Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​Alcimus also says these things: "The wise say that the soul perceives some things through the body, as for instance by hearing and seeing, while it reflects upon other things by itself, using the body not at all; wherefore of existing things, some are sensible and others are intelligible. For which reasons Plato also said that those who desire to grasp together the principles of the universe must, first, divide the forms in themselves, such as likeness and unity and multitude and magnitude and rest and motion; secondly, they must postulate the

​beautiful, the good, the just, and such things, each in itself; thirdly, they must grasp together which among the forms are relative to one another, such as knowledge or magnitude or mastery 〈considering that the things among us exist as homonymous with those by virtue of participating in them; and I mean, for example, that all things which participate in the just are just, and all things which participate in the beautiful are beautiful〉. And each of the forms is eternal, an object of thought, and in addition impassible. [Wherefore he also says that the forms stand in nature like paradigms, while other things resemble them, being established as their likenesses.] Accordingly Epicharmus speaks thus concerning the good and concerning the forms:

' —Is flute-playing a real thing? —Most certainly. —Is man then flute-playing? —By no means. —Come, let me see: what then is a flute-player? Who does he seem to you to be? A man? Or is he not? —Most certainly. —Do you not then think that the case is thus also concerning the good? The good is indeed a real thing in itself, and whoever knows it by learning, straightway becomes good. For just as a flute-player is one who has learned flute-playing, or a dancer one who has learned dancing, or a weaver weaving, or quite similarly in any of such cases that you wish, the person and the art itself would not be the same, yet he is at any rate an artisan.'

​Plato, in his conception concerning the forms, says that if indeed there is recollection, the forms exist among realities because recollection is of something that is at rest and remains; and that nothing remains other than the forms. 'For in what way,' he says, 'would living beings have been preserved if they had not grasped the form appropriate to them and received for this purpose a natural intellect? But as it is, they remember both likeness and nourishment, of what sort it is for them, showing thereby that the contemplation of likeness is innate in all living beings; wherefore they also perceive their fellow species.' How then does Epicharmus speak?

' Eumaeus, wisdom is not confined to one single kind, but as many things as live, all possess discernment too. For the female race of fowls, if you wish to observe attentively, does not bring forth living offspring, but broods upon them and causes them to have soul. And as to how this wisdom stands, Nature alone knows; for she has been educated by herself.' And again: ' It is no wonder that we speak these things in this way, and that men please themselves and think that they have been born fairly; for to a dog a dog seems to be the most beautiful thing, and a cow to a cow, and an ass to an ass is most beautiful, and a pig surely to a pig.'

​And these things and the like Alcimus sets side by side throughout his four books, indicating the benefit accruing to Plato from Epicharmus. And that Epicharmus himself was not unaware of his own wisdom, one can learn also from these lines, in which he prophesies the one who would imitate him: ' And as I deem—for in deeming I know this clearly, that a memory of these words of mine will still exist hereafter. And someone, taking them and stripping off the metre which they now have, having given them a purple robe and embellished them with fine words, being difficult to wrestle with, will show all others to be easy to throw.'