← Diogenes Laertius

Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers

§10.1.138-10.1.142

Virtue, Pleasure, and Principal Doctrines I to XI

The author reaffirms the Epicurean view that virtues are chosen for the sake of pleasure and, to conclude the work, presents the Principal Doctrines, citing Doctrines I through XI concerning the gods, death, the limits of pleasure and pain, the reciprocity of virtue and pleasure, worldly power and reputation, and the purpose of natural science.

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Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι1, οὐ διʼ αὑτάς, ὥσπερ τὴν ἰατρικὴν διὰ τὴν ὑγίειαν, καθά φησι καὶ Διογένης ἐν τῇ εἰκοστῇ τῶν Ἐπιλέκτων, ὃς καὶ διαγωγὴν λέγει τὴν ἀγωγήν. ὁ δʼ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ ἀχώριστόν φησι τῆς ἡδονῆς τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην· τὰ δʼ ἄλλα χωρίζεσθαι, οἷον βρωτά. Καὶ φέρε οὖν δὴ νῦν τὸν κολοφῶνα, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἐπιθῶμεν τοῦ παντὸς συγγράμματος καὶ τοῦ βίου τοῦ φιλοσόφου, τὰς Κυρίας αὐτοῦ δόξας παραθέμενοι καὶ ταύταις τὸ πᾶν σύγγραμμα κατακλείσαντες, τέλει χρησάμενοι τῇ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀρχῇ.

​And that the virtues are chosen for the sake of pleasure, not for their own sake, just as medicine is chosen for the sake of health, as Diogenes also says in the twentieth book of his Selected Essays, who also calls education a "way of life." But Epicurus says that virtue alone is inseparable from pleasure, whereas the other things are separated from it, such as food. Come then, let us now place the crowning touch, as one might say, upon the whole treatise and upon the life of the philosopher, by setting down his Principal Doctrines and closing the entire composition with them, having used the beginning of happiness as our end.

[I.] Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει, ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον. [ἐν ἄλλοις δέ φησι τοὺς θεοὺς λόγῳ θεωρητούς, οὓς μὲν κατʼ ἀριθμὸν ὑφεστῶτας, οὓς δὲ καθʼ ὁμοείδειαν ἐκ τῆς συνεχοῦς ἐπιρρύσεως τῶν ὁμοίων εἰδώλων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀποτετελεσμένωι ἀνθρωποειδῶς2.] [II.] Ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ γὰρ διαλυθὲν ἀναισθητεῖ· τὸ δʼ ἀναισθητοῦν οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς. [III.] Ὅρος τοῦ μεγέθους τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ παντὸς τοῦ ἀλγοῦντος ὑπεξαίρεσις. ὅπου δʼ ἂν τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐνῇ, καθʼ ὃν ἂν χρόνον ᾖ, οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀλγοῦν ἢ τὸ λυπούμενον ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον.

[I.] That which is blessed and immortal neither has troubles of its own nor provides them to another, so that it is possessed neither by angers nor by favors; for everything of this sort resides in weakness. [In other works he says that the gods are contemplated by reason, some existing numerically, others in virtue of likeness of form, arising from the continuous influx of similar images directed to the same realization in human shape.] [II.] Death is nothing to us; for what has been dissolved lacks perception, and what lacks perception is nothing to us. [III.] The limit of the magnitude of pleasures is the removal of all that causes pain. And wherever that which feels pleasure is present, for whatever time it may be there, there is no pain or grief or both together.

[IV.] Οὐ χρονίζει τὸ ἀλγοῦν συνεχῶς ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄκρον τὸν ἐλάχιστον χρόνον πάρεστι, τὸ δὲ μόνον ὑπερτεῖνον τὸ ἡδόμενον κατὰ σάρκα οὐ πολλὰς ἡμέρας συμμένει. αἱ δὲ πολυχρόνιοι τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν πλεονάζον ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδόμενον ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ ἤ περ τὸ ἀλγοῦν. [V.] Οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδέως ζῆν ἄνευ τοῦ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως, 〈οὐδὲ φρονίμως καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίωσ〉 ἄνευ τοῦ ἡδέως. ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει ἐξ οὗ ζῆν φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὑπάρχει3, οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν.

[IV.] That which causes pain does not continuously linger in the flesh, but extreme pain is present for the shortest time, while that which merely surpasses the pleasure in the flesh does not remain for many days. And prolonged illnesses have in the flesh an excess of what is pleasurable over what causes pain. [V.] It is not possible to live pleasantly without living prudently, honorably, and justly, nor to live prudently, honorably, and justly without living pleasantly. But he to whom this is not present, from which it is possible to live prudently, honorably, and justly, cannot live pleasantly.

[VI.] Ἕνεκα τοῦ θαρρεῖν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ἦν κατὰ φύσιν [ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας] ἀγαθόν4, ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε τοῦθʼ οἷός τʼ ᾖ παρασκευάζεσθαι. [VII.] Ἔνδοξοι καὶ περίβλεπτοί τινες ἐβουλήθησαν γενέσθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀσφάλειαν οὕτω νομίζοντες περιποιήσεσθαι. ὥστʼ εἰ μὲν ἀσφαλὴς ὁ τῶν τοιούτων βίος, ἀπέλαβον τὸ τῆς φύσεως ἀγαθόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀσφαλής, οὐκ ἔχουσιν οὗ ἕνεκα ἐξ ἀρχῆς κατὰ τὸ τῆς φύσεως οἰκεῖον ὠρέχθησαν. [VIII.] Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθʼ ἑαυτὸ κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν.

[VI.] For the sake of gaining confidence from men, it was a natural good—whatever means through which one might ever be able to procure this. [VII.] Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would in this way secure safety from men. So if the life of such men is safe, they have received the good of nature; but if it is not safe, they do not possess that for the sake of which they initially felt desire according to what is congenial to nature. [VIII.] No pleasure is in itself an evil; but the producers of certain pleasures bring on annoyances many times greater than the pleasures.

[IX.] Εἰ κατεπυκνοῦτο πᾶσα ἡδονή, καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ περὶ ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα ὑπῆρχεν ἢ τὰ κυριώτατα μέρη τῆς φύσεως, οὐκ ἄν ποτε διέφερον ἀλλήλων αἱ ἡδοναί. [X.] Εἰ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν περὶ τοὺς ἀσώτους ἡδονῶν ἔλυε τοὺς φόβους τῆς διανοίας τούς τε περὶ μετεώρων καὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀλγηδόνων, ἔτι τε τὸ πέρας τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐδίδασκεν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι ἐμεμψάμεθα αὐτοῖς5, πανταχόθεν εἰσπληρουμένοις τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ οὐδαμόθεν οὔτε τὸ ἀλγοῦν οὔτε τὸ λυπούμενον ἔχουσιν, ὅ περ ἐστὶ τὸ κακόν. [XI.] Εἰ μηθὲν ἡμᾶς αἱ τῶν μετεώρων ὑποψίαι ἠνώχλουν καὶ αἱ περὶ θανάτου, μή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ᾖ τι, ἔτι τε τὸ μὴ κατανοεῖν τοὺς ὅρους τῶν ἀλγηδόνων καὶ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οὐκ ἂν προσεδεόμεθα φυσιολογίας.

[IX.] If every pleasure were condensed, both in time and throughout the entire composite or the most sovereign parts of nature, pleasures would never differ from one another. [X.] If the things producing the pleasures of the profligate dissipated the fears of the mind concerning celestial phenomena, death, and pains, and further taught the limit of desires, we would never have anything with which to reproach them, as they would be filled on every side with pleasures and having from no side either pain or grief, which is the evil. [XI.] If our apprehensions concerning celestial phenomena had not troubled us at all, nor those concerning death, lest it be something to us, and further our failure to comprehend the limits of pains and desires, we would have had no need of natural philosophy.

Syntax notes5 items
  1. 10.1.138Διὰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αἱρεῖσθαι

    An accusative and infinitive construction continuing the indirect discourse of the Epicurean tenets from the preceding section without an explicit introductory verb like φασίν or λέγουσιν. The subject is τὰς ἀρετάς and the infinitive αἱρεῖσθαι is passive ('are chosen').

  2. 10.1.139ἀποτετελεσμένωι ἀνθρωποειδῶς

    The manuscript tradition has variants such as ἀποτετελεσμένους (accusative plural agreeing with θεούς) or ἀποτετελεσμένων. The text reading ἀποτετελεσμένωι is a dative participle agreeing with the neuter concept in ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό ('into one and the same entity / shape'), expressing that the idols coalesce into a human form.

  3. 10.1.140ὅτῳ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ὑπάρχει ἐξ οὗ ζῆν φρονίμως, καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὑπάρχει

    The relative pronoun ὅτῳ is a dative of reference anticipating the impersonal construction οὐκ ἔστι τοῦτον ἡδέως ζῆν. τοῦτο is the antecedent modified by ἐξ οὗ ('from which / by means of which'). In the second half, ὑπάρχει is repeated or coordinated, meaning 'he for whom that from which to live prudently, and honorably, and justly is not present'.

  4. 10.1.141ἦν κατὰ φύσιν ... ἀγαθόν

    The imperfect ἦν functions as a philosophical imperfect denoting an enduring or intrinsic truth ('was [and is] intrinsically a natural good'), rather than a historical past. It is modified by the indefinite relative clause ἐξ ὧν ἄν ποτε..., which specifies the means of procuring safety.

  5. 10.1.142οὐκ ἄν ποτε εἴχομεν ὅ τι ἐμεμψάμεθα αὐτοῖς

    In the apodosis of a counterfactual conditional (ἄν + imperfect εἴχομεν), the dependent relative clause contains the indicative aorist (ὅ τι ἐμεμψάμεθα), reflecting a deliberative past form ('we would never have had anything with which to find fault in them').

Model: gemini-3.8-flashurn:cts:greekLit:tlg0004.tlg001.humanitext-grc2:10.1.138-10.1.142