- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:469
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Socrates and Polus debate the pitiableness of killing justly or unjustly, and whether doing or suffering injustice is the greater evil. Socrates uses the analogy of a hidden dagger to show that merely being able to cause arbitrary destruction is not true power.
ΠΩΛ. ὁπότερʼ ἂν ποιῇ, οὐκ ἀμφοτέρως ζηλωτόν ἐστιν; ΣΩ. εὐφήμει,1 ὦ Πῶλε. ΠΩΛ. τί δή; ΣΩ. ὅτι οὐ χρὴ οὔτε τοὺς ἀζηλώτους ζηλοῦν οὔτε τοὺς ἀθλίους, ἀλλʼ ἐλεεῖν. ΠΩΛ. τί δέ; οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ λέγω τῶν ἀνθρώπων; ΣΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. ὅστις οὖν ἀποκτείνυσιν ὃν ἂν δόξῃ αὐτῷ, δικαίως ἀποκτεινύς, ἄθλιος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι καὶ ἐλεινός; ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε, οὐδὲ μέντοι ζηλωτός. ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἄρτι ἄθλιον ἔφησθα εἶναι; ΣΩ. τὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.2 ΠΩΛ. ἦ που ὅ γε ἀποθνῄσκων ἀδίκως ἐλεινός τε καὶ ἄθλιός ἐστιν. ΣΩ. ἧττον ἢ ὁ ἀποκτεινύς, ὦ Πῶλε, καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὁ δικαίως ἀποθνῄσκων. ΠΩΛ. πῶς δῆτα, ὦ Σώκρατες; ΣΩ. οὕτως, ὡς μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν τυγχάνει ὂν τὸ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. ἦ γὰρ τοῦτο μέγιστον; οὐ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μεῖζον; ΣΩ. ἥκιστά γε. ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα βούλοιο ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἀδικεῖν; ΣΩ. βουλοίμην μὲν ἂν ἔγωγε οὐδέτερα· εἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν3 ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν. ΠΩΛ. σὺ ἄρα τυραννεῖν οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο; ΣΩ. οὔκ, εἰ τὸ τυραννεῖν γε λέγεις ὅπερ ἐγώ. ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ ἔγωγε τοῦτο λέγω ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἐξεῖναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὃ ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ποιεῖν τοῦτο, καὶ ἀποκτεινύντι καὶ ἐκβάλλοντι καὶ πάντα πράττοντι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν. ΣΩ. ὦ μακάριε, ἐμοῦ δὴ λέγοντος τῷ λόγῳ ἐπιλαβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἐν ἀγορᾷ πληθούσῃ λαβὼν ὑπὸ μάλης ἐγχειρίδιον λέγοιμι πρὸς σὲ ὅτι ὦ Πῶλε, ἐμοὶ δύναμίς τις καὶ τυραννὶς θαυμασία ἄρτι προσγέγονεν· ἐὰν γὰρ ἄρα ἐμοὶ δόξῃ τινὰ τουτωνὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὧν σὺ ὁρᾷς αὐτίκα μάλα δεῖν τεθνάναι, τεθνήξει οὗτος ὃν ἂν δόξῃ· κἄν τινα δόξῃ μοι τῆς κεφαλῆς αὐτῶν καταγῆναι δεῖν, κατεαγὼς ἔσται αὐτίκα μάλα, κἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται4—οὕτω μέγα ἐγὼ δύναμαι ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει, εἰ οὖν ἀπιστοῦντί σοι δείξαιμι τὸ ἐγχειρίδιον, ἴσως ἂν εἴποις ἰδὼν ὅτι ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω μὲν πάντες ἂν μέγα δύναιντο, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἐμπρησθείη οἰκία τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ,5 καὶ τά γε Ἀθηναίων νεώρια καὶ αἱ τριήρεις καὶ τὰ πλοῖα πάντα καὶ τὰ δημόσια καὶ τὰ ἴδια· ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτʼ ἔστιν τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι, τὸ ποιεῖν ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἢ δοκεῖ σοι; ΠΩΛ. οὐ δῆτα οὕτω γε.
POLUS: Whichever of the two he does, is it not enviable in either case? SOCRATES: Speak words of good omen, Polus. POLUS: Why so? SOCRATES: Because one ought not to envy those who are unenviable nor those who are miserable, but to pity them. POLUS: What? Does it seem to you to be so with the men of whom I speak? SOCRATES: Why, how could it not? POLUS: Does he then, who kills whomever he sees fit, killing him justly, seem to you to be miserable and pitiable? SOCRATES: Not to me, indeed, yet certainly not enviable either. POLUS: Did you not just now say he was miserable? SOCRATES: I meant the one who kills unjustly, my friend, and pitiable indeed as well; but the one who does so justly is unenviable. POLUS: Surely, I suppose, the one who dies unjustly is both pitiable and miserable. SOCRATES: Less so than the one who kills, Polus, and less so than the one who dies justly. POLUS: How can that be, Socrates? SOCRATES: Thus, since doing injustice happens to be the greatest of evils. POLUS: Is this indeed the greatest? Is not suffering injustice greater? SOCRATES: Not in the least. POLUS: Would you then wish rather to suffer injustice than to do injustice? SOCRATES: I should wish indeed for neither; but if it were necessary either to do injustice or to suffer it, I should choose rather to suffer injustice than to do it. POLUS: Would you then not accept being a tyrant? SOCRATES: Not if you mean by “being a tyrant” the same thing as I do. POLUS: But I mean by it what I said just now: to have the power in the city to do whatever seems fit to him, whether by killing, or banishing, or doing everything according to his own opinion. SOCRATES: My admirable friend, then take hold of my argument while I speak. For if I, in a crowded marketplace, having taken a dagger under my arm, should say to you: “Polus, a certain wonderful power and tyranny has just now come to me; for if indeed I see fit that any of these men whom you see here should die on the spot, he whom I see fit shall be dead; and if I see fit that any of them should have his head broken, it shall be broken on the spot, and if his cloak should be torn, it shall be torn—so great is my power in this city.” If then, while you were disbelieving, I should show you the dagger, you would perhaps say on seeing it: “Socrates, in this way everyone would have great power, since any house which you saw fit might be burned in this manner, and even the Athenian dockyards and triremes and all the vessels, both public and private.” But then this is not what it is to have great power, namely doing what seems fit to one; or does it seem so to you? POLUS: Not indeed in that way.
- 469aεὐφήμει
The second-person singular present imperative of εὐφημέω (literally, 'to speak words of good omen' or 'to keep silence'). In dialogue, it is used idiomatically to interrupt or reject an ominous, blasphemous, or absurd claim, meaning 'Hush!' or 'Don't say such a thing.'
- 469bτὸν ἀδίκως γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἀποκτείναντα, καὶ ἐλεινόν γε πρός· τὸν δὲ δικαίως ἀζήλωτον.
An elliptical response by Socrates to Polus' question. The accusative noun phrase τὸν ... ἀποκτείναντα serves as the subject of the omitted infinitive εἶναι (or object of the implied verb of saying), with the predicate adjective ἄθλιον carried over from Polus' turn. The second part τὸν δὲ δικαίως is a parallel structure with the omitted predicate ἀζήλωτον.
- 469cεἰ δʼ ἀναγκαῖον εἴη ἀδικεῖν ἢ ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἑλοίμην ἂν μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν.
A potential conditional structure expressing a future possibility or a modest hypothesis, with an optative in the protasis (εἴη) and the optative with ἄν in the apodosis (ἑλοίμην ἂν). This form presents Socrates' subjective preference as a gentle, hypothetical choice.
- 469dκἂν θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι, διεσχισμένον ἔσται
Here κἄν is a crasis of καὶ ἐάν. The infinitive διεσχίσθαι (perfect passive infinitive of διασχίζω) relies on the syntax of the preceding parallel clauses, specifically continuing the construction κἂν [δόξῃ μοι] θοἰμάτιον διεσχίσθαι [δεῖν] ('and if it should seem [to me] that his cloak [must] be torn').
- 469eἥντινά σοι δοκοῖ
The verb δοκοῖ in the relative clause introduced by ἥντινα is in the present optative (third-person singular) due to optative assimilation, a grammatical phenomenon where a subordinate clause adopts the optative mood from the potential optative (ἂν ἐμπρησθείη) of its governing main clause.