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Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

§9.11.71-9.11.75

Precursors of Skepticism and Meaning of Key Formulas

Homer, the Seven Sages, early philosophers, and poets are cited as precursors of skepticism, followed by an explanation of the skeptics' rejection of dogmas and the meaning of their key formulas such as "We determine nothing" and "No more."

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Ταύτης δὲ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἔνιοί φασιν Ὅμηρον 〈·〉1, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων παρʼ ὁντινοῦν ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλως ἀποφαίνεται καὶ οὐδὲν ὁρικῶς δογματίζει περὶ τὴν ἀπόφασιν. ἔπειτα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν σκεπτικὰ εἶναι, οἷον τὸ Μηδὲν ἄγαν, καὶ Ἐγγύα, πάρα δʼ ἄτα· δηλοῦσθαι γὰρ τῷ βεβαίως καὶ πεπεισμένως διεγγυωμένῳ ἐπακολουθεῖν ἄτην. ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ Εὐριπίδην σκεπτικῶς ἔχειν, ἐν οἷς Ἀρχίλοχος μέν φησι· "τοῖος ἀνθρώποισι θυμός, Γλαῦκε Λεπτίνεω πάϊ, γίγνεται θνητοῖς ὁκοίην Ζεὺς ἐπʼ ἡμέρην ἄγει." Εὐριπίδης δέ· "(ὡ̓͂ Ζεῦ,) τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα δρῶμέν τε τοιάδʼ ἃ ʼν σὺ τυγχάνῃς θέλων."

​Some say that Homer was the founder of this sect, since concerning the same things he expresses himself differently at different times more than anyone else, and dogmatizes nothing definitively regarding his statement. Next, they say that the maxims of the Seven Sages are also skeptical, such as "Nothing in excess" and "Offer a pledge, and ruin is at hand"; for this indicates that ruin attends the one who makes a pledge firmly and with conviction. Moreover, Archilochus and Euripides are said to be skeptically disposed, among whom Archilochus says: "Such is the mind of mortal men, Glaucus, son of Leptines, as the day which Zeus brings upon them." And Euripides: "O Zeus, why then do they say that wretched mortals have wisdom? For we are suspended from thee and do such things as thou happenest to wish."

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοφάνης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Ἐλεάτης καὶ Δημόκριτος κατʼ αὐτοὺς σκεπτικοὶ τυγχάνουσιν· ἐν οἷς Ξενοφάνης μέν φησι, "καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται εἰδώς." Ζήνων δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ἀναιρεῖ λέγων, τὸ κινούμενον οὔτʼ ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τόπῳ κινεῖται οὔτʼ ἐν ᾧ μὴ ἔστι· Δημόκριτος δὲ τὰς ποιότητας ἐκβάλλων, ἵνα φησί, νόμῳ ψυχρόν, νόμῳ θερμόν, ἐτεῇ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν· καὶ πάλιν, ἐτεῇ δὲ οὐδὲν ἴδμεν· ἐν βυθῷ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια. καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς θεοῖς τε καὶ θεῶν παισὶν ἐκχωρεῖν, τὸν δʼ εἰκότα λόγον ζητεῖν. καὶ Εὐριπίδην λέγειν·

​Nay, further, Xenophanes, Zeno of Elea, and Democritus are also, according to them, skeptics. Among these Xenophanes says: "And indeed no man has seen, nor will there be anyone who knows, the clear truth." And Zeno does away with motion, saying: "That which moves moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not." And Democritus, rejecting qualities, says: "By convention cold, by convention hot, but in truth atoms and void." And again: "In truth we know nothing; for truth is in the depth." Plato also is said to concede the truth to gods and sons of gods, and to seek the likely account. And Euripides says:

"τίς δʼ οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἐστι κατθανεῖν, τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν νομίζεται βροτοῖς;" ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα· "οὕτως οὔτʼ ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδʼ ἀνδράσιν οὔτʼ ἐπακουστὰ οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά·" καὶ ἐπάνω, "αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτῳ προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος·" ἔτι μὴν Ἡράκλειτον, μὴ εἰκῆ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλώμεθα· καὶ Ἱπποκράτην [ἔπειτα] ἐνδοιαστῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως ἀποφαίνεσθαι· καὶ πρὶν Ὅμηρον, "στρεπτὴ δὲ γλῶσσʼ ἐστὶ βροτῶν, πολέες δʼ ἔνι μῦθοι·" καὶ "ἐπέων δὲ πολὺς νομὸς ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα·" καὶ "ὁπποῖόν κʼ εἴπῃσθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κʼ ἐπακούσαις·" τὴν ἰσοσθένειαν λέγων καὶ ἀντίθεσιν τῶν λόγων.

"Who knows if living is dying, and dying is accounted living among mortals?" And Empedocles too: "Thus these things are neither to be seen by men nor to be heard, nor to be grasped by the mind;" and previously: "Persuaded only of that which each has chanced upon." Furthermore, Heraclitus says: "Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things;" and Hippocrates is said to express himself doubtfully and humanly; and before them Homer: "Pliant is the tongue of mortals, and many tales are within it;" and: "Wide is the range of words hither and thither;" and: "Whatever word thou speakest, such wouldst thou hear in return;" speaking of the equipollence and antithesis of arguments.

Διετέλουν δὴ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ τὰ τῶν αἱρέσεων δόγματα πάντʼ ἀνατρέποντες, αὐτοὶ δʼ οὐδὲν ἀπεφαίνοντο δογματικῶς, ἕως δὲ τοῦ προφέρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ διηγεῖσθαι μηδὲν ὁρίζοντες2, μηδʼ αὐτὸ τοῦτο. ὥστε καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρίζειν ἀνῄρουν, λέγοντες οἷον Οὐδὲν ὁρίζομεν, ἐπεὶ ὥριζον ἄν· προφερόμεθα δέ, φασί, τὰς ἀποφάσεις εἰς μήνυσιν τῆς ἀπροπτωσίας, ὡς, εἰ καὶ νεύσαντας, τοῦτο ἐνεδέχετο δηλῶσαι3· διὰ τῆς οὖν Οὐδὲν ὁρίζομεν φωνῆς τὸ τῆς ἀρρεψίας πάθος δηλοῦται· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς Παντὶ λόγῳ λόγος ἀντίκειται καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων.

​The skeptics, then, continually overturned all the dogmas of the sects, while dogmatically asserting nothing themselves, proceeding only so far as to quote and narrate the views of others without determining anything, not even this very thing. So that they even did away with "not determining," saying, for example, "We determine nothing," since otherwise they would be determining. "We utter these statements," they say, "as an indication of our freedom from rashness, just as if it were possible to show this even by a nod of the head." Through the phrase "We determine nothing," therefore, the condition of non-inclination is indicated; and likewise through "No more" and "To every argument an argument is opposed," and similar expressions.

λέγεται δὲ τὸ Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καὶ θετικῶς, ὡς ὁμοίων τινῶν ὄντων· οἷον, Οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ πειρατὴς κακός ἐστιν ἢ ὁ ψεύστης. ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν σκεπτικῶν οὐ θετικῶς ἀλλʼ ἀναιρετικῶς λέγεται, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνασκευάζοντος καὶ λέγοντος, Οὐ μᾶλλον ἡ Σκύλλα γέγονεν ἢ ἡ Χίμαιρα. αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ Μᾶλλον ποτὲ μὲν συγκριτικῶς ἐκφέρεται, ὡς ὅταν φῶμεν μᾶλλον τὸ μέλι γλυκὺ ἢ τὴν σταφίδα· ποτὲ δὲ θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς4, ὡς ὅταν φῶμεν, Μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ ἢ βλάπτει· σημαίνομεν γὰρ ὅτι ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ, βλάπτει δʼ οὔ.

​The phrase "No more" is also used positively, as when certain things are equal; for example, "The pirate is no more wicked than the liar." But by the skeptics it is used not positively but negatively, as by one who refutes and says, "Scylla existed no more than the Chimaera." And the word "more" itself is sometimes uttered comparatively, as when we say "Honey is sweeter than a raisin"; and sometimes positively and negatively, as when we say "Virtue benefits rather than harms"; for we mean that virtue benefits, but does not harm.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 9.11.71Ταύτης δὲ τῆς αἱρέσεως ἔνιοί φασιν Ὅμηρον 〈·〉

    The lacuna marked by angled brackets is conventionally understood with a supplied infinitive such as ἄρξαι or προπάτορα γεγονέναι. Ὅμηρον functions as the subject accusative of an indirect discourse construction, meaning that some claim Homer to be the founder or precursor of this school.

  2. 9.11.74ἕως δὲ τοῦ προφέρεσθαι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ διηγεῖσθαι μηδὲν ὁρίζοντες

    The prepositional phrase ἕως τοῦ with infinitives (προφέρεσθαι, διηγεῖσθαι) marks the limit or scope ("only so far as citing and narrating the views of others"). The participle μηδὲν ὁρίζοντες agrees with the subject (the skeptics), qualifying the manner of their discourse ("determining nothing").

  3. 9.11.74ὡς, εἰ καὶ νεύσαντας, τοῦτο ἐνεδέχετο δηλῶσαι

    An elliptical construction. εἰ καὶ νεύσαντας functions as an elliptical condition with an accusative participle ("as if, even merely by nodding [their head], it had been possible to indicate this"), treating the skeptics as the accusative subject of the implicit action.

  4. 9.11.75ποτὲ δὲ θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς

    The adverbs θετικῶς καὶ ἀναιρετικῶς mean "by affirming the one and denying the other," as shown by the subsequent explanation ("virtue benefits, but does not harm"). It designates a composite use affirming the prior term while negating the latter.

Model: gemini-3.8-flashurn:cts:greekLit:tlg0004.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:9.11.71-9.11.75