- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:2.8#1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
The text discusses the relationship between necessity and purpose in nature, presents an opponent's argument that natural parts arise by coincidence rather than purpose, refutes this by pointing to the regularity of nature, and supports teleology through an analogy between art and nature.
Λεκτέον δὴ πρῶτον μὲν διότι ἡ φύσις τῶν ἕνεκά τὸυ αἰτίων,1 ἔπειτα περὶ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου, πῶς ἔχει ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς· εἰς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνάγουσι πάντες, ὅτι ἐπειδὴ τὸ θερμὸν τοιονδὶ πέφυκεν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν τοιούτων, ταδὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ καὶ γίγνεται· καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἄλλην αἰτίαν εἴπωσιν, ὅσον ἁψάμενοι χαίρειν ἐῶσιν,2 ὁ μὲν τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, ὁ δὲ τὸν νοῦν· ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά του ποιεῖν3 μηδʼ ὅτι βέλτιον, ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ὕει ὁ Ζεὺς οὐχ ὅπως τὸν σῖτον αὐξήσῃ, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης (τὸ γὰρ ἀναχθὲν ψυχθῆναι δεῖ, καὶ τὸ ψυχθὲν ὕδωρ γενόμενον κατελθεῖν· τὸ δʼ αὐξάνεσθαι τούτου γενομένου τὸν σῖτον συμβαίνει), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἴ τῳ ἀπόλλυται ὁ σῖτος ἐν τῇ ἅλῳ, οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ὕει ὅπως ἀπόληται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν—ὥστε τί κωλύει οὕτω καὶ τὰ μέρη ἔχειν ἐν τῇ φύσει, οἷον τοὺς ὀδόντας ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀνατεῖλαι τοὺς μὲν ἐμπροσθίους ὀξεῖς, ἐπιτηδείους πρὸς τὸ διαιρεῖν, τοὺς δὲ γομφίους πλατεῖς καὶ χρησίμους πρὸς τὸ λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν;4 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων μερῶν, ἐν ὅσοις δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. ὅπου μὲν οὖν ἅπαντα συνέβη ὥσπερ κἂν εἰ ἕνεκά του ἐγίγνετο, ταῦτα μὲν ἐσώθη ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου συστάντα ἐπιτηδείως· ὅσα δὲ μὴ οὕτως, ἀπώλετο καὶ ἀπόλλυται, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς λέγει τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρωα. ὁ μὲν οὖν λόγος, ᾧ ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν, οὗτος, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν· ἀδύνατον δὲ τοῦτον ἔχειν τὸν τρόπον. ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω γίγνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δʼ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδʼ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα·5 οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλʼ ἂν χειμῶνος. εἰ οὖν ἢ ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε ταῦτʼ εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτʼ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν εἴη. ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γʼ ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν. ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἔστι τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. οὐκοῦν ὡς πράττεται, οὔτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται ἕκαστον, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ. πράττεται δʼ ἕνεκά του· καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα ἕνεκά του. οἷον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει γιγνομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίγνετο ὡς νῦν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης· εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὡσαύτως ἂν γίγνοιτο ᾗ πέφυκεν. ἕνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. ὅλως δὲ ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τέχνην ἕνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα.
We must first state why nature is among the causes which are for the sake of something, and then about the necessary, how it is in physical things; for everyone refers to this cause, saying that since the hot and the cold and each of such things is by nature of a certain character, these other things exist and come to be of necessity. For even if they mention another cause, they only touch upon it and then let it go—one mentioning Friendship and Strife, another Intellect. But there is a difficulty: what prevents nature from acting not for the sake of something nor because it is better, but just as Zeus rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity (for what has risen must be cooled, and what has been cooled, having become water, must come down, and that the corn grows when this occurs is a coincidence); and similarly, if someone’s corn is ruined on the threshing-floor, Zeus does not rain for the sake of this, namely, that it might be ruined, but this is a coincidence—so what prevents the parts in nature from being also like this, for instance, that the teeth should rise of necessity, the front teeth sharp and suitable for tearing, and the molars flat and useful for grinding food, since they did not come to be for the sake of this, but it was a coincidence? And similarly concerning the other parts in which there seems to be that which is for the sake of something. Wherever, then, all things turned out just as if they had come to be for the sake of something, these were preserved, having been suitably constituted by spontaneity; but those which were not so, perished and continue to perish, just as Empedocles says of the ‘ox-faced offspring of men’. This, then, is the argument by which one might be puzzled, and if there is any other of this kind; but it is impossible for it to be in this way. For these and all things by nature come to be in this way either always or for the most part, but none of the things that are by luck or spontaneity do so. For it does not seem to be by luck or by coincidence that it rains often in winter, but it does if it rains under the Dog Star; nor does heat under the Dog Star, but it does in winter. If, then, they seem to be either by coincidence or for the sake of something, and if it is impossible for these to be either by coincidence or by spontaneity, they must be for the sake of something. But surely all such things are by nature, as even those who say these things would themselves admit. Therefore, that which is for the sake of something is present in things that come to be and exist by nature. Moreover, in whatever things there is an end, the prior and the subsequent steps are done for the sake of this. Therefore, as it is done, so it is by nature, and as it is by nature, so is each thing done, unless something stands in the way. But it is done for the sake of something; therefore, it is also by nature for the sake of something. For instance, if a house were among the things that come to be by nature, it would come to be in the same way as it now does by art; and if things by nature came to be not only by nature but also by art, they would come to be in the same way as they are naturally constituted. Therefore, one is for the sake of the other. And in general, art completes what nature cannot bring to an end, and in other cases imitates it. If, then, things according to art are for the sake of something, it is clear that things according to nature are also; for the relation of subsequent to prior things is the same in things according to art and in things according to nature.
- 198b8διότι ἡ φύσις τῶν ἕνεκά τὸυ αἰτίων
διότι introduces a noun clause, serving as the object of Λεκτέον ("that..."). Although it can be interpreted as an indirect question ("why..."), in light of the conclusion of the previous chapter that one must know that nature is for the sake of something (ταύτην εἰδέναι δεῖ), it is more natural to read it as a declarative "that nature is among the causes...".
- 198b15ὅσον ἁψάμενοι χαίρειν εῶσιν
ὅσον expresses limit or degree, combined with the participle ἁψάμενοι to mean "merely touching upon". The phrase χαίρειν ἐῶσιν is an idiomatic expression (literally "letting them bid farewell") meaning "to dismiss" or "to leave aside without further investigation".
- 198b15τί κωλύει τὴν φύσιν μὴ ἕνεκά του ποιεῖν
The verb κωλύει ("prevents") takes an infinitive ποιεῖν with a redundant negative μή. Due to the Greek idiom where verbs of hindering/preventing regularly take an infinitive with μή without changing the overall negative force, the phrase is translated as "what prevents nature from acting for the sake of something", implying rhetorically "nothing prevents it".
- 198b25ἐπεὶ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ συμπεσεῖν;
In the clause introduced by the conjunction ἐπεί ("since" or "supposing that"), infinitives γενέσθαι and συμπεσεῖν are used instead of finite verbs. This construction is influenced by the indirect discourse or the infinitive structure (initiated by τί κωλύει ... ἀνατεῖλαι) that governs the entire hypothetical scenario of the teeth.
- 199a1ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα
The phrase ὑπὸ κύνα (literally "under the dog") is an astronomical and calendaric idiom referring to the rising of the Dog Star (Sirius), which corresponds to the hottest period of midsummer (the dog days). The verb ὕειν (to rain) or γίγνεσθαι is elided, and the phrase means "if it rains under the Dog Star (it is considered a coincidence)".
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 3
