source 2
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
