Gorgias

POLUS: You are attempting to say strange things, Socrates! SOCRATES: But I shall try, my friend, to make you too say the same things as I do; for I consider you a friend. Now, these are the things we differ about; consider them yourself too. I said, I believe, somewhere in what went before, that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice. POLUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: But you said suffering injustice is worse. POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And I said that those who do injustice are miserable, and I was refuted by you. POLUS: Yes, by Zeus! SOCRATES: As you indeed believe, Polus. POLUS: And believing what is true, at any rate. SOCRATES: Perhaps. But you in turn believe that those who do injustice are happy, if they do not pay the penalty. POLUS: Yes, absolutely. SOCRATES: But I say they are most miserable, and those who pay the penalty are less so. Do you wish to refute this too? POLUS: Why, this is even more difficult to refute than that, Socrates! SOCRATES: Not at all, Polus, but impossible; for the truth is never refuted. POLUS: How do you mean? If a man is caught acting unjustly, plotting to set up a tyranny, and having been caught, is tortured on the wheel, castrated, has his eyes burned out, and having himself suffered many other great and various outrages and seen his own children and wife suffer them, is finally crucified or smeared with pitch and burned to death—will this man be happier than if he escapes, becomes tyrant, lives out his life ruling in the city, doing whatever he wishes, envied and congratulated on his happiness by the citizens and other foreigners? Is this what you say is impossible to refute? SOCRATES: You are trying to frighten me with bogies again, noble Polus, and are not refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses. But still, remind me of one small thing: “if he plots unjustly to set up a tyranny,” you said? POLUS: I did. SOCRATES: Then neither of them will ever be happier, neither the one who has successfully established the tyranny unjustly, nor the one who pays the penalty—for of two miserable men, one could not be happier—yet the one who escapes and becomes tyrant is indeed more miserable. What is this, Polus? Are you laughing? Is this in turn another form of refutation, to laugh when someone says something, but not to refute? POLUS: Do you not think you have been refuted, Socrates, when you say things such as no human being would say? For ask any of these people here.

​SOCRATES: Polus, I am not one of the politicians, and last year, having been chosen by lot to be on the Council, when my tribe was presiding and it was my duty to put the vote, I presented a laughable spectacle and did not know how to put the vote. So do not bid me now either to put the vote to those present, but if you do not have a better refutation than these, hand the turn over to me, as I was just saying, and try the kind of refutation that I think there ought to be. For I know how to produce one witness for the things I say, namely the very person with whom my discussion is, but I let the many go; and I know how to take the vote of one, but I do not even converse with the many. See then if you will be willing to submit to refutation in your turn by answering the questions. For I certainly think that both I and you and other human beings believe that doing injustice is worse than suffering it, and not paying the penalty is worse than paying it. POLUS: And I say that neither I nor any other human being believes so. For would you rather suffer injustice than do it? SOCRATES: Yes, and you would too, and everyone else. POLUS: Far from it! Neither I, nor you, nor anyone else. SOCRATES: Will you not answer then? POLUS: Yes, indeed; for I am eager to know what on earth you will say. SOCRATES: Tell me then, so that you may know, just as if I were asking you from the beginning: which of the two seems to you, Polus, to be worse, doing injustice or suffering it? POLUS: Suffering it, in my opinion. SOCRATES: What about this? Which is more shameful, doing injustice or suffering it? Answer. POLUS: Doing injustice. SOCRATES: Is it not therefore also worse, if indeed it is more shameful? POLUS: Not in the least. SOCRATES: I understand; you do not, as it seems, consider the beautiful and the good, and the bad and the shameful, to be the same. POLUS: Certainly not. SOCRATES: But what about this? All beautiful things, such as bodies, colors, shapes, voices, and practices—do you call them beautiful each time without looking to anything? For instance, first, do you not say that beautiful bodies are beautiful either on account of their usefulness, for whatever purpose each is useful, or on account of some pleasure, if they make those who look at them rejoice in viewing them? Have you anything else to say besides these about the beauty of a body? POLUS: I have not. SOCRATES: Then do you also address all other things—both shapes and colors—as beautiful either because of some pleasure, or because of some utility, or because of both? POLUS: I do. SOCRATES: And do you not also address voices and all things in music in the same way? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And indeed, things in laws and practices, the beautiful ones, are surely not outside of these, namely, of being either useful or pleasant or both.