Gorgias

​SOCRATES: For instance, take any part of the body you like and consider it. Does not a man sometimes have a disease in his eyes, which is called ophthalmia? CALLICLES: Of course. SOCRATES: Surely he does not also have healthy eyes at the same time? CALLICLES: Not in the least. SOCRATES: And what when he gets rid of ophthalmia? Does he then also get rid of the health of his eyes, and so in the end is he rid of both at the same time? CALLICLES: Not at all. SOCRATES: For that, I think, would be a wondrous and irrational result, would it not? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: But, I suppose, he acquires and loses each in turn? CALLICLES: Yes, I agree. SOCRATES: And strength and weakness in the same way? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And speed and slowness? CALLICLES: Yes, indeed. SOCRATES: And does he also acquire and get rid of good things and happiness, and their opposites, evil things and misery, each in turn? CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I think. SOCRATES: Then, if we find any things which a man gets rid of and possesses at the same time, it is clear that these could not be the good and the bad. Do we agree on this? Consider it very carefully before you answer. CALLICLES: Yes, I agree prodigiously. SOCRATES: Come then, to our previous admissions. Did you say that hunger was pleasant or painful? I mean hunger itself. CALLICLES: Painful, I say; but to eat when hungry is pleasant, I say. SOCRATES: I understand; but at any rate hunger itself is painful, is it not? CALLICLES: Yes, it is. SOCRATES: And thirst too? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: Shall I ask you any more, or do you agree that all lack and desire is painful? CALLICLES: I agree, so do not ask. SOCRATES: Very well. But do you say that drinking when thirsty is anything other than pleasant? CALLICLES: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: Now, in this act that you speak of, “being thirsty” is surely being in pain? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And “drinking” is a filling up of the lack and a pleasure? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: So you say that in drinking one rejoices? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: When thirsty, that is? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And when in pain? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Do you perceive, then, what follows: that you say one rejoices while in pain at the same time, when you say that one drinks when thirsty? Or does this not happen at the same time and in the same place, whether of the soul or of the body as you please? For I think it makes no difference. Is this so or not? CALLICLES: It is so. SOCRATES: But you said it is impossible to fare well and to fare ill at the same time.

​CALLICLES: Yes, I did. SOCRATES: But you have admitted that it is possible to rejoice when in pain. CALLICLES: So it appears. SOCRATES: Therefore, to rejoice is not to fare well, nor is to be in pain to fare ill, so that the pleasant is different from the good. CALLICLES: I do not know what kind of sophistries you are playing with, Socrates. SOCRATES: You do know, Callicles, but you are playing coy. Go on just a little further, so that you may realize how wise you are in warning me. Do not each of us cease from being thirsty and at the same time cease from feeling pleasure through drinking? CALLICLES: I do not know what you mean. GORGIAS: Do not do that, Callicles, but answer for our sakes too, so that the arguments may be brought to an end. CALLICLES: But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias; he asks these petty, worthless questions and refutes them. GORGIAS: But what difference does that make to you? In any case, it is not your reputation at stake, Callicles; just submit to Socrates to let him examine you however he wishes. CALLICLES: Ask, then, those petty and narrow questions of yours, since Gorgias thinks so. SOCRATES: You are a happy man, Callicles, in having been initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser; I did not think that was permitted. Answer, then, from where you left off: does not each of us cease from being thirsty and at the same time cease from feeling pleasure? CALLICLES: Yes, I say so. SOCRATES: And does he not also cease from being hungry and from the other desires and pleasures at the same time? CALLICLES: That is so. SOCRATES: Then also from pains and pleasures he ceases at the same time? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: But from good things and bad things he does not cease at the same time, as you were admitting. Do you not admit it now? CALLICLES: I do agree. What of it? SOCRATES: That they are not the same, my friend—the good and the pleasant, nor the bad and the painful. For we cease from the one class at the same time, but not from the other, because they are different. How then could pleasant things be the same as good things, or painful things the same as bad things? But if you like, consider it in this way too (for I do not think you agree with this either, but look at it): do you not call good men good by the presence of good things, just as you call beautiful those in whom beauty is present? CALLICLES: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: And what then? Do you call foolish and cowardly men good? You certainly did not just now, but you were calling the courageous and wise so. Or do you not call these good? CALLICLES: Most certainly I do. SOCRATES: And what? Have you ever seen a foolish child rejoicing? CALLICLES: Yes, I have. SOCRATES: And have you never seen a foolish man rejoicing? CALLICLES: I think I have. But what of that? SOCRATES: Nothing; just answer. CALLICLES: I have seen it.