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§8.4#2

Causes of Natural Motion and the External Mover

Sorting out the two meanings of 'potentially', this section clarifies the causes of light and heavy things moving to their proper places (either by the generator or by the remover of obstacles), concluding that all things in motion are moved by something.

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§8.4#2

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνάμει πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τοῦτʼ αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ φανερὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ τίνος τὰ τοιαῦτα κινεῖται, οἶον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω καὶ ἡ γῆ κάτω. ἔστι δὲ δυνάμει ἄλλως ὁ μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων καὶ ὁ ἔχων ἤδη καὶ μὴ ἐνεργῶν. ἀεὶ δʼ, ὅταν ἅμα τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικὸν ὦσιν, γίγνεται ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δυνατόν, οἶον τὸ μανθάνον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος ἕτερον γίγνεται δυνάμει1 (ὁ γὰρ ἔχων ἐπιστήμην μὴ θεωρῶν δὲ δυνάμει ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμων πως, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὡς καὶ πρὶν. μαθεῖν), ὅταν δʼ οὕτως ἔχῃ, ἐάν τι μὴ κωλύῃ, ἐνεργεῖ καὶ θεωρεῖ, ἢ ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει2 καὶ ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ ταῦτʼ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φυσικῶν· τὸ γὰρ ψυχρὸν δυνάμει θερμόν, ὅταν δὲ μεταβαίη, ἤδη πῦρ, καίει δέ, ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ καὶ ἐμποδίζῃ. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὸ βαρὺ καὶ κοῦφον· τὸ γὰρ κοῦφον γίγνεται ἐκ βαρέος, οἷον ἐξ ὕδατος ἀήρ (τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμει πρῶτον,3 καὶ ἤδη κοῦφον, καὶ ἐνεργήσει γʼ εὐθύς, ἂν μή τι κωλύῃ. ἐνέργεια δὲ τοῦ κούφου τὸ ποὺ εἶναι καὶ ἄνω, κωλύεται δʼ, ὅταν ἐν τῷ ἐναντίῳ τόπῳ ᾖ. καὶ τοῦθʼ ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ. καίτοι τοῦτο ζητεῖται, διὰ τί ποτε κινεῖται εἰς τὸν αὑτῶν τόπον τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὰ βαρέα. αἴτιον δʼ ὅτι πέφυκέν ποι, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὸ κούφῳ καὶ βαρεῖ εἶναι,4 τὸ μὲν τῷ ἄνω τὸ δὲ τῷ κάτω διωρισμένον. δυνάμει δʼ ἐστὶν κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ πολλαχῶς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· ὅταν τε γὰρ ὕδωρ, δυνάμει γέ πώς ἐστι κοῦφον, καὶ ὅταν ἀήρ, ἔστιν ὡς ἔτι δυνάμει (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἐμποδιζόμενον μὴ ἄνω εἶναι)· ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἀφαιρεθῇ τὸ ἐμποδίζον, ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἀεὶ ἀνωτέρω γίγνεται. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποιὸν εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ εἶναι μεταβάλλει· εὐθὺς γὰρ θεωρεῖ τὸ ἐπιστῆμον, ἐὰν μή τι κωλύῃ· καὶ τὸ ποσὸν ἐκτείνεται, ἐὰν μή τι κωλύῃ. ὁ δὲ τὸ ὑφιστάμενον καὶ κωλῦον κινήσας5 ἔστιν ὡς κινεῖ ἔστι δʼ ὡς οὔ, οἷον ὁ τὸν κίονα ὑποσπάσας ἢ ὁ τὸν λίθον ἀφελὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀσκοῦ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γὰρ κινεῖ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ ἀνακλασθεῖσα σφαῖρα οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ τοίχου ἐκινήθη ἀλλʼ ὑπὸ τοῦ βάλλοντος. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐδὲν τούτων αὐτὸ κινεῖ ἑαυτό, δῆλον· ἀλλὰ κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχει, οὐ τοῦ κινεῖν οὐδὲ τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ πάσχειν. εἰ δὴ πάντα τὰ κινούμενα ἢ φύσει κινεῖται ἢ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ βίᾳ, καὶ τά τε βίᾳ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν πάντα ὑπό τινος καὶ ὑπʼ ἄλλου, τῶν δὲ φύσει πάλιν τά θʼ ὑφ’ αὑτῶν κινούμενα ὑπό τινος κινεῖται καὶ τὰ μὴ ὑφʼ αὑτῶν, οἷον τὰ κοῦφα καὶ τὰ βαρέα (ἢ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος6 καὶ ποιήσαντος κοῦφον ἢ βαρύ, ἢ ὑπὸ τοῦ τὰ ἐμποδίζοντα καὶ κωλύοντα λύσαντος), ἅπαντα ἂν τὰ κινούμενα ὑπό τινος κινοῖτο.

Since ‘potentially’ is said in many ways, this is the cause of its not being obvious by what such things are moved, e.g., fire upward and earth downward. A learner is potentially a knower in one way, and one who already possesses [knowledge] but does not actualize it is so in another. And always, when the active and the passive are together, the potential becomes actual, as that which is learning, from being potentially [a knower] in one way, becomes potentially [a knower] in another way (for one who has knowledge but is not contemplating is potentially a knower in a way, but not in the same way as before learning); and when it is in this state, unless something prevents, it actualizes and contemplates, or else it will be in the contradictory state and in ignorance. Similarly this holds also in the case of physical things; for what is cold is potentially hot, but when it changes, it is already fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and hinders. And similarly it holds also concerning the heavy and the light; for the light comes to be from the heavy, e.g., air from water (for this is potentially first, and already light, and it will actualize immediately, unless something prevents). The actuality of the light is to be somewhere and upward, but it is prevented when it is in the opposite place. And this holds similarly also in the case of quantity and quality. And yet this is inquired, why on earth light and heavy things move to their own places. And the cause is that they are by nature [to go] somewhere, and this is what it is to be light and heavy: the one defined by the upward, the other by the downward. But ‘potentially’ light and heavy are said in many ways, as has been said; for when it is water, it is potentially light in a way, and when it is air, it is in a way still potentially [light] (for it is possible, when hindered, not to be upward); but if the hindering thing is removed, it actualizes and always becomes higher. And similarly also quality changes into being in actuality; for the knower immediately contemplates, unless something prevents; and quantity extends itself, unless something prevents. And he who has moved that which supports and prevents moves [the thing] in one way, and in another way not; for instance, one who has pulled out a pillar or one who has taken away the stone from the bladder in the water; for he moves it accidentally, just as also the rebounded ball was moved not by the wall but by the thrower. That, therefore, none of these moves itself is clear; but it has a starting-point of motion, not of causing motion nor of acting, but of being acted upon. If, then, all things that are moved are moved either by nature or contrary to nature and by force, and all those by force and contrary to nature are moved by something and by another, and of those by nature again, both those moved by themselves are moved by something and those not by themselves, such as light and heavy things (for they are moved either by that which generated them and made them light or heavy, or by that which released the obstacles and hindrances), then all things that are moved would be moved by something.

Syntax notes6 items
  1. 255b1ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος ἕτερον γίγνεται δυνάμει

    Demonstrates the distinction between the two stages of 'potentiality' (dynamis) in Aristotle. It refers to the transition from the first potentiality (a state before learning, capable of acquiring knowledge) to the second potentiality (a state of possessing knowledge but not actively contemplating).

  2. 255b1ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἀντιφάσει

    Contrasted with the preceding theōreî (contemplating), this refers to a state where knowledge is not actualized. Although translated as 'contradiction,' here it means remaining in a state of privation (or a contradictory state) where potential knowledge is not actualized.

  3. 255b5τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμει πρῶτον

    prôton is interpreted adverbially as 'at first' or 'in the first stage.' It indicates that in the process of air coming to be from water, water is at first the 'potentially light thing' in the first stage.

  4. 255b13τὸ κούφῳ καὶ βαρεῖ εἶναι

    The construction tò + [dative] + eînai means 'to be light and heavy' (the essence of being light and heavy). This is a characteristic Aristotelian expression indicating essential definition.

  5. 255b20ὁ δὲ τὸ ὑφιστάμενον καὶ κωλῦον κινήσας

    The participle phrase with the article functions as the subject of the main clause, with the following éstin hōs kineî éstin d' hōs oú serving as its predicate. It explains the indirect cause that produces motion 'accidentally' (kata symbebekos).

  6. 255b35ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννήσαντος

    Preposition hypó with genitive participle indicating the agent. In natural upward and downward motion, the generator is regarded as the primary mover (active cause) in the sense that it actualized the property of the thing.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (7, latest 2026-09-22)
  • 2026-09-22 AI review — source 3
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — source 3
  • 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:8.4#2