- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:468
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Socrates and Polus agree that human actions always aim at the "good" rather than the "intermediate" things themselves, concluding that those who act without intelligence do not do what they wish and thus do not possess true great power.
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ ἆρα τοιάδε λέγεις, ἃ ἐνίοτε μὲν μετέχει τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐδετέρου, οἷον καθῆσθαι καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ τρέχειν καὶ πλεῖν, καὶ οἷον αὖ λίθους καὶ ξύλα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις; ἢ ἄλλʼ ἄττα καλεῖς τὰ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακά; ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα. ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν τὰ μεταξὺ ταῦτα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀγαθῶν πράττουσιν ὅταν πράττωσιν, ἢ τἀγαθὰ τῶν μεταξύ; ΠΩΛ. τὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν.1 ΣΩ. τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἄρα διώκοντες καὶ βαδίζομεν ὅταν βαδίζωμεν, οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἕσταμεν ὅταν ἑστῶμεν, τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἢ οὔ; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτείνυμεν, εἴ τινʼ ἀποκτείνυμεν, καὶ ἐκβάλλομεν καὶ ἀφαιρούμεθα χρήματα, οἰόμενοι ἄμεινον εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἢ μή; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἕνεκʼ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες. ΠΩΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι,2 ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνο οὗ ἕνεκα ταῦτα ποιοῦμεν; ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα σφάττειν βουλόμεθα οὐδʼ ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν πόλεων οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἁπλῶς οὕτως, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ᾖ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πράττειν αὐτά, βλαβερὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βουλόμεθα. τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φῂς σύ, τὰ δὲ μήτε ἀγαθὰ μήτε κακὰ οὐ βουλόμεθα, οὐδὲ τὰ κακά. ἦ γάρ; ἀληθῆ σοι δοκῶ λέγειν, ὦ Πῶλε, ἢ οὔ; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; ΠΩΛ. ἀληθῆ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ ταῦτα ὁμολογοῦμεν, εἴ τις ἀποκτείνει τινὰ ἢ ἐκβάλλει ἐκ πόλεως ἢ ἀφαιρεῖται χρήματα, εἴτε τύραννος ὢν εἴτε ῥήτωρ, οἰόμενος ἄμεινον εἶναι αὐτῷ, τυγχάνει δὲ ὂν κάκιον, οὗτος δήπου ποιεῖ ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ· ἦ γάρ; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἃ βούλεται, εἴπερ τυγχάνει ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα; τί οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ; ΠΩΛ. ἀλλʼ οὔ μοι δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος μέγα δύναται ἐν τῇ πόλει ταύτῃ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα δύνασθαι ἀγαθόν τι κατὰ τὴν σὴν ὁμολογίαν; ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔστιν. ΣΩ. ἀληθῆ ἄρα ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, λέγων ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπον ποιοῦντα ἐν πόλει ἃ δοκεῖ αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα δύνασθαι μηδὲ ποιεῖν ἃ βούλεται. ΠΩΛ. ὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο3 ἐξεῖναί σοι ποιεῖν ὅτι δοκεῖ σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ μή, οὐδὲ ζηλοῖς ὅταν ἴδῃς τινὰ ἢ ἀποκτείναντα ὃν ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀφελόμενον χρήματα ἢ δήσαντα. ΣΩ. δικαίως λέγεις ἢ ἀδίκως;
SOCRATES: And do you mean that the things which are neither good nor bad are such as sometimes partake of the good, sometimes of the bad, and sometimes of neither, such as sitting, walking, running, and sailing, and again, like stones and wood and other such things? Is it not these you mean? Or do you call something else things which are neither good nor bad? POLUS: No, but these. SOCRATES: Do they then do these intermediate things, when they do them, for the sake of the good things, or the good things for the sake of the intermediate things? POLUS: Surely the intermediate things for the sake of the good things. SOCRATES: Therefore, it is in pursuit of the good that we both walk when we walk, thinking it is better, and on the contrary, we stand still when we stand still, for the sake of the same thing, the good; or is it not so? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And so too we kill, if we kill anyone, and banish and strip of property, thinking it is better for us to do these things than not? POLUS: Quite so. SOCRATES: It is then for the sake of the good that those who do all these things do them. POLUS: I say so. SOCRATES: Did we not then agree that, as for the things we do for the sake of something, we do not wish for those things themselves, but for that for the sake of which we do them? POLUS: Most certainly. SOCRATES: Then we do not wish to slaughter people, or banish them from cities, or strip them of property simply in this way, but if these things are beneficial, we wish to do them, but if they are harmful, we do not wish to. For we wish for the good things, as you say, but we do not wish for the things which are neither good nor bad, nor for the bad things. Is that not so? Do I seem to you to speak the truth, Polus, or not? Why do you not answer? POLUS: True. SOCRATES: Then if we agree on these things, if someone—whether he is a tyrant or a rhetorician—kills anyone or banishes him from the city or strips him of property, thinking it is better for him, but it happens to be worse, this person surely does what seems fit to him; is that not so? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Is it then also what he wishes, if indeed these things happen to be bad? Why do you not answer? POLUS: Indeed, it does not seem to me that he does what he wishes. SOCRATES: Is there then any way that such a person has great power in this city, if indeed having great power is something good according to your agreement? POLUS: There is not. SOCRATES: Then I was speaking the truth when I said that it is possible for a person who does what seems fit to him in a city not to have great power nor to do what he wishes. POLUS: As if you, Socrates, would not accept the freedom to do whatever seems fit to you in the city rather than not, or do not feel envy when you see someone who has either killed whomsoever he saw fit, or stripped him of property, or bound him! SOCRATES: Do you mean justly or unjustly?
- 468aτὰ μεταξὺ δήπου τῶν ἀγαθῶν
Meaning "Surely we do the intermediate things for the sake of the good things." In response to the preceding question "πὸτερον... ἢ...", the verb πράττομεν (or πράττουσιν) and the preposition ἕνεκα are omitted.
- 468bἃ ἕνεκά του ποιοῦμεν, μὴ ἐκεῖνα βούλεσθαι
The clause introduced by the relative pronoun ἃ ("the things we do for the sake of something") serves as the object of the infinitive βούλεσθαι, which depends on the verb of agreement ὡμολογήσαμεν. The relative clause without an explicit antecedent is placed at the beginning of the sentence for emphasis.
- 468eὡς δὴ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο...
The particles ὡς δή express strong irony or counter-argument ("as if... indeed"), here governing the potential optative with ἄν (οὐκ ἂν δέξαιο), meaning "as if you, Socrates, would not accept..."