- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:475
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates argues that since doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, it must exceed it either in pain or in badness. Since doing injustice is not more painful, it must be worse (exceed in badness), forcing Polus to admit this conclusion.
ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ τῶν μαθημάτων κάλλος ὡσαύτως; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε· καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζῃ,1 ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡδονῇ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ αἰσχρὸν τῷ ἐναντίῳ, λύπῃ τε καὶ κακῷ; ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ὅταν ἄρα δυοῖν καλοῖν θάτερον κάλλιον ᾖ, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτοιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις ὑπερβάλλον κάλλιόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡδονῇ ἢ ὠφελίᾳ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις. ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. καὶ ὅταν δὲ δὴ δυοῖν αἰσχροῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἴσχιον ᾖ, ἤτοι λύπῃ ἢ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἔσται· ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. φέρε δή, πῶς ἐλέγετο νυνδὴ περὶ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀδικεῖσθαι; οὐκ ἔλεγες τὸ μὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν αἴσχιον; ΠΩΛ. ἔλεγον. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἤτοι λυπηρότερόν ἐστιν καὶ λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιον ἂν εἴη ἢ κακῷ ἢ ἀμφοτέροις; οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἀνάγκη; ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ σκεψώμεθα, ἆρα λύπῃ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀλγοῦσι μᾶλλον οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι; ΠΩΛ. οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα λύπῃ γε ὑπερέχει. ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ λύπῃ, ἀμφοτέροις μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ὑπερβάλλοι. ΠΩΛ. οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ ἑτέρῳ λείπεται. ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. τῷ κακῷ. ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κακῷ ὑπερβάλλον τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι. ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι. ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν2 ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡμολογεῖτο ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν χρόνῳ αἴσχιον εἶναι τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. νῦν δέ γε κάκιον ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. ἔοικε. ΣΩ. δέξαιο ἂν οὖν σὺ μᾶλλον τὸ κάκιον καὶ τὸ αἴσχιον ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧττον; μὴ ὄκνει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐδὲν γὰρ βλαβήσῃ· ἀλλὰ γενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων3 ἀποκρίνου, καὶ ἢ φάθι ἢ μὴ ἃ ἐρωτῶ. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν δεξαίμην, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἄλλος δέ τις ἀνθρώπων; ΠΩΛ. οὔ μοι δοκεῖ κατά γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον. ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι οὔτʼ ἂν ἐγὼ οὔτʼ ἂν σὺ οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων δέξαιτʼ ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι· κάκιον γὰρ τυγχάνει ὄν. ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: It does not seem so to me. SOCRATES: Then is it not the same also with the beauty of studies? POLUS: Yes, absolutely; and you define it beautifully now, Socrates, by defining the beautiful by pleasure and the good. SOCRATES: Then is not the shameful defined by the opposite, by pain and the bad? POLUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: Therefore, when one of two beautiful things is more beautiful than the other, it is more beautiful by exceeding either in one of these two or in both, that is, either in pleasure or in utility or in both? POLUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And when in turn one of two shameful things is more shameful, it will be more shameful by exceeding either in pain or in badness; or is that not necessary? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Come then, what was being said just now about doing injustice and suffering it? Were you not saying that suffering injustice is worse, but doing it is more shameful? POLUS: I was saying so. SOCRATES: Then if indeed doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, must it not be either more painful, and be more shameful by exceeding in pain, or in badness, or in both? Is this too not necessary? POLUS: How could it not be? SOCRATES: First then let us consider, does doing injustice exceed suffering it in pain, and do those who do injustice suffer more pain than those who suffer it? POLUS: By no means, Socrates, at least not that. SOCRATES: Then it does not surpass in pain. POLUS: Certainly not. SOCRATES: Then if not in pain, it could no longer exceed in both. POLUS: It seems not. SOCRATES: Therefore it is left with the other of the two. POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: In the bad. POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: Therefore, by exceeding in badness, doing injustice would be worse than suffering it. POLUS: It is indeed clear. SOCRATES: Was it not agreed by us, then, in the time before, both by the majority of mankind and by you, that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: But now indeed it has appeared to be worse. POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: Would you then prefer the worse and the more shameful instead of the less so? Do not hesitate to answer, Polus; for you will not be harmed at all. But submit yourself courageously to the argument as to a physician, and answer, and either say yes or no to what I ask. POLUS: But I would not prefer it, Socrates. SOCRATES: And would any other human being? POLUS: It does not seem so to me, at least according to this argument. SOCRATES: Then I was saying the truth, that neither I nor you nor any other human being would prefer doing injustice to suffering it; for it actually is worse. POLUS: It seems so.
- 475aὁρίζῃ
Although the form is a middle-passive second-person singular, it is used here in an active sense of the middle voice (indirect middle), meaning 'defining for oneself' or 'making a definition'.
- 475dἄλλο τι οὖν
An idiomatic expression arising from the ellipsis of ἤ from ἄλλο τι ἤ. It functions as a strong affirmative question expecting a positive answer, equivalent to the Latin 'nonne' ('is it not the case that...').
- 475dπαρέχων
The reflexive pronoun ἑαυτόν is omitted here, and the participle is used intransitively to mean 'submitting or offering oneself' to the argument (τῷ λόγῳ), just as to a physician (ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ).