Gorgias

​SOCRATES: My dear friend, for you are attempting to refute me rhetorically, just like those who believe they refute in the law courts. For there too, one party seems to refute the other whenever they produce many reputable witnesses for the statements they make, while the one who says the opposite produces only some single witness or none at all. But this refutation is worth nothing in relation to the truth; for sometimes someone might even be falsely witnessed against by many people who appear to be of some consequence. And now, concerning what you say, almost everyone—both Athenians and foreigners—will agree with you in this, if you wish to produce witnesses against me to show that I do not speak the truth. They will bear witness for you: if you wish, Nicias the son of Niceratus and his brothers with him, whose tripods are standing in a row in the Dionysium; and if you wish, Aristocrates the son of Scellias, whose beautiful offering this in turn is in the Pythium; and if you wish, the whole house of Pericles or any other family you might wish to choose from those here. But I, being only one, do not agree with you; for you do not compel me, but by producing many false witnesses against me, you attempt to cast me out of my property and the truth. But as for me, if I do not produce you yourself, being only one, as a witness agreeing with what I say, I think I have accomplished nothing worthy of mention concerning the things about which our discussion may be; and I think the same is true for you, unless I alone bear witness for you, and you let all these other go. Now, on the one hand, this is one kind of refutation, as you and many others think; but on the other hand, there is also another, which I in turn believe in. Let us then compare them with one another and consider whether they will differ from each other in any way. For indeed, the things about which we dispute happen to be not at all small, but are pretty much those things which it is finest to know and most shameful not to know; for the sum of them is either to recognize or to be ignorant of who is happy and who is not. To take the first instance, about which our discussion now is: you believe that it is possible for a man who acts unjustly and is unjust to be happy, since indeed you think Archelaus is unjust but happy. Are we to understand that this is your opinion? POLUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: But I say it is impossible. This is one point we dispute. Very well. But will the wrongdoer indeed be happy if he happens to meet with justice and punishment? POLUS: Not in the least, since in that way he would be most miserable. SOCRATES: But if the wrongdoer does not meet with justice, will he be happy according to your argument? POLUS: I say so. SOCRATES: But according to my view, Polus, the wrongdoer and the unjust man are miserable in any case, but they are more miserable if they do not pay the penalty and do not meet with punishment for their wrongdoing, and less miserable if they pay the penalty and meet with justice from both gods and men.