- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus I: Tetralogia I-II. Burnet, John, 1863-1928, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg006.humanitext-grc2:188
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates and Theaetetus examine how false opinion is possible, concluding first that it is impossible within the dichotomy of "knowing or not knowing," and then shift their investigation to the alternative standpoint of "being and not being."
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τόδε γʼ ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαίρειν λέγω1 ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γʼ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα οἴεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ αὖ ἀμφότερα; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἆρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι ἕτερα ἄττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι2 εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης; ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς ἄν; ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μήν, ἅ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεταί που ἃ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδʼ αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν. ΘΕΑΙ. τέρας γὰρ ἔσται. ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν ἂν ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν που δοξάζειν, ἐπείπερ πάντʼ ἢ ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ ταύτῃ σκεπτέον ὃ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰόντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μή; ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς λέγεις; ΣΩ. μὴ ἁπλοῦν ᾖ ὅτι3 ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὁτουοῦν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὡς οὐ4 ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ. ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γʼ αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ· δυνατὸν δὲ ὁτῳοῦν ὃ λέγεται, καί τις ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὂν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του εἴτε αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτό; καὶ ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, πρὸς ταῦτα φήσομεν· ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος· ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν; ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως. ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν; ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μέν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἕν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. ἢ σὺ οἴει ποτὲ τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι; ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκ ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ὁ ἄρα ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ. ΘΕΑΙ. φαίνεται.
SOCRATES: Is it not, then, the case for us, concerning everything and each individual thing, that we either know it or do not know it? For learning and forgetting, which lie between these, I bid goodbye to for the present; for at present they have nothing to do with our argument. THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, nothing else is left concerning each thing except knowing or not knowing. SOCRATES: Therefore, is it not now necessary that one who opines must opine either about something of what he knows, or about what he does not know? THEAETETUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: And indeed, it is impossible for one who knows not to know the very same thing, or for one who does not know to know it. THEAETETUS: Of course. SOCRATES: Does, then, the one who opines falsely think that these things which he knows are not these very things, but some other things of those which he knows, so that, knowing both, he is in turn ignorant of both? THEAETETUS: But that is impossible, Socrates. SOCRATES: But then, does he believe that the things which he does not know are some other things of those which he does not know? And is this like someone who knows neither Theaetetus nor Socrates conceiving in his mind that Socrates is Theaetetus or Theaetetus is Socrates? THEAETETUS: And how could that be? SOCRATES: But surely, one does not think that the things which he knows are the things which he does not know, nor, again, that the things which he does not know are the things which he knows. THEAETETUS: For that would be a monstrosity. SOCRATES: How then could one still opine falsely? For it is surely impossible to opine outside of these, since we either know or do not know all things, and within these limits it nowhere appears possible to opine falsely. THEAETETUS: Most true. SOCRATES: Should we then examine what we are seeking, not by going along the line of knowing and not knowing, but along that of being and not being? THEAETETUS: How do you mean? SOCRATES: May it not be simply that one who opines what is not about anything cannot fail to opine falsely, no matter how his mind may otherwise be disposed? THEAETETUS: That indeed is likely, Socrates. SOCRATES: How then? What shall we say, Theaetetus, if someone questions us: “Is what is proposed possible for anyone, and will any human being opine what is not, whether about some of the things that are or by itself?” And we, as it seems, shall say in reply to this: “Yes, whenever one opines, and does not opine what is true.” Or how shall we say? THEAETETUS: Thus. SOCRATES: Is there, then, such a thing as this anywhere else? THEAETETUS: What sort of thing? SOCRATES: If someone sees something, but sees nothing. THEAETETUS: How indeed? SOCRATES: But surely, if he sees at least some one thing, he sees something of those things which are. Or do you think that ‘one’ can ever be among the things that are not? THEAETETUS: Not I. SOCRATES: Then he who sees at least some one thing sees something that is. THEAETETUS: So it appears.
- 188aχαίρειν λέγω
An idiomatic expression meaning "to bid goodbye" or "to dismiss." Here it is used in the sense of "to exclude from consideration for now," declaring that learning (μανθάνειν) and forgetting (ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι) are temporarily set aside from the inquiry.
- 188bτῷ μήτε Θεαίτητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι
A dative participle acting as the logical subject of the infinitive phrase εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν, which is governed by ἔστι in its impersonal sense of "it is possible." It expresses the structure "it is possible for one who knows neither... to conceive in their mind."
- 188dμὴ ἁπλοῦν ᾖ ὅτι
An independent clause with μὴ followed by the subjunctive (ᾖ), expressing a cautious assertion or conjecture ("may it not be that..."). The ὅτι clause is a noun clause explaining the content of the adjective ἁπλοῦν (a simple thing).
- 188dοὐκ ἔσθʼ ὡς οὐ
An idiomatic double negation expressing a strong affirmation ("it is impossible that... not," i.e., "it must certainly be"). Here it is used with δοξάσει (future indicative) to show that one who opines non-being cannot fail to opine falsely.