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Gorgias

§470-471

The Example of Archelaus and the Happiness of the Unjust

Socrates and Polus agree that the power to do as one pleases is good only when followed by benefit, and they clash over whether a wrongdoer can be happy. Polus cites the brutal usurpation of Archelaus of Macedonia to argue that an unjust man can be happy, but Socrates rejects this refutation.

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§470

ΣΩ. ἔχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν διʼ ὅτι μέμφῃ τὴν τοιαύτην δύναμιν; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. τί δή; λέγε. ΠΩΛ. ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον τὸν οὕτω πράττοντα ζημιοῦσθαί ἐστιν. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ζημιοῦσθαι οὐ κακόν; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πάλιν αὖ σοι φαίνεται, ἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν,1 ἀγαθόν τε εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, κακὸν καὶ σμικρὸν δύνασθαι. σκεψώμεθα δὲ καὶ τόδε· ἄλλο τι2 ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀποκτεινύναι τε καὶ ἐξελαύνειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι χρήματα, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, καὶ παρὰ σοῦ καὶ παρʼ ἐμοῦ ὁμολογεῖται. ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. πότε οὖν σὺ φῂς ἄμεινον εἶναι ταῦτα ποιεῖν; εἰπὲ τίνα ὅρον ὁρίζῃ. ΠΩΛ. σὺ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπόκριναι τοῦτο. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν φημί, ὦ Πῶλε, εἴ σοι παρʼ ἐμοῦ ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἀκούειν, ὅταν μὲν δικαίως τις ταῦτα ποιῇ, ἄμεινον εἶναι, ὅταν δὲ ἀδίκως, κάκιον. ΠΩΛ. χαλεπόν γέ σε ἐλέγξαι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ κἂν παῖς σε ἐλέγξειεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγεις; ΣΩ. πολλὴν ἄρα ἐγὼ τῷ παιδὶ χάριν ἕξω, ἴσην δὲ καὶ σοί, ἐάν με ἐλέγξῃς καὶ ἀπαλλάξῃς φλυαρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴ κάμῃς φίλον ἄνδρα εὐεργετῶν, ἀλλʼ ἔλεγχε. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδέν γέ σε δεῖ παλαιοῖς πράγμασιν ἐλέγχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἐχθὲς καὶ πρώην γεγονότα ταῦτα ἱκανά σε ἐξελέγξαι ἐστὶν καὶ ἀποδεῖξαι ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν. ΣΩ. τὰ ποῖα ταῦτα; ΠΩΛ. Ἀρχέλαον δήπου τοῦτον τὸν Περδίκκου ὁρᾷς ἄρχοντα Μακεδονίας; ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή,3 ἀλλʼ ἀκούω γε. ΠΩΛ. εὐδαίμων οὖν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἢ ἄθλιος; ΣΩ. οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Πῶλε· οὐ γάρ πω συγγέγονα τῷ ἀνδρί. ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; συγγενόμενος ἂν γνοίης, ἄλλως δὲ αὐτόθεν οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅτι εὐδαιμονεῖ; ΣΩ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ δῆτα. ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα γιγνώσκειν φήσεις εὐδαίμονα ὄντα. ΣΩ. καὶ ἀληθῆ γε ἐρῶ· οὐ γὰρ οἶδα παιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης.4 ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; ἐν τούτῳ ἡ πᾶσα εὐδαιμονία ἐστίν; ΣΩ. ὥς γε ἐγὼ λέγω, ὦ Πῶλε· τὸν μὲν γὰρ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα καὶ γυναῖκα εὐδαίμονα εἶναί φημι, τὸν δὲ ἄδικον καὶ πονηρὸν ἄθλιον.

SOCRATES: Can you then tell me why you find fault with such power? POLUS: I can. SOCRATES: Why indeed? Speak. POLUS: Because it is necessary that the one who acts in this way is punished. SOCRATES: And is being punished not an evil? POLUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: So then, my admirable friend, it appears to you once more that if doing what seems fit to someone is followed by doing it beneficially, it is a good thing, and this, as it seems, is what it is to have great power; but if not, it is a bad thing and to have little power. And let us consider this as well: do we agree that sometimes it is better to do those things we were just now speaking of, namely to kill and banish men and deprive them of property, and sometimes not? POLUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: This, then, as it seems, is agreed upon both by you and by me. POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: When, then, do you say it is better to do these things? Tell me what limit you define. POLUS: You rather, Socrates, answer this yourself. SOCRATES: I say then, Polus, if it is more pleasing to you to hear it from me, that when someone does these things justly, it is better, but when unjustly, worse. POLUS: It is hard to refute you, Socrates! But could not even a child refute you and show that you do not speak the truth? SOCRATES: I shall then be very grateful to the child, and equally to you, if you refute me and rid me of my folly. But do not grow weary of doing a favor to a friend, but refute me. POLUS: But indeed, Socrates, there is no need at all to refute you with ancient matters; for these things that happened only yesterday and the day before are sufficient to refute you and to demonstrate that many unjust men are happy. SOCRATES: What sort of things are these? POLUS: Surely you see this Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, ruling Macedonia? SOCRATES: If I do not see him, at least I hear of him. POLUS: Does he then seem to you to be happy or miserable? SOCRATES: I do not know, Polus; for I have not yet met the man. POLUS: What? Would you know it by meeting him, but otherwise you do not recognize straight off from here that he is happy? SOCRATES: No, by Zeus, certainly not. POLUS: It is clear then, Socrates, that you will say you do not even recognize the Great King as being happy. SOCRATES: And I shall speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands with respect to education and justice. POLUS: What? Is all happiness in this? SOCRATES: So I say, Polus; for I claim that the noble and good man and woman are happy, but the unjust and wicked are miserable.

§471

ΠΩΛ. ἄθλιος ἄρα οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀρχέλαος κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον; ΣΩ. εἴπερ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἄδικος. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικος; ᾧ γε προσῆκε μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐδὲν ἣν νῦν ἔχει, ὄντι ἐκ γυναικὸς ἣ ἦν δούλη Ἀλκέτου τοῦ Περδίκκου ἀδελφοῦ, καὶ κατὰ μὲν τὸ δίκαιον δοῦλος ἦν Ἀλκέτου, καὶ εἰ ἐβούλετο τὰ δίκαια ποιεῖν, ἐδούλευεν ἂν Ἀλκέτῃ καὶ ἦν εὐδαίμων κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον. νῦν δὲ θαυμασίως ὡς5 ἄθλιος γέγονεν, ἐπεὶ τὰ μέγιστα ἠδίκηκεν· ὅς γε πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον μεταπεμψάμενος ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο, ξενίσας καὶ καταμεθύσας αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν ὑὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀνεψιὸν αὑτοῦ, σχεδὸν ἡλικιώτην, ἐμβαλὼν εἰς ἅμαξαν, νύκτωρ ἐξαγαγὼν ἀπέσφαξέν τε καὶ ἠφάνισεν ἀμφοτέρους. καὶ ταῦτα ἀδικήσας ἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος6 καὶ οὐ μετεμέλησεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλʼ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τὸν ἀδελφόν, τὸν γνήσιον τοῦ Περδίκκου ὑόν, παῖδα ὡς ἑπτέτη, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐγίγνετο κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, οὐκ ἐβουλήθη εὐδαίμων γενέσθαι δικαίως ἐκθρέψας καὶ ἀποδοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκείνῳ, ἀλλʼ εἰς φρέαρ ἐμβαλὼν καὶ ἀποπνίξας πρὸς τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ Κλεοπάτραν χῆνα ἔφη διώκοντα ἐμπεσεῖν καὶ ἀποθανεῖν. τοιγάρτοι νῦν, ἅτε μέγιστα ἠδικηκὼς τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀθλιώτατός ἐστιν πάντων Μακεδόνων, ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐδαιμονέστατος, καὶ ἴσως ἔστιν ὅστις Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ σοῦ ἀρξάμενος δέξαιτʼ ἂν ἄλλος ὁστισοῦν Μακεδόνων γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀρχέλαος. ΣΩ. καὶ κατʼ ἀρχὰς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Πῶλε, ἔγωγέ σε ἐπῄνεσα ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς εὖ πρὸς τὴν ῥητορικὴν πεπαιδεῦσθαι, τοῦ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι ἠμεληκέναι· καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος, ᾧ με καὶ ἂν παῖς ἐξελέγξειε, καὶ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ σοῦ νῦν, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἐξελήλεγμαι τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, φάσκων τὸν ἀδικοῦντα οὐκ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι; πόθεν, ὠγαθέ; καὶ μὴν οὐδέν γέ σοι τούτων ὁμολογῶ ὧν σὺ φῄς. ΠΩΛ. οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλεις, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ γέ σοι ὡς ἐγὼ λέγω.

POLUS: Is this Archelaus then miserable according to your argument? SOCRATES: If indeed, my friend, he is unjust. POLUS: But how indeed is he not unjust? A man to whom belonged no part of the rule which he now holds, since he was born of a woman who was a slave of Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, and according to justice he was a slave of Alcetas, and if he wished to do what is just, he would be slaving for Alcetas and would be happy according to your argument. But now he has become wonderfully miserable, since he has committed the greatest injustices; who first of all, having sent for this very master and uncle of his, as if to restore the rule which Perdiccas took from him, having entertained him and made him and his son Alexander, his own cousin, who was almost his equal in age, completely drunk, threw them into a wagon, took them out by night, slaughtered them and made away with both of them. And having done these unjust deeds, he did not realize that he had become most miserable and did not feel any regret; but a little later, when he had a brother, the legitimate son of Perdiccas, a boy of about seven years, to whom the rule belonged according to justice, he did not wish to become happy by justly rearing him and restoring the rule to him, but having thrown him into a well and drowned him, he told his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while chasing a goose and died. Therefore now, having committed the greatest injustices of those in Macedonia, he is the most miserable of all Macedonians, but not the happiest, and perhaps there is some Athenian, beginning with you, who would choose to become any other Macedonian whatsoever rather than Archelaus. SOCRATES: At the beginning of our discussion, Polus, I praised you because you seemed to me to be well-educated in rhetoric, but to have neglected dialogue; and now, is this the argument with which even a child would refute me, and have I now, as you think, been refuted by you with this argument, when I assert that the wrongdoer is not happy? How so, my good friend? For indeed I agree to none of these things that you say. POLUS: Because you do not wish to, since it seems to you just as I say.

Syntax notes6 items
  1. 470aἐὰν μὲν πράττοντι ἃ δοκεῖ ἕπηται τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν

    The dative participle πράττοντι functions as the dative complement of the verb ἕπηται, while the subject of the clause is the articular infinitive phrase τὸ ὠφελίμως πράττειν (doing so beneficially).

  2. 470bἄλλο τι

    An idiomatic expression with ἤ omitted from ἄλλο τι ἤ, introducing a question that expects a strong affirmative answer ("is it not the case that...?").

  3. 470dεἰ δὲ μή

    An elliptical conditional expression based on the negation of the preceding verb (here ὁρᾷς), meaning "even if [I do] not [see him], at least I hear of him."

  4. 470eπαιδείας ὅπως ἔχει καὶ δικαιοσύνης

    A proleptic construction where the subjects of the dependent clause are placed beforehand in the genitive case (παιδείας ... καὶ δικαιοσύνης) as if they were objects, preceding ὅπως and the intransitive verb ἔχει (how he stands with respect to education and justice).

  5. 471aθαυμασίως ὡς

    A colloquial contraction of the impersonal expression θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ὡς (it is wonderful how...), functioning adverbially to mean "wonderfully," "marvelously," or "incredibly."

  6. 471bἔλαθεν ἑαυτὸν ἀθλιώτατος γενόμενος

    The verb λανθάνω combined with the accusative of the reflexive pronoun ἑαυτόν and the participle γενόμενος with a nominative complement, expressing the idea that "he escaped his own notice having become most miserable" (i.e., he did not realize that he had become most miserable).

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:470-471