Nicomachean Ethics

​Secondly, the life in accordance with the other virtue is happy; for the activities in accordance with this are human. For we perform just and brave actions, and other actions in accordance with the virtues, towards one another in contracts, needs, and actions of all kinds, observing what is fitting for each in our feelings as well. And all these appear to be human. And some of them seem even to result from the body, and the virtue of character is closely connected with the feelings in many ways. Wisdom, too, is linked with the virtue of character, and this with wisdom, if indeed the principles of wisdom are in accordance with the moral virtues, and the correctness of the moral virtues is in accordance with wisdom. And these, being connected also with the feelings, would belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our composite nature are human; and so too is the life in accordance with these, and happiness. But the happiness in accordance with intellect is separate. Let so much suffice to have said about it; for to describe it in detail is greater than our present task. And it would seem to need external equipment only to a small extent, or to a lesser extent than the moral virtue. For let there be a need of necessaries for both, and equally, even if the politician labors more about the body and such things; for that would make only a small difference; but with regard to their activities there will be a great difference. For the liberal man will need money to perform liberal actions, and the just man too for his returns (for intentions are invisible, and even the unjust pretend to wish to act justly), and the brave man will need power if he is to accomplish anything in accordance with his virtue, and the temperate man will need opportunity; for how else will he or any of the others be revealed? It is also disputed whether choice or actions are more authoritative in virtue, since virtue is in both; it is clear indeed that perfect virtue would be in both; but for actions many things are needed, and the greater and nobler they are, the more things. But the contemplator has no need of any such things, at least for his activity, but, so to speak, they are even hindrances at least to contemplation; but in so far as he is a man and lives with more people, he chooses to perform actions in accordance with virtue; he will therefore need such things for living as a human being. That perfect happiness is a certain contemplative activity would be clear from this also. For we have assumed the gods to be pre-eminently blessed and happy; but what kinds of actions is it necessary to attribute to them? Just actions? Or will they appear ridiculous making contracts, restoring deposits, and all such things? Brave actions, then, enduring terrifying things and running risks because it is noble? Or liberal actions? But to whom will they give? It is absurd if they are to have currency or anything of the sort. And what would temperate actions be? Or is praise of them vulgar, because they do not have base desires? If we go through them all, everything concerning actions would appear petty and unworthy of the gods. But surely all assume that they live and therefore are active; for they are surely not asleep like Endymion.