Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

"Next to these points, one must observe, referring back to sensation and feelings—for thus the firmest conviction will be secured—that the soul is a body consisting of fine parts, distributed throughout the whole compound, most resembling wind with a blend of heat, and in some respect resembling the former, in some respect the latter; and there is a <third> part that possesses a great variation in the fineness of its parts even in comparison with these, and is more sympathetic with this blend and with the rest of the compound. All this is revealed by the powers of the soul, its feelings, its ease of motion, its thought processes, and the things of which being deprived we die. Furthermore, one must maintain that the soul possesses the principal cause of sensation.

​It would not, however, have acquired this cause, had it not been in some way enclosed by the rest of the compound. And the rest of the compound, having prepared this cause for the soul, itself also received from the soul a share in such an attribute, though not of all that the soul possesses. Wherefore, when the soul is departed, the body does not possess sensation. For it did not itself possess this power within itself, but another thing brought into being along with it provided it, which, straightway accomplishing an attribute of sensation for itself by means of the power brought to completion around it in its motion, imparted it, as I said, to that body as well, in accordance with their contact and sympathy.

"Wherefore, as long as the soul is present within, it never loses sensation when some other part is removed; but even if some part of it is lost together with the dissolving of the enclosing body, whether of the whole or of some part, provided it remains, it will possess sensation. The rest of the compound, however, though remaining both as a whole and in part, does not possess sensation when that has departed, however great the quantity of atoms contributing to the nature of the soul may be. Furthermore, when the whole compound dissolves, the soul is scattered and no longer possesses the same powers nor moves, so that it does not possess sensation either.

"For it is not possible to conceive it as perceiving when not in this structure and not employing these motions, whenever the enclosing and surrounding parts are no longer such as those in which, being now present, it has these motions. [He says in other works that it is composed of the smoothest and roundest atoms, differing by far from those of fire; and that one part of it is irrational, which is scattered through the rest of the body, while the rational part is in the chest, as is evident from fears and joy; and that sleep occurs when the parts of the soul scattered throughout the whole compound are held within or dispersed, and then collapse along with the supports; and that seed is drawn from the whole body.]

"Moreover, one must also understand this: that we speak of the incorporeal, according to the most prevalent use of the term, in reference to that which could be conceived in itself; but it is impossible to conceive the incorporeal in itself except for the void. And the void is able neither to act nor to be acted upon, but merely affords motion through itself to bodies. Therefore, those who say that the soul is incorporeal talk in vain. For it would be able neither to act nor to be acted upon at all, if it were of such a nature; but as it is, both of these attributes are clearly observed concerning the soul.

"Anyone, therefore, who refers all these reflections about the soul to the feelings and sensations, remembering what was said at the beginning, will adequately grasp them as embraced in outlines so as to make precise each part on this basis with certainty."Furthermore, shapes, colors, magnitudes, weights, and whatever else is predicated of body as accident, either to all bodies or to those that are visible and knowable through sensation itself, must not be believed to be independent natures in themselves—for it is not possible to conceive this—"