Nicomachean Ethics

​Indeed, when action and, still more, production are taken away from a living being, what is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of God, which surpasses in blessedness, would be contemplative; and of human activities, that which is most akin to this is the happiest. A sign of this is also that the other animals do not participate in happiness, being completely deprived of such activity. For to the gods their whole life is blessed, and to men, as far as some likeness to such activity belongs to them; but none of the other animals is happy, since they in no way share in contemplation. As far, then, as contemplation extends, so far does happiness, and those to whom contemplation more belongs, are also happier, not accidentally but in accordance with contemplation; for this is honorable in itself. So that happiness would be a kind of contemplation. But he will also need external prosperity, being human; for our nature is not self-sufficient for contemplation, but the body must also be healthy, and food and other care must be supplied. Surely, however, we must not think that he who is to be happy will need many and great things, even if it is not possible to be blessed without external goods; for self-sufficiency and action do not consist in excess, and it is possible to perform noble actions without ruling land and sea; for even with moderate resources one can act in accordance with virtue. (This is to be seen clearly; for private citizens seem to perform decent actions no less than rulers do, but even more.) And it is sufficient if so much is present; for the life of one who is active in accordance with virtue will be happy. And Solon too perhaps described those who are happy well, when he said that they were moderately supplied with external equipment, but had performed the noblest deeds, as he thought, and had lived temperately; for it is possible for those who possess moderate goods to do what they ought. And Anaxagoras, too, seems to have assumed that the happy man was neither rich nor a ruler, when he said that he would not be surprised if such a person appeared strange to the many; for they judge by externals, perceiving only these. So the opinions of the wise seem to agree with our arguments. Now, though such things also carry a certain conviction, the truth in practical matters is judged from deeds and life; for in these lies the decisive authority. We must therefore examine what has been said before by bringing it to bear on deeds and life, and if they harmonize with deeds we must accept them, but if they clash, we must assume them to be mere words. But he who acts in accordance with intellect, and cultivates this, and is in the best state, seems also to be most loved by the gods. For if some care for human affairs is exercised by the gods, as is thought, it would also be reasonable that they should rejoice in what is best and most akin to them (which would be intellect), and that they should requite those who love and honor this most, as caring for what is dear to them, and acting rightly and nobly. And that all these things belong most to the wise man is not unclear. He is, therefore, most loved by the gods. And it is likely that the same person is also the happiest; so that in this way too the wise man would be happiest.