- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:5.4#1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
This section defines the unity of motion in terms of genus, species, and number (absolute unity), presenting the three conditions required for a motion to be absolutely one (the subject, the domain, and the time) and examining related difficulties about the reacquisition of states.
Μία δὲ κίνησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγομεν. γένει μὲν οὖν μία κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας ἐστί (φορὰ μὲν γὰρ πάσῃ φορᾷ τῷ γένει μία, ἀλλοίωσις δὲ φορᾶς ἑτέρα τῷ γένει), εἴδει δὲ μία, ὅταν τῷ γένει μία οὖσα καὶ ἐν ἀτόμῳ εἴδει ᾖ. οἷον χρώματος μὲν εἰσὶ διαφοραί—τοιγαροῦν ἄλλη τῷ εἴδει μέλανσις καὶ λεύκανσις —λευκότητος δʼ οὐκέτι· διὸ τῷ εἴδει μία λεύκανσις λευκάνσει πάσῃ. εἰ δʼ ἔστιν ἀτθ’ ἃ1 καὶ γένη ἅμα καὶ εἶδη ἐστίν, δῆλον ὡς ἔστιν ὡς εἴδει μία ἔσται, ἁπλῶς δὲ μία εἴδει οὔ, οἷον ἡ μάθησις, εἰ ἡ ἐπιστήμη εἶδος μὲν ὑπολήψεως, γένος δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἀπορήσειν δʼ ἄν τις εἰ εἴδει μία ἡ κίνησις, ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ μεταβάλλῃ, οἷον ἡ μία στιγμὴ ἐκ τοῦδε τοῦ τόπου εἰς τόνδε τὸν τόπον πάλιν καὶ πάλιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτʼ, ἔσται ἡ κυκλοφορία τῇ εὐθυφορίᾳ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κύλισις τῇ βαδίσει. ἢ διώρισται, τὸ ἐν ᾧ2 ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ τῷ εἴδει, ὅτι ἑτέρα ἡ κίνησις, τὸ δὲ περιφερὲς τοῦ εὐθέος ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει; γένει μὲν οὖν καὶ εἴδει κίνησις μία οὕτως, ἁπλῶς δὲ μία κίνησις ἡ τῇ οὐσίᾳ μία καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ τίς δʼ ἡ τοιαύτη, δῆλον διελομένοις. τρία γάρ ἐστι τὸν ἀριθμὸν περὶ ἃ λέγομεν τὴν κίνησιν, ὃ καὶ ἐν ᾧ καὶ ὅτε. λέγω δʼ ὅτι ἀνάγκη εἶναί τι τὸ κινούμενον, οἶον ἄνθρωπον ἢ χρυσόν, καὶ ἔν τινι τοῦτο κινεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τόπῳ ἢ ἐν πάθει, καὶ ποτέ· ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶν κινεῖται. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τῷ γένει ἢ τῷ εἴδει μίαν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ πράγματι ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται, τὸ δʼ ἐχομένην3 ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ δʼ ἁπλῶς μίαν ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις· καὶ ἐν ᾧ γὰρ ἓν δεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἄτομον, οἶον τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ ὅτε, οἶον τὸν χρόνον ἕνα καὶ μὴ διωαλείπειν,4 καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἓν εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν μελαίνεσθαι καὶ Κορίσκον βαδίζειν (ἓν δὲ Κορίσκος καὶ λευκόν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός), μηδὲ κοινόν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἅμα δύο ἀνθρώπους ὑγιάζεσθαι τὴν αὐτὴν ὑγίανσιν, οἷον ὀφθαλμίας· ἀλλʼ οὐ μία αὕτη, ἀλλʼ εἴδει μία. τὸ δὲ Σωκράτη τὴν αὐτὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τῷ εἴδει, ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐν ἄλλῳ, εἰ μὲν ἐνδέχεται τὸ φθαρὲν πάλιν ἓν γίγνεσθαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ, εἴη ἂν καὶ αὕτη μία, εἰ δὲ μή, ἡ αὐτὴ μέν, μία δʼ οὔ. ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν ταύτῃ παραπλησίαν καὶ πότερον μία ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅλως αἱ ἕξεις καὶ τὰ πάθη τῇ οὐσίᾳ εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν· κινούμενα γὰρ φαίνεται τὰ ἔχοντα καὶ ῥέοντα. εἰ δὴ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία ἡ ἔωθεν καὶ νῦν ὑγίεια, διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν καὶ ὅταν διαλιπὼν λάβη πάλιν τὴν ὑγίειαν, καὶ αὕτη κἀκείνη μία τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἂν εἴη; ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος· πλὴν τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, ὅτι εἰ μὲν δύο, διʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὡς τῷ ἀριθμῷ,5 καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀνάγκη (μία γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἐνέργεια ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ)· εἰ δʼ ἡ ἕξις μία, ἴσως οὐκ ἄν τῳ δόξειέ πω μία καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια εἶναι (ὅταν γὰρ παύσηται βαδίζων, οὐκέτι ἔστιν ἡ βάδισις, πάλιν δὲ βαδίζοντος ἔσται). εἰ δʼ οὖν μία καὶ ἡ αὐτή, ἐνδέχοιτʼ ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν καὶ φθείρεσθαι καὶ εἶναι πολλάκις.
A single motion is spoken of in many ways; for we speak of “one” in many ways. Genetically, then, a motion is one according to the schemata of the categories (for every locomotion is genetically one with every other locomotion, but alteration is genetically different from locomotion); and specifically one, when, being genetically one, it is also in an indivisible species. For example, there are differences of color—wherefore blackening and whitening are specifically different—but there are no longer differences of whiteness; hence whitening is specifically one with every other whitening. And if there are certain things which are at the same time genera and species, it is clear that in a sense a motion will be specifically one, but not absolutely specifically one, for example learning, if knowledge is a species of belief, but a genus of knowledges. But someone might raise a difficulty as to whether a motion is specifically one when the same thing changes from the same to the same, for example, when a single point moves from this place to this place again and again. For if this is so, circular motion will be the same as rectilinear motion, and rolling the same as walking. Or is it defined that if that in which the motion occurs is different in species, the motion is different, and that the circular is specifically different from the straight? Genetically and specifically, then, motion is one in this way; but absolutely one is that which is one in essence and in number. And what kind of motion this is will be clear to those who divide it. For there are three things in number about which we speak of motion: that which, that in which, and when. I mean that there must be something which is moved, for example, a man or gold, and that this must be moved in something, for example, in place or in affection, and at some time; for everything is moved in time. And of these, to be one in genus or in species is in the thing in which it is moved, to be continuous is in the time, and to be absolutely one is in all of these. For that in which must be one and indivisible, for example, the species, and the when, for example, the time, must be one and not leave a gap, and that which is moved must be one, not accidentally, as when the white becomes black and Coriscus walks (for Coriscus and the white are one, but only accidentally), nor must it be common; for it would be possible for two men to be cured of the same disease at the same time, for example, of ophthalmia, yet this is not one motion, but only specifically one. But as for Socrates undergoing the same alteration in species, at one time and again at another, if indeed it is possible for what has perished to become one again in number, then this motion would also be one, but if not, it is the same, but not one. There is a difficulty close to this, namely, whether health and generally states and affections are one in essence in bodies; for the things that have them appear to be moved and to be in flux. If, then, the morning health and the present health are the same and one, why, when after an interval one recovers health, should not this and that also be one in number? For the argument is the same. Except that it differs to this extent: if they are two, for this very reason, as in number, the activities must also be two (for one activity in number is of one thing in number). But if the state is one, perhaps it would not yet seem to anyone that the activity also is one (for when one stops walking, the walking is no longer, but when one walks again, it will be). But if, then, they are one and the same, it would be possible for the same and one thing both to perish and to exist many times.
- 227b5ἀτθ’ ἃ
A contracted and aspirated form of ἅττα ἅ (or ἅτινα ἅ), meaning 'certain things which...', functioning as the subject with a relative pronoun.
- 227b15τὸ ἐν ᾧ
The relative clause with an article ἐν ᾧ ('that in which [the motion occurs]') functions as the subject of the conditional clause ἂν ἕτερον ᾖ.
- 227b25ἐχομένην
A feminine accusative singular participle modifying the omitted κίνησιν (the subject of the accusative-with-infinitve construction), or agreeing with μίαν [κίνησιν] εἶναι. Some editions read the neuter ἐχόμενον.
- 227b30διωαλείπειν
A scribal error or printing mistake for διαλείπειν ('to leave an interval' or 'to discontinue').
- 228a10ὡς τῷ ἀριθμῷ
Meaning 'as in number', it connects with the following ἀνάγκη [εἶναι] to yield the conclusion 'the activities also must [be two in number]'.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (7, latest 2026-11-04)
- 2026-11-04 Curator — source 2
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 4
- 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
