Theaetetus

SOCRATES: Then also he who hears something hears at least some one thing, and a thing which is? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And indeed, one who touches something touches at least some one thing, and a thing which is, if indeed he touches one? THEAETETUS: This too. SOCRATES: And does not one who opines opine at least some one thing? THEAETETUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: And does not one who opines some one thing opine something that is? THEAETETUS: I agree. SOCRATES: Therefore, one who opines what is not opines nothing. THEAETETUS: It appears not. SOCRATES: But surely, one who opines nothing at all does not even opine. THEAETETUS: That is clear, as it seems. SOCRATES: Therefore, it is not possible to opine what is not, either about the things which are or by itself. THEAETETUS: It appears not. SOCRATES: Is opining falsely, then, something other than opining what is not? THEAETETUS: It seems to be other. SOCRATES: Therefore, neither in this way nor in the way we were examining a little while ago does false opinion exist in us. THEAETETUS: Certainly not indeed. SOCRATES: But do we call this so when it arises in the following way? THEAETETUS: How? SOCRATES: We say that false opinion is a sort of ‘other-opining’, when someone, exchanging in his mind one of the things that are for another of the things that are, says that it is that other. For in this way he always opines something that is, but one thing instead of another, and missing the mark of what he was aiming at, he might justly be called one who opines falsely. THEAETETUS: You seem to me to have spoken most correctly now. For when someone opines ugly instead of beautiful, or beautiful instead of ugly, then he truly opines falsely. SOCRATES: It is clear, Theaetetus, that you despise me and do not fear me. THEAETETUS: Why especially? SOCRATES: I suppose you think I would not catch you up on your ‘truly false’, asking whether it is possible for a fast thing to become slowly, or a light thing heavily, or any other opposite to become contrary to itself, not according to its own nature but according to that of its opposite. However, I let this pass, so that you may not be bold in vain. But does it please you, as you say, that opining falsely is ‘other-opining’? THEAETETUS: To me, yes. SOCRATES: There is, then, according to your opinion, a setting down in thought of one thing as another and not as what it is. THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed. SOCRATES: Whenever, then, the mind of someone does this, is it not also necessary that it thinks either of both or of one of them? THEAETETUS: Necessarily indeed; either at the same time or in turn. SOCRATES: Excellent. But do you call ‘thinking’ the same thing that I do? THEAETETUS: Calling it what?

​SOCRATES: The talk which the soul itself goes through with itself concerning whatever it is examining. I present this to you as one who does not know. For this is what it appears to me to be doing when it is thinking: nothing other than conversing, questioning itself and answering, affirming and denying. And when it has reached a decision, whether slowly or by leaping more quickly to it, and now says the same thing and no longer doubts, we set this down as its opinion. So that I call opining ‘speaking’, and opinion ‘spoken talk’—not, indeed, to another nor aloud, but in silence to oneself. What about you? THEAETETUS: I agree too. SOCRATES: So, whenever someone opines one thing as another, he also says to himself, as it seems, that the one is the other. THEAETETUS: Of course. SOCRATES: Recall then whether you have ever said to yourself that most assuredly the beautiful is ugly or the unjust is just. Or indeed, as the sum of all, examine whether you have ever attempted to persuade yourself that most assuredly one thing is another, or whether, quite to the contrary, you have never dared to say to yourself, even in your sleep, that absolutely odd numbers are even, or anything else of that sort. THEAETETUS: You speak the truth. SOCRATES: And do you think anyone else, whether sane or mad, would dare to say in all seriousness to himself, trying to persuade himself, that a cow must be a horse or that two must be one? THEAETETUS: By Zeus, not I. SOCRATES: Therefore, if speaking to oneself is opining, no one who speaks of and opines both, and touches both with his soul, would say and opine that the one is the other. And you must also let the phrase pass; for I mean it in this way: that no one opines that the ugly is beautiful or anything else of that sort. THEAETETUS: But, Socrates, I do let it pass, and it seems to me to be as you say. SOCRATES: So, for one who opines both, it is impossible to opine that the one is the other. THEAETETUS: So it seems. SOCRATES: But surely, one who opines only one of them, but the other not at all, will never opine that the one is the other. THEAETETUS: You speak the truth; for he would be compelled to touch also that which he does not opine. SOCRATES: Therefore, neither for one who opines both nor for one who opines only one is ‘other-opining’ possible. So, if anyone defines false opinion as ‘hetero-opining’, he would be saying nothing at all; for neither in this way nor according to the previous ones does false opinion appear to exist in us. THEAETETUS: It seems not. SOCRATES: But indeed, Theaetetus, if this does not appear to exist, we shall be compelled to admit many strange things. THEAETETUS: What sort of things, indeed?