Gorgias

​SOCRATES: Come then, reckon up in common with me what follows for us from our admissions; for they say it is a fine thing to say and examine fine things twice and even thrice. We say that the wise and courageous man is good. Is that not so? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And the foolish and cowardly is bad? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: And again, that he who rejoices is good? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: And he who feels pain is bad? CALLICLES: Necessarily. SOCRATES: And that the good and the bad feel pain and rejoice equally, or perhaps the bad even more? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, does the bad man become bad and good to an equal degree as the good man, or even more good? Does not this follow, as well as those earlier conclusions, if one asserts that pleasant things and good things are the same? Are these not necessary consequences, Callicles? CALLICLES: I have been listening to you for a long time, Socrates, and agreeing with you, while reflecting that, even if one concedes anything to you in jest, you gladly cling to it just like young boys. As if you actually think that I, or any other human being whatever, do not believe that some pleasures are better and others worse! SOCRATES: Oho, Callicles! What a rascal you are, and how you treat me like a child, telling me now that things are one way, and now another, trying to deceive me! And yet I did not think at the beginning that I should be voluntarily deceived by you, since you are a friend. But now I have been mistaken, and it seems I must, according to the ancient proverb, “make the best of what is present” and accept just what is given by you. And what you are saying now, as it seems, is that some pleasures are good, and others bad. Is that not so? CALLICLES: Yes. SOCRATES: Are, then, the beneficial ones good, and the harmful ones bad? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: And are those which produce some good beneficial, and those which produce some evil bad? CALLICLES: Yes, I say so. SOCRATES: Are these, then, the sort of things you mean—for instance, in the case of the body, those pleasures we were speaking of just now in eating and drinking, if those which produce health in the body, or strength, or any other bodily virtue, are good, while those which produce the opposite of these are bad? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: Therefore, are pains likewise some of them good, and others bad? CALLICLES: Of course. SOCRATES: Therefore, must we choose and practice the good ones, both pleasures and pains? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: And the bad ones not? CALLICLES: Obviously.