- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:498
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates points out to Callicles that since the wise, the foolish, the cowardly, and the courageous feel pleasure and pain in a similar degree, the good and the bad would paradoxically end up being good and bad to an equal degree.
ΣΩ. τί δέ; νοῦν ἔχοντα1 λυπούμενον καὶ χαίροντα; ΚΑΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. πότεροι δὲ μᾶλλον χαίρουσι καὶ λυποῦνται, οἱ φρόνιμοι ἢ οἱ ἄφρονες; ΚΑΛ. οἶμαι ἔγωγε οὐ πολύ τι διαφέρειν. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἀρκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο. ἐν πολέμῳ δὲ ἤδη εἶδες ἄνδρα δειλόν; ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. τί οὖν; ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων2 πότεροί σοι ἐδόκουν μᾶλλον χαίρειν, οἱ δειλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. ἀμφότεροι ἔμοιγε · εἰ δὲ μή, παραπλησίως γε. ΣΩ. οὐδὲν διαφέρει. χαίρουσιν δʼ οὖν καὶ οἱ δειλοί; ΚΑΛ. σφόδρα γε. ΣΩ. καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες, ὡς ἔοικεν. ΚΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. προσιόντων δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ μόνον λυποῦνται ἢ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι; ΚΑΛ. ἀμφότεροι. ΣΩ. ἆρα ὁμοίως; ΚΑΛ. μᾶλλον ἴσως οἱ δειλοί. ΣΩ. ἀπιόντων δʼ οὐ μᾶλλον χαίρουσιν; ΚΑΛ. ἴσως. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λυποῦνται μὲν καὶ χαίρουσιν καὶ οἱ ἄφρονες καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι παραπλησίως, ὡς σὺ φῄς, μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ δειλοὶ τῶν ἀνδρείων; ΚΑΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οἵ γε φρόνιμοι καὶ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι ἀγαθοί, οἱ δὲ δειλοὶ καὶ ἄφρονες κακοί; ΚΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. παραπλησίως ἄρα χαίρουσιν καὶ λυποῦνται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ κακοί; ΚΑΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν παραπλησίως εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί τε καὶ οἱ κακοί; ἢ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν οἱ κακοί; ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅτι λέγεις. ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶσθʼ ὅτι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἀγαθῶν φῂς παρουσίᾳ εἶναι ἀγαθούς, καὶ κακοὺς δὲ κακῶν; τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰς ἡδονάς, κακὰ δὲ τὰς ἀνίας; ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῖς χαίρουσιν πάρεστιν τἀγαθά, αἱ ἡδοναί, εἴπερ χαίρουσιν; ΚΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀγαθῶν παρόντων ἀγαθοί εἰσιν οἱ χαίροντες; ΚΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δέ; τοῖς ἀνιωμένοις οὐ πάρεστιν τὰ κακά, αἱ λῦπαι; ΚΑΛ. πάρεστιν. ΣΩ. κακῶν δέ γε παρουσίᾳ φῂς σὺ εἶναι κακοὺς τοὺς κακούς· ἢ οὐκέτι φῄς; ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα οἳ ἂν χαίρωσι, κακοὶ δὲ οἳ ἂν ἀνιῶνται; ΚΑΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον,3 οἳ δʼ ἧττον ἧττον, οἳ δὲ παραπλησίως παραπλησίως; ΚΑΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φῂς παραπλησίως χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας καὶ τοὺς δειλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τοὺς δειλούς; ΚΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
SOCRATES: And what? Have you seen a man of sense in pain and rejoicing? CALLICLES: Yes, I have. SOCRATES: And which class rejoices and feels pain more, the wise or the foolish? CALLICLES: I think there is no great difference. SOCRATES: Well, even this is enough. But have you ever seen a cowardly man in war? CALLICLES: Of course I have. SOCRATES: What then? When the enemy retreated, which seemed to you to rejoice more, the cowards or the courageous? CALLICLES: Both, I thought, or if not, at least about equally. SOCRATES: It makes no difference. At any rate, do the cowards also rejoice? CALLICLES: Very much so. SOCRATES: And the foolish too, it seems. CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: But when the enemy approaches, do only the cowards feel pain, or do the courageous too? CALLICLES: Both. SOCRATES: Equally? CALLICLES: More, perhaps, the cowards. SOCRATES: And when they retreat, do they not rejoice more? CALLICLES: Perhaps. SOCRATES: Then do both the foolish and the wise, and both the cowards and the courageous, feel pain and rejoice about equally, as you say, but the cowards even more than the courageous? CALLICLES: Yes, I say so. SOCRATES: But furthermore, are the wise and courageous good, and the cowards and foolish bad? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, do the good and the bad rejoice and feel pain about equally? CALLICLES: Yes, I say so. SOCRATES: Are, then, the good and the bad good and bad to about an equal degree? Or are the bad even more good? CALLICLES: But by Zeus, I do not know what you mean. SOCRATES: Do you not know that you say the good are good by the presence of good things, and the bad by the presence of bad things? And that the good things are pleasures, and the bad things pains? CALLICLES: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: Then do those who rejoice have good things present to them—that is, pleasures—if indeed they rejoice? CALLICLES: Of course they do. SOCRATES: Therefore, since good things are present, are those who rejoice good? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And what? Do those who feel pain not have bad things present to them—namely, pains? CALLICLES: They are present. SOCRATES: And yet you say that the bad are bad by the presence of bad things; or do you no longer say so? CALLICLES: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: So those who rejoice are good, and those who feel pain are bad? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: And those who feel so more are more so, those who feel so less are less so, and those who feel so about equally are about equally so? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Then do you say that the wise and the foolish, the cowardly and the courageous, rejoice and feel pain about equally, or even the cowardly still more? CALLICLES: Yes, I do.
- 498νοῦν ἔχοντα
An accusative phrase meaning "one who has intellect (sense)." It functions as the direct object of the omitted verb εἶδες (have you seen), continuing the contrast established with the preceding παῖδα ἀνόητον (foolish child) and ἄνδρα ἀνόητον (foolish man).
- 498ἀπιόντων τῶν πολεμίων
Genitive absolute construction expressing time ("when the enemy retreated") or circumstance, grammatically contrasted with the subsequent προσιόντων (approaching).
- 498eοἳ μέν γε μᾶλλον μᾶλλον
A highly elliptical parallel construction where verbs (such as χαίρωσιν / ἀνιῶνται and ἀγαθοὶ / κακοί εἰσιν) are omitted. It concisely represents the proportional relationship: "those who [rejoice/feel pain] more are more [good/bad]."