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Physics

§2.8#2

Teleology in Living Things and Nature as a Final Cause

The author demonstrates that nature acts for the sake of an end by pointing to teleological behavior in plants and animals, drawing an analogy between errors in art and monstrosities in nature, and refuting the objection that nature does not deliberate, ultimately concluding that nature is an end-directed cause.

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§2.8#2

μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ·1 ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῷ ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἵ τʼ ἀράχναι καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. κατὰ μικρὸν δʼ οὕτω προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γιγνόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης.2 ὥστʼ εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα ἕνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἢ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις καὶ οὖσιν. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ φύσις διττή, ἡ μὲν ὡς ὕλη ἡ δʼ ὡς μορφή, τέλος δʼ αὕτη, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα τἆλλα, αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἡ αἰτία, ἡ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἁμαρτία δὲ γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην (ἔγραψε γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ γραμματικός, καὶ ἐπότισεν ὁ ἰατρὸς τὸ φάρμακον). ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ἔνια κατὰ τέχνην ἐν οἷς τὸ ὀρθῶς ἕνεκά του, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἕνεκα μέν τινος ἐπιχειρεῖται ἀλλʼ ἀποτυγχάνεται, ὁμοίως ἂν ἔχοι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἁμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἕνεκά του. καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄρα συστάσεσι τὰ βουγενῆ, εἰ μὴ πρός τινα ὅρον καὶ τέλος δυνατὰ ἦν ἐλθεῖν, διαφθειρομένης ἂν ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἐγίγνετο,3 ὥσπερ νῦν τοῦ σπέρματος. ἔτι ἀνάγκη σπέρμα γενέσθαι πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐθὺς τὰ ζῶα· καὶ τὸ “οὐλοφυὲς μὲν πρῶτα” σπέρμα ἦν. ἔτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, ἦττον δὲ διήρθρωται· πότερον οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐγίγνετο, ὥσπερ τὰ βουγενῆ ἀνδρόπρῳρα, οὕτω καὶ ἀμπελογενῆ ἐλαιόπρῳρα, ἢ οὔ; ἄτοπον γάρ· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔδει γε, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις. ἔτι ἔδει καὶ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι γίγνεσθαι ὅπως ἔτυχεν· ὅλως δʼ ἀναιρεῖ ὁ οὕτως λέγων τὰ φύσει τε καὶ φύσιν· φύσει γάρ, ὅσα ἀπό τινος ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχῆς συνεχῶς κινούμενα ἀφικνεῖται εἴς τι τέλος· ἀφʼ ἑκάστης δὲ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἑκάστοις οὐδὲ τὸ τυχόν, ἀεὶ μέντοι ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕνεκα, καὶ ὃ τούτου ἕνεκα, γένοιτο ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον λέγομεν ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης ἦλθεν ὁ ξένος καὶ λυσάμενος ἀπῆλθεν, ὅταν ὥσπερ ἕνεκα τούτου ἐλθὼν πράξῃ, μὴ ἕνεκα δὲ τούτου ἔλθῃ. καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ συμβεβηκός (ἡ γὰρ τύχη τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίων, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν), ἀλλʼ ὅταν τοῦτο αἰεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γένηται, οὐ συμβεβηκὸς οὐδʼ ἀπὸ τύχης· ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίσῃ. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον.4 καίτοι καὶ ἡ τέχνη οὐ βουλεύεται» καὶ εἰ ἐνῆν ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ ἡ ναυπηγική, ὁμοίως ἂν τῇ φύσει ἐποίει· ὥστʼ εἰ ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ ἔνεστι τὸ ἕνεκά του, καὶ ἐν τῇ φύσει. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρεύῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν· τούτῳ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἰτία ἡ φύσις, καὶ οὕτως ὡς ἕνεκά του, φανερόν.

This is most apparent in the case of the other animals, which act neither by art nor after inquiry or deliberation. Hence some people are puzzled whether it is by intellect or by something else that spiders, ants, and suchlike things work. And to one proceeding thus by small steps, even in plants things appear to come to be which are advantageous for the end, as leaves are for the sake of the protection of the fruit. So that if it is both by nature and for the sake of something that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and that plants produce leaves for the sake of the fruits and roots not upwards but downwards for the sake of nourishment, it is clear that this sort of cause exists in things which come to be and exist by nature. And since nature is twofold, on the one hand as matter and on the other as form, and the latter is the end, and the other things are for the sake of the end, this would be the cause, namely, that for the sake of which. But mistakes occur even in things according to art (for the grammarian has written incorrectly, and the doctor has administered the draft incorrectly). So that it is clear that it is possible also in things according to nature. If, then, there are some things according to art in which the ‘correct’ is for the sake of something, and in those that are failed, it is indeed attempted for the sake of something but failed, it would be similarly in physical things, and monstrosities are mistakes of that ‘for the sake of something’. And so in the original combinations, the ‘ox-progeny man-faced’, if they were unable to reach some limit and end, would have come to be by the corruption of some principle, just as now happens by the corruption of the seed. Moreover, seed must come to be first, and not the animals immediately; and ‘first the undifferentiated’ was seed. Moreover, in plants also there is that which is for the sake of something, though it is less articulated. Did there, then, come to be in plants also, just as the ‘ox-faced offspring of men’, so also ‘olive-faced offspring of vines’, or not? For that is absurd; yet surely it must have been so, if indeed it was so in the case of animals. Moreover, in the seeds also, things must have come to be just as it chanced. And in general, he who says this abolishes both things by nature and nature itself. For those things are by nature which, starting from some principle in themselves, by a continuous movement arrive at some end. And from each principle there does not come to be the same thing for each, nor yet just any chance thing, but always indeed towards the same, unless something stands in the way. Now that for the sake of which, and that which is for the sake of this, might also come to be by luck; as we say that the stranger came by luck and went away after ransoming, when he acted as if he had come for this purpose, though he did not come for this purpose. And this is by coincidence (for luck is among the coincidental causes, as we said before); but when this happens always or for the most part, it is not a coincidence nor by luck; and in physical things it is always so, unless something stands in the way. And it is absurd to suppose that there is no coming to be for the sake of something, if they do not see the moving agent deliberating. And yet even art does not deliberate. And if the ship-building art were in the wood, it would produce in the same way as nature; so that if that which is for the sake of something is present in art, it is also in nature. This is most apparent when someone doctors himself; for nature is like that. It is clear, then, that nature is a cause, and in this way, namely, as that for the sake of which.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 199a20ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ

    The dative noun τέχνῃ (denoting means) and the nominative neuter plural participles ζητήσαντα and βουλευσάμενα are coordinated by οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὔτε to modify the verb ποιεῖ. The participles agree with the relative pronoun ἃ, whose antecedent is τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα.

  2. 199a20τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης

    The preposition ἕνεκα governs the genitive case. Here, the genitive phrase τοῦ καρποῦ and the preposition ἕνεκα are nested between the article τῆς and its governing noun σκέπης (genitive), forming a modifier for σκέπη ('for the sake of the protection of the fruit').

  3. 199b5διαφθειρομένης ἂν ἀρχῆς τινὸς ἐγίγνετο

    This forms the apodosis of a counterfactual condition with ἂν + imperfect indicative (ἐγίγνετο). διαφθειρομένης ... ἀρχῆς τινὸς is a genitive absolute construction expressing the hypothetical condition ('if some principle were corrupted').

  4. 199b26ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἕνεκά του γίγνεσθαι, ἐὰν μὴ ἴδωσι τὸ κινοῦν βουλευσάμενον

    The articular infinitive τὸ μὴ οἴεσθαι functions as the subject of the sentence, with the neuter adjective ἄτοπον as its predicate. The implicit subject of the infinitive (general 'people') matches the subject of the conditional verb ἴδωσι (3rd person plural subjunctive). βουλευσάμενον is an attributive or circumstantial participle modifying the accusative object τὸ κινοῦν ('the moving agent').

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-09-21)
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — translation 2
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:2.8#2