← Diogenes Laertius

Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

§7.1.114-7.1.119

Good Emotions and the Virtues of the Passionless Sage

The passage defines the remaining passions (wrath, rage, pleasure and its species) and analogizes diseases of the soul, before contrasting them with the three good emotions (joy, caution, wishing). It then describes the virtuous characteristics of the Stoic sage—passionless, unaffected, austere, genuinely pious, and alone fit to be a priest.

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μῆνις δέ ἐστιν ὀργή τις πεπαλαιωμένη καὶ ἐπίκοτος, ἐπιτηρητικὴ δέ, ὅπερ ἐμφαίνεται διὰ τῶνδε· "εἴ περ γάρ τε χόλον γε καὶ αὐτῆμαρ καταπέψῃ, ἀλλά τε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον, ὄφρα τελέσσῃ." ὁ δὲ θυμός ἐστιν ὀργὴ ἀρχομένη. Ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφʼ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν, ὑφʼ ἣν τάττεται κήλησις, ἐπιχαιρεκακία, τέρψις, διάχυσις. κήλησις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡδονὴ διʼ ὤτων κατακηλοῦσα· ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπʼ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις1, προτροπή τις ψυχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἀνειμένον· διάχυσις δʼ ἀνάλυσις ἀρετῆς.

​And wrath is an anger that is inveterate and resentful, yet waiting for an opportunity, which is shown by these verses: "For even if he swallows down his anger for the day itself, yet he still keeps rancor thereafter, until he accomplishes it." And rage is an anger that is just beginning. Pleasure is an irrational elation over what seems to be choice-worthy, under which are arranged charm, malice, delight, and dissipation. Charm, then, is a pleasure that enchants through the ears; malice is pleasure at another's misfortunes; delight is, as it were, a turning, a certain inclination of the soul toward relaxation; and dissipation is a dissolution of virtue.

Ὡς δὲ λέγεταί τινα ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀρρωστήματα, οἷον ποδάγρα καὶ ἀρθρίτιδες, οὕτω κἀπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς φιλοδοξία καὶ φιληδονία καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. τὸ γὰρ ἀρρώστημά ἐστι νόσημα μετʼ ἀσθενείας, τὸ δὲ νόσημα οἴησις σφόδρα δοκοῦντος αἱρετοῦ. καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος εὐεμπτωσίαι τινὲς λέγονται, οἷον κατάρρους καὶ διάρροια, οὕτω κἀπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσιν εὐκαταφορίαι, οἷον φθονερία, ἐλεημοσύνη, ἔριδες καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια.

​And just as certain infirmities are spoken of in the body, such as gout and arthritis, so also in the soul are ambition, love of pleasure, and things similar to these. For an infirmity is an illness accompanied by weakness, and an illness is an opinion of something that seems strongly choice-worthy. And just as certain proclivities are spoken of in the body, such as catarrh and diarrhea, so also in the soul are propensities, such as enviousness, excessive pity, contentious rivalry, and the like.

Εἶναι δὲ καὶ εὐπαθείας φασὶ τρεῖς, χαράν, εὐλάβειαν, βούλησιν. καὶ τὴν μὲν χαρὰν ἐναντίαν [φασὶν] εἶναι τῇ ἡδονῇ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔπαρσιν· τὴν δʼ εὐλάβειαν τῷ φόβῳ, οὖσαν εὔλογον ἔκκλισιν. φοβηθήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ τὸν σοφὸν οὐδαμῶς, εὐλαβηθήσεσθαι δέ. τῇ δʼ ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐναντίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν βούλησιν, οὖσαν εὔλογον ὄρεξιν. καθάπερ οὖν ὑπὸ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη πίπτει τινά, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὑπὸ τὰς πρώτας εὐπαθείας· καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν βούλησιν εὔνοιαν, εὐμένειαν, ἀσπασμόν, ἀγάπησιν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν εὐλάβειαν αἰδῶ, ἁγνείαν· ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν χαρὰν τέρψιν, εὐφροσύνην, εὐθυμίαν.

​And they say that there are also three good emotions: joy, caution, and wishing. And they say that joy is contrary to pleasure, being a rational elation; and caution to fear, being a rational avoidance. For the wise man will by no means fear, but will exercise caution. And they say that wishing is contrary to appetite, being a rational desire. Just as, then, certain species fall under the primary passions, in the same manner they do under the primary good emotions: under wishing are goodwill, kindliness, affection, and loving regard; under caution are modesty and purity; and under joy are delight, cheerfulness, and good spirits.

Φασὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπαθῆ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ ἀνέμπτωτον εἶναι· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἀπαθῆ τὸν φαῦλον, ἐν ἴσῳ λεγόμενον τῷ σκληρῷ καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ. ἄτυφόν τʼ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· ἴσως γὰρ ἔχειν πρός τε τὸ ἔνδοξον καὶ τὸ ἄδοξον. εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ἄτυφον, κατὰ τὸν εἰκαῖον τεταγμένον, ὅς ἐστι φαῦλος. καὶ αὐστηροὺς δέ φασιν εἶναι πάντας τοὺς σπουδαίους, τῷ μήτʼ αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν2 μήτε παρʼ ἄλλων τὰ πρὸς ἡδονὴν προσδέχεσθαι. καὶ ἄλλον δὲ εἶναι αὐστηρόν, παραπλησίως λεγόμενον τῷ αὐστηρῷ οἴνῳ, ᾧ πρὸς μὲν φαρμακοποιίαν χρῶνται, πρὸς δὲ πρόποσιν οὐ πάνυ.

​And they say that the wise man is also free from passion, because he is not liable to fall into it; but the base person is also said to be passionless in another sense, spoken of on a par with hard and unbending. And the wise man is free from vanity; for he is equally disposed toward both good reputation and disrepute. But there is also another who is free from vanity, ranked among the thoughtless, who is base. And they say that all virtuous persons are austere, in that they neither converse for pleasure nor accept from others things directed toward pleasure. But another person is also called austere, spoken of in a way similar to austere wine, which they use for medicine, but not at all for banquet drinking.

Ἀκιβδήλους τοὺς σπουδαίους φυλακτικούς τʼ εἶναι τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον αὑτοὺς παριστάναι3, διὰ παρασκευῆς τῆς τὰ φαῦλα μὲν ἀποκρυπτούσης, τὰ δʼ ὑπάρχοντα ἀγαθὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιούσης. ἀπλάστους τε· περιῃρηκέναι γὰρ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τὸ πλάσμα καὶ τῷ εἴδει. ἀπράγμονάς τʼ εἶναι· ἐκκλίνειν γὰρ τὸ πράττειν τι παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. καὶ οἰνωθήσεσθαι μέν, οὐ μεθυσθήσεσθαι δέ. ἔτι δʼ οὐδὲ μανήσεσθαι· προσπεσεῖσθαι μέντοι ποτὲ αὐτῷ φαντασίας ἀλλοκότους διὰ μελαγχολίαν ἢ λήρησιν, οὐ κατὰ τὸν τῶν αἱρετῶν λόγον, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν. οὐδὲ μὴν λυπηθήσεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, διὰ τὸ τὴν λύπην ἄλογον εἶναι συστολὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρός φησιν ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ.

​Virtuous persons are genuine, being guarded against presenting themselves in a better light through artifice that conceals faults and makes present goods appear. And they are unaffected; for they have stripped away affectedness in speech and appearance. And they mind their own business; for they avoid doing anything contrary to appropriate action. And they will become cheerful with wine, but will not become drunk. Furthermore, the wise man will not go mad; however, grotesque impressions may once fall upon him on account of melancholy or delirium, not according to the rational assessment of choice-worthy things, but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man grieve, because grief is an irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics.

Θείους τʼ εἶναι· ἔχειν γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱονεὶ θεόν. τὸν δʼ φαῦλον ἄθεον. διττὸν δὲ εἶναι τὸν ἄθεον, τόν τʼ ἐναντίως τῷ θείῳ λεγόμενον καὶ τὸν ἐξουθενητικὸν τοῦ θείου· ὅπερ οὐκ εἶναι περὶ πάντα φαῦλον. θεοσεβεῖς τε τοὺς σπουδαίους· ἐμπείρους γὰρ εἶναι τῶν περὶ θεοὺς νομίμων· εἶναί τε τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ θύσειν αὐτοὺς θεοῖς ἁγνούς θʼ ὑπάρχειν· ἐκνεύειν γὰρ τὰ περὶ θεοὺς ἁμαρτήματα. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἄγασθαι αὐτούς· ὁσίους τε γὰρ εἶναι καὶ δικαίους πρὸς τὸ θεῖον. μόνους θʼ ἱερέας τοὺς σοφούς· ἐπεσκέφθαι γὰρ περὶ θυσιῶν, ἱδρύσεων, καθαρμῶν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν πρὸς θεοὺς οἰκείων.

​And they are divine; for they have within themselves, as it were, a god. But the base person is godless. And godless has a twofold meaning: the one spoken of as contrary to the divine, and the one that despises the divine; which latter does not apply to every base person. Virtuous persons are also pious; for they are experienced in the customs concerning the gods; and piety is knowledge of the service of the gods. What is more, they will sacrifice to the gods and remain pure; for they swerve away from offenses concerning the gods. And the gods admire them; for they are holy and just toward the divine. And only the wise are priests; for they have investigated sacrifices, foundations of temples, purifications, and the other matters proper to the gods.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 7.1.114τέρψις δέ, οἷον τρέψις

    An etymological and phonetic association linking τέρψις ("delight") with τρέψις ("turning"), typical of Stoic etymological practice explaining psychological phenomena by phonetic resemblance.

  2. 7.1.117τῷ μήτʼ αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν

    The articular infinitive in the dative case (τῷ + infinitive) expresses cause or ground for the preceding assertion αὐστηροὺς εἶναι ("because they themselves neither converse for pleasure...").

  3. 7.1.118φυλακτικούς τʼ εἶναι τοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον αὑτοὺς παριστάναι

    The adjective φυλακτικός takes a genitive articular infinitive (τοῦ + infinitive) in the sense of the middle φυλάσσομαι ("to guard against", "to avoid carefully"), complementing ἀκιβδήλους: they are careful to guard against presenting themselves in a better light through hypocritical artifice.

Model: gemini-3.8-flashurn:cts:greekLit:tlg0004.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:7.1.114-7.1.119