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Nicomachean Ethics

§9.10

The Proper Limit to the Number of Friends

Aristotle discusses whether there is a proper limit to the number of friends, arguing that friends for utility or pleasure should be few, and even excellent friends must be limited to the number with whom one can actively share a life.

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§9.10

ἆρʼ οὖν ὡς πλείστους φίλους ποιητέον, ἢ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ξενίας ἐμμελῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκεῖ "μήτε πολύξεινος μήτʼ ἄξεινος," καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φιλίας ἁρμόσει μήτʼ ἄφιλον εἶναι μήτʼ αὖ πολύφιλον καθʼ ὑπερβολήν; τοῖς μὲν δὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν κἂν πάνυ δόξειεν ἁρμόζειν τὸ λεχθέν· πολλοῖς γὰρ ἀνθυπηρετεῖν ἐπίπονον, καὶ οὐχ ἱκανὸς ὁ βίος αὐτὸ πράττειν. οἱ πλείους δὴ τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν1 περίεργοι καὶ ἐμπόδιοι πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζῆν· οὐθὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτῶν. καὶ οἱ πρὸς ἡδονὴν δὲ ἀρκοῦσιν ὀλίγοι, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τὸ ἥδυσμα. τοὺς δὲ σπουδαίους πότερον πλείστους κατʼ ἀριθμόν, ἢ ἔστι τι μέτρον καὶ φιλικοῦ πλήθους, ὥσπερ πόλεως; οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ δέκα ἀνθρώπων γένοιτʼ ἂν πόλις, οὔτʼ ἐκ δέκα μυριάδων ἔτι πόλις ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ ποσὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἴσως ἕν τι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ μεταξὺ τινῶν ὡρισμένων. καὶ φίλων δή ἐστι πλῆθος ὡρισμένον, καὶ ἴσως οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθʼ ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν2 (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδόκει φιλικώτατον εἶναι)· ὅτι δʼ οὐχ οἷόν τε πολλοῖς συζῆν καὶ διανέμειν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἄδηλον. ἔτι δὲ κἀκείνους δεῖ ἀλλήλοις φίλους εἶναι, εἰ μέλλουσι πάντες μετʼ ἀλλήλων συνημερεύειν· τοῦτο δʼ ἐργῶδες ἐν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν. χαλεπὸν δὲ γίνεται καὶ τὸ συγχαίρειν καὶ τὸ συναλγεῖν οἰκείως πολλοῖς· εἰκὸς γὰρ συμπίπτειν ἅμα τῷ μὲν συνήδεσθαι τῷ δὲ συνάχθεσθαι. ἴσως οὖν εὖ ἔχει μὴ ζητεῖν ὡς πολυφιλώτατον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τοσούτους ὅσοι εἰς τὸ συζῆν ἱκανοί· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι δόξειεν ἂν πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον σφόδρα. διόπερ οὐδʼ ἐρᾶν πλειόνων· ὑπερβολὴ γάρ τις εἶναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἕνα· καὶ τὸ σφόδρα δὴ πρὸς ὀλίγους. οὕτω δʼ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων· οὐ γίνονται γὰρ φίλοι πολλοὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑταιρικὴν φιλίαν, αἱ δʼ ὑμνούμεναι ἐν δυσὶ λέγονται. οἱ δὲ πολύφιλοι καὶ πᾶσιν οἰκείως ἐντυγχάνοντες οὐδενὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φίλοι, πλὴν πολιτικῶς, οὓς καὶ καλοῦσιν ἀρέσκους. πολιτικῶς μὲν οὖν ἔστι πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ·3 διʼ ἀρετὴν δὲ καὶ διʼ αὐτοὺς οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς πολλούς, ἀγαπητὸν δὲ καὶ ὀλίγους εὑρεῖν τοιούτους.

Should we then make as many friends as possible, or, just as it seems to have been appropriately said in the case of hospitality, “neither of many guests, nor of none,” will it also be fitting in the case of friendship to be neither without friends, nor again to have excessively many friends? To those based on utility, what has been said would indeed seem to fit perfectly; for to return services to many is troublesome, and life is not sufficient to do this. Thus, those who are more than enough for one’s own life are superfluous and obstacles to living well; there is, therefore, no need of them. And those for pleasure also are sufficient in small numbers, just like seasoning in food. But as for excellent friends, should we have them as many as possible in number, or is there some measure also for the size of a group of friends, just as for a city? For a city could not come into being from ten people, nor is it still a city when it reaches ten thousand. But the proper quantity is perhaps not some single number, but any number between certain defined limits. And of friends indeed there is a defined number, and it is perhaps the greatest number with whom one could live together (for this seemed to be the most friendly thing). But that it is not possible to live together with many and distribute oneself is not unclear. Furthermore, those friends must also be friends with one another, if they are all to spend their days together; and this is a laborious thing to exist among many. It also becomes difficult to share in joy and share in pain intimately with many; for it is likely that it will happen that one is pleased together with one person and at the same time grieved together with another. Perhaps, then, it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but only as many as are sufficient for living together; for indeed it would seem impossible to be a close friend to many. For this reason, one cannot love many passionately either; for love wishes to be a certain excess of friendship, and this is toward one person; and so close friendship is toward a few. This indeed seems to be the case in actual facts too; for many friends do not come into being in the friendship of comrades, and those celebrated in song are said to be between two. But those with many friends, who encounter everyone intimately, seem to be friends to no one, except in a civic way, whom people also call obsequious. In a civic way, then, it is possible to be a friend to many without being obsequious, but being truly decent; but because of virtue and for their own sake, it is not possible to be a friend toward many, and it is welcome to find even a few such people.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 1170b26οἱ πλείους τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν

    The comparative πλείους takes the genitive τῶν πρὸς τὸν οἰκεῖον βίον ἱκανῶν as a genitive of comparison, meaning "those who are more than those sufficient for one's own life."

  2. 1171a1οἱ πλεῖστοι μεθʼ ὧν ἂν δύναιτό τις συζῆν

    The phrase οἱ πλεῖστοι (the greatest number of people) serves to concretely specify the preceding πλῆθος (limit/number), identifying the maximum number of people with whom an individual is actually capable of living together.

  3. 1171a18πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον καὶ μὴ ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐπιεικῆ

    This construction features the infinitive εἶναι depending on the impersonal verb ἔστι (it is possible). Its predicate accusatives (φίλον, ἄρεσκον ὄντα, ἐπιεικῆ) agree with the omitted subject of the infinitive, while the dative πολλοῖς modifies the verbal phrase as "to many."

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:9.10