- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:5.2#2
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
Following the proof of the impossibility of the change of change, the text reaffirms that there is no motion in the categories of substance, relation, and action/passion, thereby restricting motion to quality (alteration), quantity (growth/decay), and place (locomotion). It also classifies three types of the unmoved and defines 'rest' in its strict sense.
ἅμα δὲ πῶς καὶ ἔσται;1 οὐ γὰρ ἔσται μάθησις ἡ τῆς μαθήσεως γένεσις,2 ὥστʼ οὐδὲ γενέσεως γένεσις, οὐδέ τις τινός. ἔτι εἰ τρία εἴδη κινήσεώς ἔστιν, τούτων τινὰ ἀνάγκη εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν καὶ εἰς ἃ κινοῦνται, οἷον τὴν φορὰν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι ἢ φέρεσθαι. ὅλως δὲ ἐπεὶ κινεῖται πᾶν τριχῶς, ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἢ τῷ μέρος τι ἢ καθʼ αὑτό, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μόνον ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο μεταβάλλειν τὴν μεταβολήν, οἷον εἰ ὁ ὑγιαζόμενος τρέχοι ἢ μανθάνοι· τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀφεῖμεν πάλαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε οὐσίας οὔτε τοῦ πρός τι οὔτε τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, λείπεται κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποὺ κίνησιν εἶναι μόνον· ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἔστι τούτων ἐναντίωσις. ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κίνησις ἀλλοίωσις ἔστω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπέζευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα. λέγω δὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐ τὸ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφορὰ ποιότης) ἀλλὰ τὸ παθητικόν, καθʼ ὃ λέγεται πάσχειν ἢ ἀπαθὲς εἶναι. ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἀνώνυμος, καθʼ ἑκάτερον δʼ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, ἡ μὲν εἰς τὸ τέλειον μέγεθος αὔξησις, ἡ δʼ ἐκ τούτου φθίσις. ἡ δὲ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τὸ κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἴδιον ἀνώνυμος, ἔστω δὲ φορὰ καλουμένη τὸ κοινόν· καίτοι λέγεταί γε ταῦτα φέρεσθαι μόνα κυρίως, ὅταν μὴ ἐφʼ αὑτοῖς ᾖ τὸ στῆναι τοῖς μεταβάλλουσι τὸν τόπον, καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτὰ ἑαυτὰ κινεῖ κατὰ τόπον. ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει μεταβολὴ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν·3 ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἐναντίου ἢ εἰς ἐναντίον κίνησίς ἐστιν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ πῄ. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἦττον ἰοῦσα εἰς τοὐναντίον λεχθήσεται μεταβάλλειν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ μᾶλλον ὡς ἐκ τοὐναντίου εἰς αὐτό, διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδὲν πῂ μεταβάλλειν ἢ ἁπλῶς, πλὴν πῂ δεήσει τἀναντία ὑπάρχειν· τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττόν ἐστι τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἐνυπάρχειν τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ μή.4 ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὗται τρεῖς μόναι κινήσεις εἰσίν, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον· ἀκίνητον δʼ ἐστὶ τό τε ὅλως ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ ὁ ψόφος ἀόρατος, καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ μόλις κινούμενον ἢ τὸ βραδέως ἀρχόμενον, ὃ λέγεται δυσκίνητον, καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς μὲν κινεῖσθαι καὶ δυνάμενον, μὴ κινούμενον δὲ τότε ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ οὗ καὶ ὥς, ὅπερ ἠρεμεῖν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἠρεμία κινήσει, ὥστε στέρησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ δεκτικοῦ, τί μὲν οὖν ἐστι κίνησις καὶ τί ἠρεμία, καὶ πόσαι μεταβολαὶ καὶ ποῖαι κινήσεις, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.
And how will it also be at the same time? For the coming to be of learning will not be learning, so that neither will there be a coming to be of coming to be, nor any particular one of any other. Moreover, if there are three species of motion, then both the underlying nature and that into which they are moved must be some of these; for instance, locomotion must either be altered or be moved locally. Generally, since everything is moved in three ways, either accidentally, or by a part of it, or in itself, it would be possible for change to change only accidentally, for instance if the one who is being healed should run or learn; but we have dismissed accidental change long ago. And since there is motion neither of substance, nor of relation, nor of acting and being acted upon, it remains that there is motion only in respect of quality, quantity, and place; for in each of these there is contrariety. Let the motion in respect of quality, then, be called alteration; for this common name has been applied to it. By quality I mean not that which is in substance (for even the difference is a quality) but the affective quality, in respect of which a thing is said to be affected or to be unaffected. Motion in respect of quantity is nameless in its common aspect, but in each of its two directions it is growth and decay: growth being the motion toward complete magnitude, and decay being that from this. Motion in respect of place is nameless both in its common and in its proper aspect, but let the common aspect be called locomotion; and yet only those things are properly said to be carried when those which change their place do not have it in their power to stop, and those things which do not move themselves in respect of place. And change within the same species toward the “more” and “less” is alteration; for it is motion either from a contrary or to a contrary, either absolutely or in a certain respect. For when it goes toward the “less”, it will be said to change into the contrary, but when toward the “more”, as from the contrary into itself; for it makes no difference whether it changes in a certain respect or absolutely, except that in a certain respect the contraries will have to be present; and the “more” and “less” is the presence of more or less of the contrary, or its absence. That, then, these three alone are motions, is clear from this. What is unmoved is: first, that which is completely impossible to be moved, just as sound is invisible; and second, that which is moved with difficulty over a long time, or starts slowly, which is called hard to move; and third, that which is by nature adapted and able to be moved, but is not being moved at the time when, where, and in the manner in which it is naturally adapted, which alone of the unmoved things I call being at rest; for rest is contrary to motion, so that it would be a privation in that which is receptive of it. What motion is, then, and what rest is, and how many changes there are, and of what kind motions are, is clear from what has been said.
- 226a15ἅμα δὲ πῶς καὶ ἔσται;
An elliptical sentence where the verb ἔσται is understood in the sense of 'be possible' or 'exist'. In light of the preceding context (the absurdity that if a change changes in itself, the subject would have to undergo both the prior and posterior changes simultaneously), it rhetorically asks how such simultaneity could ever be possible.
- 226a15οὐ γὰρ ἔσται μάθησις ἡ τῆς μαθήσεως γένεσις
The articular phrase ἡ τῆς μαθήσεως γένεσις ('the coming to be of learning') is the subject, while the anarthrous noun μάθησις ('learning') is the predicate complement. It asserts that the coming to be of a process of learning is not identical with the learning process itself.
- 226a35ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ εἴδει μεταβολὴ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἀλλοίωσίς ἐστιν
The text points out that alteration (ἀλλοίωσις) is restricted to the increase or decrease in degree 'within the same species'. If the essential species (substantial form) were to change, it would be a coming to be or passing away, so only within the same species can a transition of degree (the 'more' and 'less') be called an alteration.
- 226b5τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττόν ἐστι τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον ἐνυπάρχειν τοῦ ἐναντίου καὶ μή.
The articular infinitive phrase τὸ ... ἐνυπάρχειν serves as the predicate complement. The genitive τοῦ ἐναντίου depends on πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον or ενυπάρχειν, meaning 'the presence of more or less of the contrary'. The phrase καὶ μή ('and not') denotes the state where the contrary is entirely absent, allowing the quality itself to exist in its pure form.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-11-04)
- 2026-11-04 Curator — source 1
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
