← Diogenes Laertius

Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

§7.1.104-7.1.108

Division of Indifferents and the Definition of Appropriate Action

The passage discusses the two senses of Stoic “indifferents,” the division into “preferred” and “rejected” things based on three definitions of “value,” followed by the definition, etymology, and classification of “appropriate action” (kathēkon).

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ὠφελεῖν δέ ἐστι κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν1 κατʼ ἀρετήν, βλάπτειν δὲ κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν κατὰ κακίαν. Διχῶς δὲ λέγεσθαι ἀδιάφορα· ἅπαξ μὲν τὰ μήτε πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν συνεργοῦντα, ὡς ἔχει πλοῦτος, δόξα, ὑγίεια, ἰσχὺς καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων εὐδαιμονεῖν, τῆς ποιᾶς αὐτῶν χρήσεως εὐδαιμονικῆς οὔσης ἢ κακοδαιμονικῆς. ἄλλως δὲ λέγεται ἀδιάφορα τὰ μήθʼ ὁρμῆς μήτʼ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά, ὡς ἔχει τὸ ἀρτίας ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς τρίχας ἢ περιττάς, ἢ ἐκτεῖναι τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ συστεῖλαι, τῶν προτέρων ἀδιαφόρων οὐκέθʼ οὕτω λεγομένων· ὁρμῆς γάρ ἐστιν ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀφορμῆς κινητικά.

​And to benefit is to set in motion or hold fast in accordance with virtue, while to harm is to set in motion or hold fast in accordance with vice. They say that “indifferents” is spoken of in two ways: in one sense, of things that contribute neither to happiness nor to misery, as is the case with wealth, reputation, health, strength, and the like; for it is possible to be happy even without these, since it is the specific use of them that is happiness-inducing or misery-inducing. In another sense, “indifferents” is said of things that stimulate neither impulse nor aversion, as is the case with having an even or odd number of hairs on the head, or stretching out or bending one’s finger, whereas the former indifferents are no longer spoken of in this way; for those former things are capable of stimulating impulse and aversion.

διὸ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκλέγεται, 〈τὰ δὲ ἀπεκλέγεται〉 τῶν ἑτέρων ἐπίσης ἐχόντων πρὸς αἵρεσιν καὶ φυγήν. Τῶν ἀδιαφόρων τὰ μὲν λέγουσι προηγμένα, τὰ δὲ ἀποπροηγμένα· προηγμένα μὲν τὰ ἔχοντα ἀξίαν, ἀποπροηγμένα δὲ τὰ ἀπαξίαν ἔχοντα. ἀξίαν δὲ τὴν μέν τινα λέγουσι σύμβλησιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμολογούμενον βίον, ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· τὴν δὲ εἶναι μέσην τινὰ δύναμιν ἢ χρείαν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἥντινα προσφέρεται πρὸς τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον πλοῦτος ἢ ὑγίεια· τὴν δʼ εἶναι ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ2, ὅμοιον εἰπεῖν ἀμείβεσθαι πυροὺς πρὸς τὰς σὺν ἡμιόνῳ κριθάς.

​Hence some of the former are chosen, and some are rejected, while the latter are in an equal relation with respect to choice and avoidance. Among indifferents, they call some “preferred” and others “rejected.” Preferred are those that possess value, while rejected are those that possess disvalue. And by “value” they speak in one sense of a contribution to the life in agreement, which concerns every good; in another sense, of a certain intermediate capacity or usefulness contributing to the life according to nature, just as one might speak of the contribution that wealth or health brings to the life according to nature; and in a third sense, value is the exchange rate estimated by an appraiser, which one who is experienced in matters would assign, just as one might speak of exchanging wheat for barley together with a mule.

Προηγμένα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ἃ καὶ ἀξίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν εὐφυΐαν, τέχνην, προκοπὴν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν ζωήν, ὑγίειαν, ῥώμην, εὐεξίαν, ἀρτιότητα, κάλλος 〈καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια〉· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πλοῦτον, δόξαν, εὐγένειαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια. ἀποπροηγμένα δʼ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ψυχικῶν ἀφυΐαν, ἀτεχνίαν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σωματικῶν θάνατον, νόσον, ἀσθένειαν, καχεξίαν, πήρωσιν, αἶσχος καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς πενίαν, ἀδοξίαν, δυσγένειαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια· οὔτε δὲ προήχθη οὔτʼ ἀποπροήχθη τὰ οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα.

​Preferred things, then, are those that also possess value: such as, among the things of the soul, natural aptitude, art, moral progress, and the like; among bodily things, life, health, strength, good condition, soundness of limbs, beauty, and things similar; and among external things, wealth, reputation, noble birth, and the like. And rejected things are, among the things of the soul, lack of aptitude, lack of art, and the like; among bodily things, death, disease, weakness, poor condition, mutilation, ugliness, and the like; and among external things, poverty, disrepute, low birth, and things similar. But those things that stand in neither condition are neither preferred nor rejected.

Ἔτι τῶν προηγμένων τὰ μὲν διʼ αὑτὰ προῆκται, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἕτερα, τὰ δὲ καὶ διʼ αὑτὰ καὶ διʼ ἕτερα. διʼ αὑτὰ μὲν εὐφυΐα, προκοπὴ καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· διʼ ἕτερα δὲ πλοῦτος, εὐγένεια καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· διʼ αὑτὰ δὲ καὶ διʼ ἕτερα ἰσχύς, εὐαισθησία, ἀρτιότης. διʼ αὑτὰ μέν, ὅτι κατὰ φύσιν ἐστί· διʼ ἕτερα δέ, ὅτι περιποιεῖ χρείας οὐκ ὀλίγας. ὁμοίως δʼ ἔχει καὶ τὸ ἀποπροηγμένον κατὰ τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον. Ἔτι δὲ καθῆκόν φασιν εἶναι ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν [τε] ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν3, οἷον τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν τῇ ζωῇ, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα διατείνει· ὁρᾶσθαι γὰρ κἀπὶ τούτων καθήκοντα.

​Furthermore, among preferred things, some are preferred for their own sake, some for the sake of other things, and some both for their own sake and for the sake of other things. Preferred for their own sake are natural aptitude, moral progress, and the like; for the sake of other things, wealth, noble birth, and the like; and both for their own sake and for the sake of other things, strength, keenness of the senses, and soundness of limbs. For their own sake, because they are according to nature; for the sake of other things, because they provide not a few uses. And similarly the rejected thing stands according to the opposite account. Furthermore, they say that an appropriate action is that which, when done, holds a reasonable justification, such as what is consistent in life, which extends also to plants and animals; for appropriate actions are observed even in these.

Κατωνομάσθαι δʼ οὕτως ὑπὸ πρώτου Ζήνωνος τὸ καθῆκον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας ἥκειν4 τῆς προσονομασίας εἰλημμένης. ἐνέργημα δʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν κατασκευαῖς οἰκεῖον. τῶν γὰρ καθʼ ὁρμὴν ἐνεργουμένων τὰ μὲν καθήκοντα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον, τὰ δʼ οὔτε καθήκοντα οὔτε παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον. Καθήκοντα μὲν οὖν εἶναι ὅσα λόγος αἱρεῖ ποιεῖν5, ὡς ἔχει τὸ γονεῖς τιμᾶν, ἀδελφούς, πατρίδα, συμπεριφέρεσθαι φίλοις· παρὰ τὸ καθῆκον δέ, ὅσα μὴ αἱρεῖ λόγος, ὡς ἔχει τὰ τοιαῦτα, γονέων ἀμελεῖν, ἀδελφῶν ἀφροντιστεῖν, φίλοις μὴ συνδιατίθεσθαι, πατρίδα ὑπερορᾶν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια·

​And the term “appropriate action” was first coined thus by Zeno, the designation being derived from “reaching down to/applying to certain ones.” And it is an activity proper to constitutions that are according to nature. For of things enacted according to impulse, some are appropriate actions, some are contrary to appropriate action, and some are neither appropriate actions nor contrary to appropriate action. Appropriate actions, then, are all those that reason urges us to do, such as honoring parents, brothers, and fatherland, and associating harmoniously with friends; whereas contrary to appropriate action are all those that reason does not urge, such as neglecting parents, disregarding brothers, failing to accommodate friends, looking down upon fatherland, and things similar.

Syntax notes5 items
  1. 7.1.104κινεῖν ἢ ἴσχειν

    κινεῖν ("to move / set in motion") and ἴσχειν ("to keep / hold fast") form a complementary pair covering active motion and stable state in Stoic philosophical terminology.

  2. 7.1.105ἀμοιβὴν δοκιμαστοῦ, ἣν ἂν ὁ ἔμπειρος τῶν πραγμάτων τάξῃ

    ἀμοιβή means "exchange rate" or "market value," while δοκιμαστής denotes an "assayer" or "evaluator." The relative clause ἣν ἂν ... τάξῃ with subjunctive expresses general/indefinite prospective value assigned by an expert.

  3. 7.1.107ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογόν [τε] ἴσχει ἀπολογισμόν

    The classical Stoic definition of καθῆκον. πραχθέν is a circumstantial participle with temporal/conditional force ("once performed / when done"), and εὔλογον ἀπολογισμόν means "a reasonable justification" or "rational defense."

  4. 7.1.108ἀπὸ τοῦ κατά τινας ἥκειν

    The etymological derivation of καθῆκον offered by Zeno, combining the preposition κατά and the verb ἥκειν ("to reach / apply to"), hence "that which has come down to / applies to certain individuals."

  5. 7.1.108ὅσα λόγος αἱρεῖ ποιεῖν

    αἱρεῖ with infinitive here carries the established idiomatic sense of reason "dictating," "requiring," or "bidding" one to do something, rather than merely "choosing."

Model: gemini-3.8-flashurn:cts:greekLit:tlg0004.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:7.1.104-7.1.108