- Source
- Diogenes Laertius. Hicks, R. D., editor. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.8-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0004.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:3.1.89-3.1.93
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-09-24
The passage outlines the fourth form of good birth (personal virtue) and the three forms of beauty, followed by the tripartite soul, the four cardinal virtues, the five modes of rule, and the first four genres of rhetoric.
ἄλλο εἶδος, ἐὰν αὐτός τις ᾖ γεννάδας τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος· καὶ τοῦτον εὐγενῆ φασι· καὶ τῆς γε εὐγενείας αὕτη κρατίστη. τῆς ἄρα εὐγενείας τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ προγόνων ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ δυναστῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐνδόξων, τὸ δʼ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ καλοκαγαθίας. Τὸ κάλλος διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· ἓν μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐπαινετόν, οἷον ἡ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως εὐμορφία· ἄλλο δὲ χρηστικόν, οἷον ὄργανον καὶ οἰκία καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρὸς χρῆσίν ἐστι καλά· τὸ δὲ πρὸς νόμους καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, 〈ἃ〉 πρὸς ὠφέλειάν ἐστι καλά. τοῦ ἄρα κάλλους τὸ μέν ἐστι πρὸς ἔπαινον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς χρῆσιν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς ὠφέλειαν.
Another form is if a person is himself noble in soul and magnanimous; people say that this person too is well-born; and this is indeed the best kind of good birth. Of good birth, then, one sort derives from virtuous ancestors, another from rulers, another from renowned ancestors, and another from one's own nobility of character. Beauty is divided into three kinds: for one kind of it is praiseworthy, such as comeliness through sight; another is utilitarian, such as an instrument, a house, and the like, which are beautiful for use; and another pertains to laws, customs, and the like, which are beautiful for utility. Of beauty, then, one kind is directed to praise, another to use, and another to utility.
Ἡ ψυχὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς τρία· τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστι λογιστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν. τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν λογιστικόν ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ βουλεύεσθαί τε καὶ λογίζεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων· τὸ δʼ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς αἴτιον τοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖν φαγεῖν καὶ τοῦ πλησιάσαι καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων. τὸ δὲ θυμικὸν μέρος αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ θαρρεῖν καὶ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ὀργίζεσθαι. τῆς ἄρα ψυχῆς ἐστι τὸ μὲν λογιστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν, τὸ δὲ θυμικόν. Τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς εἴδη τέτταρα· ἓν μὲν φρόνησις, ἓν δὲ δικαιοσύνη, ἄλλο δʼ ἀνδρεία, τέταρτον σωφροσύνη.
The soul is divided into three parts: for one part of it is rational, another appetitive, and another spirited. Of these, the rational part is the cause of deliberate counsel, reasoning, thinking, and all such activities; the appetitive part of the soul is the cause of desiring to eat, of sexual union, and of all such things; while the spirited part is the cause of feeling confidence, feeling joy, grieving, and being angry. Of the soul, then, there is the rational part, the appetitive part, and the spirited part. Of complete virtue there are four forms: one is prudence, one is justice, another is courage, and the fourth is temperance.
τούτων ἡ μὲν φρόνησις αἰτία τοῦ πράττειν ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα· ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δικαιοπραγεῖν· ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία τοῦ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ φοβεροῖς μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ μένειν1· ἡ δὲ σωφροσύνη τοῦ κρατεῖν τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ μηδεμιᾶς ἡδονῆς δουλοῦσθαι, ἀλλὰ κοσμίως ζῆν. τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄρα τὸ μέν ἐστι φρόνησις, ἄλλο δικαιοσύνη, τρίτον ἀνδρεία, τέταρτον σωφροσύνη. Ἡ ἀρχὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς μέρη πέντε· ἓν μὲν εἰς τὸ κατὰ νόμον, ἓν δὲ εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἓν δὲ εἰς τὸ κατὰ ἔθος, τέταρτον εἰς τὸ κατὰ γένος, πέμπτον δὲ κατὰ βίαν.
Of these, prudence is the cause of doing things correctly; justice of acting justly in associations and contracts; courage of causing one not to flinch in dangers and fears, but to stand firm; and temperance of mastering desires, of not being enslaved by any pleasure, but living in an orderly manner. Of virtue, then, one part is prudence, another justice, a third courage, and a fourth temperance. Rule is divided into five parts: one according to law, one according to nature, one according to custom, a fourth according to birth, and a fifth by force.
οἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἄρχοντες ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐπὰν αἱρεθῶσι, κατὰ νόμον ἄρχουσιν· οἱ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, οἱ ἄρρενες, οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις· ἐπὶ πολὺ γὰρ πανταχοῦ τὰ ἄρρενα τῶν θηλειῶν ἄρχει. ἡ δὲ τοῦ κατὰ ἔθος ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη ἐστίν, οἵαν οἱ παιδαγωγοὶ τῶν παίδων ἄρχουσι2 καὶ οἱ διδάσκαλοι τῶν φοιτώντων. κατὰ γένος δὲ ἀρχὴ τοιαύτη τις λέγεται, οἵαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βασιλεῖς ἄρχουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ γένους τινὸς ἡ βασιλεία. καὶ ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἄρχουσι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ ἀπὸ γένους ἡ βασιλεία καθίσταται. οἱ δὲ βιασάμενοι ἢ παρακρουσάμενοι ἄρχουσιν ἀκόντων τῶν πολιτῶν· ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρχὴ κατὰ βίαν λέγεται εἶναι. τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν κατὰ νόμον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ ἔθος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ γένος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ βίαν.
Now rulers in cities, whenever they are elected by the citizens, rule according to law; those who rule according to nature are males, not only among human beings, but also among the other animals; for largely everywhere males rule over females. Rule according to custom is of such a kind as pedagogues exercise over children and teachers over pupils. Rule according to birth is described as being of such a kind as the Lacedaemonian kings exercise; for kingship derives from a certain lineage. In Macedonia too they rule in the same manner; for there as well kingship is established from birth. Those who rule against the will of the citizens, having used violence or deception—such rule is said to be by force. Of rule, then, one kind is according to law, another according to nature, another according to custom, another according to birth, and another by force.
Τῆς ῥητορείας εἴδη ἐστὶν ἕξ. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ κελεύωσι πολεμεῖν ἢ συμμαχεῖν πρός τινα, καλεῖται τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος προτροπή. ὅταν δʼ ἀξιῶσι μὴ πολεμεῖν 〈ἢ〉 μὴ συμμαχεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδός ἐστιν ἀποτροπή. τρίτον εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας, ὅταν τις φάσκῃ ἀδικεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος καὶ πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιον ἀποφαίνῃ· τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον εἶδος κατηγορία ὀνομάζεται. τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ῥητορείας [ἀπολογία καλεῖται], ὅταν ἀποφαίνῃ αὑτὸν μηθὲν ἀδικοῦντα μήτε ἄλλο ἄτοπον μηθὲν πράττοντα· τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀπολογίαν καλοῦσι.
There are six forms of rhetoric. For whenever they urge people to go to war or to make an alliance with someone, such a form is called hortatory (persuasion). Whenever they urge people not to go to war nor to make an alliance, but to keep peace, such a form is dissuasive. A third form of rhetoric is whenever someone claims to be wronged by another and shows that person to be the cause of many evils; such a form is called accusation. The fourth form of rhetoric is whenever one shows oneself to be doing no wrong and committing nothing else improper; such a form they call defense.
- 3.1.91τοῦ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις καὶ φοβεροῖς μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ μένειν
The grammatical core is the articular infinitive in the genitive τοῦ ποιεῖν governed by αἰτία, with the causative verb ποιεῖν taking the two dependent infinitives μὴ ἐξίστασθαι ("not to flinch/give way") and μένειν ("to stand firm") as its complement: "the cause of making one not give way in dangers and terrors, but stand firm."
- 3.1.92οἵαν οἱ παιδαγωγοὶ τῶν παίδων ἄρχουσι
The relative pronoun οἵαν functions as an internal (cognate) accusative governed by ἄρχουσι (corresponding to the antecedent noun ἀρχή), alongside the genitive of the persons ruled, τῶν παίδων ("the kind of rule which pedagogues exercise over children"). The parallel clauses with οἱ διδάσκαλοι τῶν φοιτώντων and οἵαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι βασιλεῖς ἄρχουσιν share this exact construction.
