Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​They also say that the wise man does all things well, just as we also say that Ismenias plays all tunes well on the flute. And all things belong to the wise; for the law has given them complete authority. But some things are said to belong to the base in the same manner as they are said to belong to the unjust, just as we say that a thing belongs in one sense to the city, but in another sense to those who use it. They also say that the virtues follow upon one another reciprocally, and that the one who has one has them all; for their theorems are common, just as Chrysippus says in the first book of On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the ancient doctrine, and Hecaton in the third book of On Virtues.

​For the virtuous person is both contemplative and practical regarding what must be done. And the things that must be done are things to be chosen, things to be endured, things to be steadfastly adhered to, and things to be distributed; so that if he does some things by choice, some by endurance, some by distribution, and some by adherence, he is prudent, courageous, just, and temperate. Each of the virtues is summarized around a specific principal matter: for example, courage is concerned with things to be endured, prudence with things to be done, things not to be done, and things neither; and similarly the other virtues are directed toward their proper objects. Furthermore, good counsel and sagacity follow upon prudence, good order and propriety follow upon temperance, equality and fairness follow upon justice, and stability and mental vigor follow upon courage.

​It is also their doctrine that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice, whereas the Peripatetics say that moral progress is intermediate between virtue and vice; for just as they say a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a person must be either just or unjust, and neither more just nor more unjust, and likewise in the other cases. Furthermore, Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, but Cleanthes that it cannot be lost; the former says it can be lost through intoxication and melancholy, while the latter says it cannot be lost on account of firm graspings; and it is choice-worthy for its own sake. At any rate, we feel shame over the things in which we act badly, as if knowing that only the noble is good. And it is sufficient for happiness, as Zeno and Chrysippus say in the first book of On Virtues and Hecaton in the second book of On Goods.

"For if," he says, "greatness of soul is sufficient to make one rise above all things, and it is a part of virtue, virtue too will be sufficient for happiness, despising even the things that seem troublesome." Panaetius and Posidonius, however, say that virtue is not self-sufficient, but claim that there is need of health, material provision, and physical strength as well. They also approve of exercising virtue continually, as the followers of Cleanthes say; for it is indestructible, and the virtuous person continually employs his soul, which is in a state of perfection. And justice exists by nature and not by convention, as do the law and right reason, as Chrysippus says in On the Noble.

​They also hold that one should not abandon philosophy on account of disagreement among philosophers, since by that reasoning one would abandon life as a whole, as Posidonius also says in the Exhortations. Chrysippus also says that the general curriculum studies are useful. Furthermore, they hold that we have no obligation of justice toward the other animals, on account of unlikeness, as Chrysippus says in the first book of On Justice and Posidonius in the first book of On Duty. And the wise man will love those youths who manifest through their appearance a natural disposition toward virtue, as Zeno says in the Republic, Chrysippus in the first book of On Lives, and Apollodorus in the Ethics.