Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

​nor as not existing at all, nor as some other incorporeal entities belonging to it in addition, nor as parts of it; but one must believe that the whole body in general derives its own everlasting nature from all of these, yet not in such a way as to be compounded of them—just as when a larger composite is formed from the masses themselves, either of the primary elements or of magnitudes of the whole smaller than this particular one—but only, as I say, as having its own everlasting nature from all of these. And all these have their own specific intuitive apprehensions and distinctions, while the aggregate as a whole accompanies them and is nowhere torn away, but receives predication according to the collective conception of the body.

"Furthermore, it often happens to bodies that things accompany them that are not everlasting, and are neither among invisible things nor incorporeal. So then, using this name according to its most prevalent application, we make it plain that accidents have neither the nature of the whole, which grasping collectively we call body, nor that of the everlasting accompaniments, without which body cannot be conceived. And each of them might be designated according to certain acts of focus while the aggregate as a whole accompanies them,

​yet only at whatever time each of them is observed to occur, since the accidents do not accompany it everlastingly. And we must not banish this evident reality from what exists because it does not possess the nature of the whole to which it occurs (which we indeed call body), nor that of the everlasting accompaniments, nor again must we regard them as existing in themselves—for this is not conceivable either for these or for the everlasting properties—; but, just as it appears, we must consider them all to be accidents belonging to bodies, and not everlasting accompaniments, nor again having the rank of a nature in themselves, but they are viewed in the very way that sensation itself produces their specific character.

"Moreover, one must also understand this point very firmly: that time must not be investigated like the other things that we seek in a substratum by referring them to the preconceptions seen in ourselves, but we must take into account the evident fact itself in accordance with which we pronounce time 'long' or 'short', applying this in a way intimately familiar. And we must not change expressions on the assumption that they are better, but we must use those already in existence regarding it, nor must we predicate anything else of it as having the same substance as this distinct property—for some indeed do this—, but we must above all reflect upon that alone with which we connect this distinct property and by which we measure it.

​For this does not require a demonstration but a reflective consideration, namely that we connect time with days and nights and with parts of these, and likewise with feelings and lack of feeling, and with motions and rests, conceiving around these again this very distinct accident in accordance with which we name it 'time'. [He says this also in the second book of On Nature and in the Great Epitome.] "In addition to what has been said, one must believe that worlds, and every limited composite that frequently has a form similar to those things observed around us, have come into being from the infinite, all these having been segregated from their own peculiar conglomerations, both larger and smaller; and that all things are dissolved again, some more quickly and others more slowly, suffering this, some at the hands of things of one kind, others at the hands of things of another kind. [It is clear, therefore, that he also says that worlds are perishable, since their parts change. And in other works he says that the earth is buoyed up by air.]"