Gorgias

​SOCRATES: Well then, one of the two, having filled his jars, would no longer pour anything in or have any care, but as far as these are concerned, he would remain at rest. But for the other, although the inflows, just as for that first man, are possible to procure, though difficult, yet the vessels are perforated and decayed, and he would be compelled always, both night and day, to keep filling them, or else suffer the most extreme pains. If each of these two lives is such as this, do you say that the life of the licentious man is happier than that of the orderly man? Do I persuade you at all by saying these things to agree that the orderly life is better than the licentious one, or do I not? CALLICLES: You do not persuade me, Socrates. For that man who has filled his jars no longer has any pleasure, but this is what I was just saying: to live like a stone, once he has filled them, neither rejoicing any more nor suffering pain. Rather, living pleasantly consists in this: in having as much as possible flow in. SOCRATES: Then is it not necessary, if much flows in, that much also goes out, and that the holes for the outflows must be quite large? CALLICLES: Very much so. SOCRATES: Then you are speaking of the life of a stone-curlew, and not of a dead man or a stone. And tell me: do you mean something like being hungry and eating when hungry? CALLICLES: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: And being thirsty and drinking when thirsty? CALLICLES: I say so, and having all other desires and being able to satisfy them, and so living happily in joy. SOCRATES: Well done, my excellent friend! Carry on as you began, and mind you do not lose your courage through shame. And it seems that I too must not be ashamed. First, then, tell me if a man who has the itch and wants to scratch, having plenty of opportunity to scratch, and spending his whole life scratching, can live happily? CALLICLES: How strange you are, Socrates, and an absolute mob-orator! SOCRATES: That, indeed, Callicles, is how I dismayed Polus and Gorgias and made them ashamed; but you will certainly not be dismayed or ashamed, for you are courageous. Just answer, then. CALLICLES: Well then, I say that even the man who scratches would live pleasantly. SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily? CALLICLES: Certainly. SOCRATES: What if he only scratches his head—or do I need to ask you anything further? See, Callicles, what you will answer if someone should ask you all the consequences of this, one after another. And as the crown of all such things, is not the life of catamites terrible, shameful, and miserable? Or will you dare to say that these are happy, if they have in abundance what they need? CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, to bring the argument to such things?

​SOCRATES: Is it I who bring it there, my noble friend, or he who asserts so unconditionally that those who rejoice, however they may rejoice, are happy, and makes no distinction between what pleasures are good and what are bad? But tell me even now, do you say that the pleasant and the good are the same, or that there is something among pleasant things which is not good? CALLICLES: In order that my argument may not be inconsistent with itself, if I should say they are different, I say they are the same. SOCRATES: You are destroying your first statements, Callicles, and you would no longer be adequately examining the things that are with me, if you are going to speak contrary to what you yourself think. CALLICLES: For you do the same, Socrates. SOCRATES: Then neither do I act correctly, if indeed I do this, nor do you. But, my dear friend, see whether the good may not be something other than rejoicing in every way; for both these things just now hinted at, and many other shameful things, clearly appear to follow, if this is so. CALLICLES: That is as you think, Socrates. SOCRATES: But do you really, Callicles, maintain this? CALLICLES: I do. SOCRATES: Shall we then apply ourselves to the argument, on the assumption that you are in earnest? CALLICLES: Most certainly. SOCRATES: Come then, since you think so, distinguish this for me: do you call something knowledge? CALLICLES: I do. SOCRATES: And did you not just now say that courage was something along with knowledge? CALLICLES: Yes, I did. SOCRATES: Did you not, then, speak of them as two things, courage being distinct from knowledge? CALLICLES: Very much so. SOCRATES: What then? Are pleasure and knowledge the same, or different? CALLICLES: Different, surely, you wisest of men! SOCRATES: And courage is different from pleasure too? CALLICLES: How could it not be? SOCRATES: Come then, let us keep this in mind: that Callicles of Acharnae said that the pleasant and the good are the same, but that knowledge and courage are different both from each other and from the good. CALLICLES: And Socrates of Alopece does not agree with this—or does he? SOCRATES: He does not agree; nor, I think, will Callicles, whenever he looks at himself properly. For tell me: do you not believe that those who fare well experience the opposite condition to those who fare ill? CALLICLES: I do. SOCRATES: If, then, these are opposite to one another, must it not hold concerning them just as it does concerning health and disease? For surely a person is not healthy and sick at the same time, nor does he get rid of health and disease at the same time. CALLICLES: What do you mean?