Nicomachean Ethics

​Now, if these matters and the virtues, and also friendship and pleasure, have been sufficiently discussed in outline, should we think that our purpose has reached its end? Or, as is said, is the end in practical matters not to contemplate and know each thing, but rather to practice them? Nor is it sufficient to know about virtue, but we must try to possess and use it, or if there is any other way we become good. If, then, arguments were self-sufficient for making people decent, they would justly have brought many and great rewards, according to Theognis, and we would have had to provide them. But as it is, they seem to be able to encourage and stimulate those of the young who are of a generous mind, and to make a character that is well-born and truly loves the beautiful receptive to virtue, but they appear unable to encourage the many towards nobility and goodness. For they are not by nature disposed to obey a sense of shame but fear, nor to abstain from bad things because of baseness but because of punishments. For living by passion, they pursue their own pleasures and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, but they have no conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, having never tasted it. What argument, then, could reform such people? For it is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been gripped by habits. But we must perhaps be content if, when all the means by which we are thought to become decent are present, we might share in virtue. Now, some think we become good by nature, others by habit, and others by teaching. The contribution of nature, then, is clearly not in our power, but is present through some divine cause in those who are truly fortunate. But argument and teaching perhaps do not have power in all cases, but the soul of the listener must have been prepared beforehand by habits to enjoy and hate in a noble way, like land that is to nourish the seed. For one who lives according to passion would not listen to an argument that turns him away, nor indeed would he understand it; and how is it possible to change the mind of one who is in this state? In general, passion seems to yield not to argument but to force. The character, therefore, must somehow pre-exist as akin to virtue, loving what is noble and disgusted by what is shameful. But to obtain a right training toward virtue from youth is difficult without being brought up under such laws; for to live temperately and hardily is not pleasant to the many, and especially to the young. Therefore, training and occupations must be ordained by laws; for they will not be painful once they have become habitual. But it is perhaps not sufficient for them to receive right training and care when they are young, but since they must also practice these things and be habituated to them when they have grown into manhood, we would need laws concerning these too, and generally indeed for the whole of life; for the many obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than what is noble. Therefore, some think that legislators ought to encourage people to virtue and urge them to it for the sake of what is noble, on the assumption that those who have been decently brought up by habits will listen; but that they should impose punishments and penalties on those who are disobedient and of a less gifted nature, and completely banish the incurable. For they think that the decent person, living with a view to what is noble, will obey argument, but the base person, desiring pleasure, must be punished by pain like a beast of burden. Therefore, they also say that the pains must be of such a kind as are most opposed to the pleasures that are loved.