Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​They hold that one should also revere parents and brothers in the second rank after the gods. They also say that parental affection toward children is natural to them, but does not exist in the base. Furthermore, they approve of regarding errors as equal, as Chrysippus says in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, and Persaeus, and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another truth, neither is one falsehood more false than another falsehood; so too, neither is one deceit more deceitful than another, nor one error greater than another. For both the person who is a hundred stades distant from Canopus and the one who is one stade distant are equally not in Canopus; so also both the person who errs more and the one who errs less are equally not in the state of acting rightly.

​However, Heraclides of Tarsus, a pupil of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus say that errors are unequal. They say that the wise man will engage in public life unless something hinders him, as Chrysippus says in the first book of On Lives; for he will both restrain vice and urge on to virtue. And he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and produce children. Moreover, the wise man will not form mere opinions, that is, he will not give assent to any falsehood. They also say that he will follow the Cynic way; for Cynicism is a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. He will also taste human flesh under extraordinary circumstances. And only the wise man is free, but the base are slaves; for freedom is the power of independent action, while slavery is the privation of independent action.

​There is also another form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third consisting in both possession and subordination, to which mastership is opposed, which is also itself base. And not only are the wise free, but they are also kings, since kingship is an office not subject to audit, which could subsist only in the case of the wise, just as Chrysippus says in his work On Zeno's Proper Use of Terms; for he says that the ruler must have knowledge of goods and evils, and none of the base understands these things. Similarly, they alone are capable of ruling, of acting as judges, and of oratory, while none of the base is. Moreover, they are sinless, in that they are not liable to fall into error.

​They are also harmless; for they harm neither others nor themselves. Nor are they compassionate, nor do they grant pardon to anyone; for they do not remit the punishments assigned by the law, since yielding, pity, and leniency itself are petty weakness of a soul pretending to kindness toward punishments; nor do they think these punishments too harsh. Moreover, the wise man marvels at none of the things that seem paradoxical, such as Charon's caves, the ebb and flow of tides, springs of hot water, and eruptions of fire. Furthermore, they say that the virtuous person will by no means live in solitude; for he is by nature social and practical. Nevertheless, he will accept physical training for the sake of bodily endurance.

​And they say that the wise man will pray, asking for goods from the gods, as Posidonius says in the first book of On Appropriate Actions and Hecaton in the third book of On Paradoxical Things. They also say that friendship exists only among the virtuous, on account of their similarity; and they say that it is a certain partnership in the affairs of life, since we treat our friends as ourselves. And they declare that a friend is choice-worthy for his own sake and that having many friends is a good. But among the base there is no friendship, and none of the base has a friend. And all the foolish are mad; for they are not prudent, but do everything according to a madness equal to their foolishness.