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Physics

§5.3

Definitions of Seven Spatial and Temporal Relations

In this chunk, Aristotle defines key spatial and temporal relations: "at the same time", "apart", "touching", "between", "in succession", "contiguous", and "continuous", clarifying their definitions and logical priority.

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§5.3

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν τί ἐστιν τὸ ἅμα καὶ χωρίς, καὶ τί τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ τί τὸ μεταξὺ καὶ τί τὸ ἐφεξῆς καὶ τί τὸ ἐχόμενον καὶ συνεχές, καὶ τοῖς ποίοις ἕκαστον τούτων ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. ἅμα μὲν οὖν λέγω ταῦτʼ εἶναι κατὰ τόπον, ὅσα ἐν ἑνὶ τόπῳ ἐστὶ πρώτῳ. χωρὶς δὲ ὅσα ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἅπτεσθαι δὲ ὧν τὰ ἄκρα ἅμα. | ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα μεταβολὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις, τὰ δʼ ἀντικείμενα τά τε ἐναντία καὶ τὰ κατὰ ἀντίφασιν, ἀντιφάσεως δʼ οὐδὲν ἀνὰ μέσου, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἔσται τὸ μεταξύ. ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τρισίν· ἔσχατον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῆς μεταβολῆς τὸ ἐναντίον,| μεταξὺ δὲ εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον μεταβάλλει κατὰ φύσιν συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον.1 | συνεχῶς δὲ κινεῖται τὸ μηθὲν ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον διαλεῖπον τοῦ πράγματος—μὴ τοῦ χρόνου (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαλείποντα, καὶ εὐθὺς δὲ μετὰ τὴν ὑπάτην φθέγξασθαι τὴν νεάτην) ἀλλὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἐν ὧ κινεῖται. τοῦτο δὲ ἔν τε ταῖς κατὰ τόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μεταβολαῖς φανερόν. ἐναντίον δὲ κατὰ τόπον τὸ κατʼ εὐθεῖαν ἀπέχον πλεῖστον· ἡ γὰρ ἐλαχίστη πεπέρανται, μέτρον δὲ τὸ πεπερασμένον. ἐφεξῆς δὲ οὗ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὄντος ἢ θέσει ἢ εἴδει ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ οὕτως ἀφορισθέντος μηδὲν μεταξύ ἐστι τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει καὶ οὗ ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν (λέγω δʼ οἶον γραμμὴ γραμμῆς ἢ γραμμαί, ἢ μονάδος μονὰς ἢ μονάδες, ἢ οἰκίας οἰκία· ἄλλο δʼ οὐδὲν κωλύει μεταξὺ εἶναι). τὸ γὰρ ἐφεξῆς τινὶ ἐφεξῆς καὶ ὕστερόν τι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἓν ἐφεξῆς τοῖν δυοῖν, οὐδʼ ἡ νουμηνία τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἐφεξῆς, ἀλλὰ ταῦτʼ ἐκείνοις. ἐχόμενον δὲ ὃ ἂν ἐφεξῆς ὂν ἅπτηται. τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ἔστι μὲν ὅπερ ἐχόμενόν τι, λέγω δʼ εἶναι συνεχὲς ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκατέρου πέρας οἶς ἅπτονται, καὶ ὥσπερ σημαίνει τοὔνομα, συνέχηται. τοῦτο δʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἶναι τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν.2 τούτου δὲ διωρισμένου φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τὸ συνεχές, ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι κατὰ τὴν σύναψιν. καὶ ὥς ποτε γίγνεται τὸ συνέχον ἕν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἔσται ἔν, οἷον ἢ γόμφῳ ἢ κόλλῃ ἢ ἁφῇ ἢ προσφύσει. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πρῶτον τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἐστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁπτόμενον ἐφεξῆς ἀνάγκη εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ἐφεξῆς οὐ πᾶν ἅπτεσθαι (διὸ καὶ ἐν προτέροις τῷ λόγῳ3 τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἔστιν, οἷον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς, ἁφὴ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν), καὶ εἰ μὲν συνεχές, ἀνάγκη ἅπτεσθαι, εἰ δʼ ἅπτεται, οὔπω συνεχές· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἓν εἶναι αὐτῶν τὰ ἄκρα, εἰ ἅμα εἶεν· ἀλλʼ εἰ ἕν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἅμα. ὥστε ἡ σύμφυσις ὑστάτη κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἅψασθαι εἰ συμφύσεται τὰ ἄκρα, τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα οὐ πάντα συμπέφυκεν· ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἁφή, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ σύμφυσις ἐν τούτοις. ὥστʼ εἰ ἔστι στιγμὴ καὶ μονὰς οἵας λέγουσι κεχαωρισμένας, οὐχ οἶόν τε εἶναι μονάδα καὶ στιγμὴν τὸ αὐτό· ταῖς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ μονάσιν τὸ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐνδέχεται εἶναί τι μεταξύ (πᾶσα γὰρ γραμμὴ μεταξὺ στιγμῶν), τῶν δʼ οὐκ ἀνάγκη· οὐδὲ γὰρ μεταξὺ δυάδος καὶ μονάδος. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ ἅμα καὶ χωρίς, καὶ τί τὸ ἅπτεσθαι, καὶ τί τὸ μεταξὺ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς, καὶ τί τὸ ἐχόμενον καὶ τὸ συνεχές, καὶ τοῖς ποίοις ἕκαστον τούτων ὑπάρχει, εἴρηται.

​After this let us state what is “at the same time” and “apart”, and what is “touching”, and what is “between” and what is “in succession” and what is “contiguous” and “continuous”, and to what kind of things each of these is by nature adapted to belong. Now I say that those things are “at the same time” in respect of place which are in one primary place; and “apart” which are in different places; and “touching” whose extremities are at the same time. But since every change is between opposites, and opposites are contraries and contradictories, and there is nothing between contradictories, it is clear that the “between” will be among contraries. The “between” is, at least, in three things. For the contrary is the extremity of change, and “between” is that into which the changing thing is by nature adapted to arrive before it changes into the extremity, when changing continuously according to nature. And a thing is moved “continuously” when it leaves no gap, or the least possible, in the thing itself—not in time (for nothing prevents leaving a gap in time, and sounding the highest note immediately after the lowest) but in the thing in which it is moved. This is clear both in changes in respect of place and in other changes. And “contrary” in respect of place is that which is most distant in a straight line; for the shortest line is limited, and that which is limited is a measure. And “in succession” is that which, being after the beginning either in position or in species or in some other way thus determined, has nothing of the same genus between itself and that which it is in succession to (I mean, for instance, a line after a line or lines, a unit after a unit or units, or a house after a house; but nothing prevents something of another kind from being between). For that which is in succession to something is in succession to it and is something posterior; for “one” is not in succession to “two”, nor is the first of the month in succession to the second, but the latter to the former. And “contiguous” is that which, being in succession, touches. And the “continuous” is indeed a certain species of the contiguous, but I call it “continuous” when the extremity of each of the two things becomes the same and one at the point where they touch, and, just as the name signifies, they are held together. And this is not possible when the extremities are two. This being defined, it is clear that the continuous is among those things from which some one thing is by nature adapted to come to be by their union. And in whatever way that which holds them together becomes one, in that way also the whole will be one, for instance, either by a peg, or by glue, or by contact, or by organic union. And it is also clear that “in succession” is primary. For that which touches must be in succession, but not everything which is in succession touches (wherefore “in succession” is also in things prior in definition, as in numbers, while touching is not); and if a thing is continuous, it must touch, but if it touches, it is not yet continuous; for it is not necessary that their extremities should be one if they are at the same time; but if they are one, they must also be at the same time. Consequently, organic union is the last in respect of coming to be; for the extremities must touch if they are to unite organically, but things which touch are not all united organically; and in those things in which there is no touching, it is clear that there is also no organic union among them. So if there are points and units as they say, existing separately, it is not possible for a unit and a point to be the same; for touching belongs to points, but to units succession, and in the case of points there can be something between them (for every line is between points), but in the case of units it is not necessary; for there is nothing between a dyad and a unit. What, then, is “at the same time” and “apart”, and what is “touching”, and what is “between” and “in succession”, and what is “contiguous” and “continuous”, and to what kind of things each of these belongs, has been stated.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 226b26μεταξὺ δὲ εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρότερον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον μεταβάλλει κατὰ φύσιν συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον.

    The two relative clauses starting with εἰς ὃ are compared by πρότερον ... ἢ ("prior to / before"). The structure is: "that into which the changing thing (τὸ μεταβάλλον) is naturally adapted to arrive prior to (πρότερον ἢ) that into which it changes in the end (εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον μεταβάλλει)". The participle συνεχῶς μεταβάλλον agrees with the subject τὸ μεταβάλλον, expressing the condition or manner of the change.

  2. 227a10τοῦτο δʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἶναι τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν.

    δυοῖν ὄντοιν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν is a genitive absolute construction expressing a condition: "if/while the two extremities remain two". τοῦτο ("being continuous") is the subject of the infinitive εἶναι.

  3. 227a20ἐν προτέροις τῷ λόγῳ

    The dative τῷ λόγῳ expresses the respect or criterion, meaning "in definition" or "conceptually". Thus the phrase means "in those things which are prior in definition". Numbers, being prior in definition to physical or spatial relations like touching, possess succession but not contact.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (6, latest 2026-09-22)
  • 2026-09-22 AI review — source 2
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — source 2
  • 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 2
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:5.3