Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​Moreover, the skeptics do away with the phrase "No more" itself; for just as providence exists no more than it does not exist, so also "No more" is no more than it is not. The phrase therefore signifies, as Timon also says in the Python, "to determine nothing, but to withhold assent." And the phrase "To every argument an argument is opposed" itself also brings about suspension of judgment; for when the matters of fact are in conflict, and the arguments are of equal strength, ignorance of the truth follows. And to this argument itself an argument is opposed, which, after overturning the others, is itself inverted by itself and perishes, just like puratives, which, having first expelled the matter from the body, are themselves evacuated and eliminated along with it.

​To this the dogmatists say that [the skeptics] do not abolish argument, but rather corroborate it. But they used arguments merely as instruments; for it was not possible to overturn argument without argument; just as we are accustomed to say that place does not exist, and yet must by all means say "place," though not dogmatically, but demonstratively; and that nothing happens by necessity, and yet must say "necessity." They made use of an interpretation of this sort; for, they say, things are not by nature of such a kind as they appear, but merely appear so; and they said that they investigate not the things they conceive (for what is conceived is obvious), but those which they participate in through sensations.

​The Pyrrhonian argument, then, is a certain indication of things appearing or in any way conceived, according to which all things are compared with all, and when examined together are found to contain much irregularity and confusion, as Aenesidemus says in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism. And against the antitheses in their inquiries, having first shown the modes by which things persuade, they abolished belief concerning them by those very same modes. For things that are consistent with sensation, and those that never or at least rarely change, and customary things, and those ordained by laws, and pleasing things, and admired things, carry persuasion.

​They demonstrated, therefore, from the opposites equal plausibilities to those that persuade. And the perplexities concerning the agreements of things appearing or conceived, which they rendered, were according to ten modes, in accordance with which the underlying objects appeared variable. And he sets out these ten modes: The first is that based on the differences among animals with respect to pleasure, pain, harm, and benefit. Through this it is inferred that the same impressions do not arise from the same objects, and that suspension of judgment follows upon such a conflict. For among animals, some come into being without copulation, such as fire-dwellers, the Arabian phoenix, and grubs; while others come from intercourse, such as human beings and the rest;

​and some are compounded in this way, and others in that. Wherefore they differ also in sensation, as hawks are keenest of sight, and dogs keenest of scent. It is reasonable, then, that to different eyes different appearances also present themselves; and that for a goat a young shoot is edible, but for a human being bitter, and hemlock is nourishing to quail, but fatal to human beings, and dung is edible to swine, but not to a horse. The second mode is that based on the natures and idiosyncrasies of human beings; Demophon, for instance, the table-servant of Alexander, felt warm in the shade and shivered in the sun.