- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:94.46-94.55
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-07
Seneca argues that concrete "admonitions" and "precepts" are indispensable for giving faith and confidence to the soul, citing the anecdote of Agrippa and the example of a boy's education. He further asserts that because individuals are constantly corrupted by the crowd and those close to them, a "guardian" and frequent "admonitions" are required to ward off these negative influences.
Duae res plurimum roboris animo dant, fides veri et fiducia: utramque admonitio facit. Nam et creditur illi et, cum creditum est, magnos animus spiritus concipit ac fiducia impletur. Ergo admonitio non est supervacua. M. Agrippa, vir ingentis animi, qui solus ex iis, quos civilia bella claros potentesque fecerunt, felix in publicum fuit, dicere solebat multum se huic debere sententiae: "Nam concordia parvae res crescunt, discordia maximae dilabuntur." Hac se aibat et fratrem et amicum optimum factum.1
Two things give the most strength to the mind: faith in truth and confidence; admonition produces both. For it is believed, and when it is believed, the mind conceives great spirits and is filled with confidence. Therefore, admonition is not superfluous. Marcus Agrippa, a man of huge mind, who alone of those whom civil wars made famous and powerful was prosperous for the public, used to say that he owed much to this maxim: “For by concord small things grow, by discord the greatest fall apart.” By this he said that he had been made both a very good brother and a very good friend.
Si eiusmodi sententiae familiariter in animum receptae formant eum, cur non haec pars philosophiae, quae talibus sententiis constat, idem possit? Pars virtutis disciplina constat, pars exercitatione; et discas oportet et quod didicisti agendo confirmes. Quod si est, non tantum scita sapientiae prosunt, sed etiam praecepta, quae adfectus nostros velut edicto coercent et ablegant.
If maxims of this kind, familiarly received into the mind, form it, why should not this part of philosophy, which consists of such maxims, be able to do the same? Part of virtue consists in instruction, part in practice; you must both learn and confirm what you have learned by doing. If this is so, not only the decrees of wisdom benefit, but also the precepts, which restrain and banish our passions as if by an edict.
'' Philosophia,'' inquit,'' dividitur in haec, scientiam et habitum animi. Nam qui didicit et facienda ac vitanda percepit, nondum sapiens est, nisi in ea, quae didicit, animus eius transfiguratus est. Tertia ista pars praecipiendi ex utroque est, et ex decretis et ex habitu. Itaque supervacua est ad implendam virtutem, cui duo illa sufficiunt."
”Philosophy,” he says, “is divided into these: knowledge and the habit of the mind. For he who has learned and perceived what is to be done and avoided is not yet wise, unless his mind has been transfigured into what he has learned. That third part of giving precepts is from both, from decrees and from habit. Therefore, it is superfluous for completing virtue, for which those two are sufficient.”
Isto ergo modo et consolatio supervacua est, nam haec quoque ex utroque est, et adhortatio et suasio et ipsa argumentatio. Nam et haec ab habitu animi compositi validique proficiscitur. Sed quamvis ista ex optimo habitu animi veniant, optimus animi habitus ex his est; et facit illa et ex illis ipse fit.
In that way, then, consolation also is superfluous, for this too is from both, as are exhortation, persuasion, and argument itself. For these too proceed from the habit of a well-ordered and strong mind. But although those come from the best habit of the mind, the best habit of the mind comes from these; it produces them, and from them it is itself made.
Deinde istud, quod dicis, iam perfecti viri est ac summam consecuti felicitatis humanae. Ad haec autem tarde pervenitur; interim etiam inperfecto sed proficient demonstranda est in rebus agendis via. Hanc forsitan etiam sine admonitione dabit sibi ipsa sapientia, quae iam eo perduxit animum, ut moveri nequeat nisi in rectum. Inbecillioribus quidem ingeniis necessarium est aliquem praeire: hoc vitabis, hoc facies.
Next, that which you say belongs already to the perfect man and one who has attained the summit of human happiness. But these are reached slowly; in the meantime, even to the imperfect but progressing person, the way must be shown in things to be done. Wisdom itself, which has already led the mind to the point where it cannot be moved except to the right, will perhaps give this way to itself even without admonition. For weaker minds indeed, it is necessary for someone to go before: “this you will avoid, this you will do.”
Praeterea si expectat tempus, quo per se sciat quid optimum factu sit, interim errabit et errando inpedietur, quo minus ad illud perveniat, quo possit se esse contentus. Regi ergo debet, dum incipit posse se regere. Pueri ad praescriptum discunt. Digiti illorum tenentur et aliena manu per litterarum simulacra ducuntur, deinde imitari iubentur proposita et ad illa reformare chirographum. Sic animus noster dum eruditur ad praescriptum, iuvatur.
Furthermore, if he waits for the time when he knows by himself what is best to do, in the meantime he will err and by erring be hindered from arriving at that state in which he can be content with himself. He must, therefore, be ruled while he begins to be able to rule himself. Boys learn by a copy-text. Their fingers are held and guided by another’s hand through the outlines of letters, then they are ordered to imitate what is set before them and to reform their handwriting to it. So our mind, while it is instructed by a copy-text, is helped.
Haec sunt, per quae probatur hanc philosophiae partem supervacuam non esse. Quaeritur deinde, an ad faciendum sapientem sola sufficiat. Huic quaestioni suum diem dabimus; interim omissis argumentis nonne apparet opus esse nobis aliquo advocato, qui contra populi praecepta praecipiat?
These are the things by which it is proved that this part of philosophy is not superfluous. It is asked next whether it alone suffices to make a wise man. To this question we will give its own day; in the meantime, setting aside arguments, does it not appear that we need some advocate who may give precepts contrary to the precepts of the people?
Nulla ad aures nostras vox inpune perfertur; nocent qui optant, nocent qui execrantur. Nam et horum inprecatio falsos nobis metus inserit et illorum amor male docet bene optando. Mittit enim nos ad longinqua bona et incerta et errantia, cum possimus felicitatem domo promere.
No voice reaches our ears with impunity; those who wish us well harm us, those who curse us harm us. For the curse of the latter implants false fears in us, and the love of the former teaches us badly by wishing us well. For it sends us to distant, uncertain, and wandering goods, when we can produce happiness from home.
Non licet, inquam, ire recta via. Trahunt in pravum parentes, trahunt servi. Nemo errat uni sibi, sed dementiam spargit in proximos accipitque invicem. Et ideo in singulis vitia populorum sunt, quia illa populus dedit. Dum facit quisque peiorem, factus est; didicit deteriora, deinde docuit, effectaque est ingens illa nequitia congesto in unum quod cuique pessimum scitur. 5 Sit ergo aliquis custos et aurem subinde pervellat abigatque rumores et reclamet populis laudantibus.
It is not allowed, I say, to go by the straight path. Parents drag us into evil, slaves drag us. No one errs for himself alone, but scatters his madness among his neighbors and receives it in turn. And therefore the vices of peoples are in individual men, because the people gave them. While each makes someone worse, he is made worse himself; he learned worse things, then taught them, and that huge wickedness has been produced by piling into one what is known to be worst in each. Let there be, therefore, some guardian, and let him twitch our ear from time to time, drive away rumors, and protest against the praising peoples.
Erras enim, si existimas nobiscum vitia nasci; supervenerunt, ingesta sunt. Itaque monitionibus crebris opiniones, quae nos circumsonant, repellantur.
For you err if you think that vices are born with us; they have come upon us, they have been poured in. Therefore, let the opinions that sound around us be repelled by frequent admonitions.
- 94.46Hac se aibat et fratrem et amicum optimum factum.
An accusative-and-infinitive construction subordinate to the main verb "aibat" (to say). "se" is the subject in the accusative, and the perfect infinitive "factum [esse]" is the verb. "et fratrem et amicum optimum" serves as the predicate accusative complement of the copulative "fieri" (represented by its participle "factum"). It means that Agrippa claimed that he himself had been made a good brother and an excellent friend by this maxim.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-25) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — translation 1
