- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:85.25-85.32
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-06
The author explains why a brave man does not fear even in the face of danger and pain, and discusses the difference between wisdom and other arts through the contrast between the goals of the wise man and the pilot.
Qui hoc dicunt, rursus in idem revolvuntur, ut illis virtutum loco sint minora vitia. Nam qui timet quidem, sed rarius et minus, non caret malitia, sed leviore vexatur. "At enim dementem puto, qui mala imminentia non extimescit." Verum est, quod dicis, si mala sunt; sed si scit mala illa non esse et unam tantum turpitudinem malum iudicat, debebit secure pericula aspicere et aliis timenda contemnere. Aut si stulti et amentis est1 mala non timere, quo quis prudentior est, hoc timebit magis. "
Those who say this, fall back again into the same position, so that in place of virtues they have smaller vices. For he who indeed fears, but less frequently and less, is not free from evil, but is troubled by a lighter one. “But indeed, I think he is mad who does not dread imminent evils.” What you say is true, if they are evils; but if he knows that those are not evils, and judges baseness alone to be evil, he will have to look upon dangers with security and despise what others must fear. Or, if it belongs to a foolish and mad person not to fear evils, the wiser anyone is, the more he will fear.
Ut vobis," inquit, "videtur, praebebit se periculis fortis." Minime; non timebit illa, sed vitabit. Cautio illum decet, timor non decet. "Quid ergo?" inquit, "mortem, vincla, ignes, alia tela fortunae non timebit? "Non. Scit enim illa non esse mala, sed videri. Omnia ista humanae vitae formidines putat.
”As it seems to you,” he says, “the brave man will expose himself to dangers.” By no means; he will not fear them, but avoid them. Caution becomes him, fear does not become him. “What then?” he says, “will he not fear death, chains, fires, and other weapons of fortune?” No. For he knows that those are not evils, but only seem to be. He considers all those things to be terrors of human life.
Describe captivitatem, verbera, catenas, egestatem et membrorum lacerationes vel per morbum vel per iniuriam et quicquid aliud adtuleris: inter lymphatos metus numerat. Ista timidis timenda sunt. An id existimas malum, ad quod aliquando nobis2 nostra sponte veniendum est?
Describe captivity, scourges, chains, poverty, and the tearing of limbs either through disease or through injury, and whatever else you bring up: he counts them among frantic fears. Those are to be feared by the fearful. Or do you think that is an evil, to which we must sometimes go of our own free will?
Quaeris quid sit malum? Cedere iis, quae mala vocantur, et illis libertatem suam dedere, pro qua cuncta patienda sunt. Perit libertas, nisi illa contemnimus, quae nobis iugum inponunt. Non dubitarent, quid conveniret forti viro, si scirent, quid esset fortitudo. Non est enim inconsulta temeritas nec periculorum amor nec formidabilium adpetitio; scientia est distinguendi, quid sit malum et quid non sit. Diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est et eadem patientissima eorum, quibus falsa species malorum est.3 "
Do you ask what is evil? To yield to those things which are called evils, and to surrender to them one’s freedom, for which all things must be endured. Freedom perishes, unless we despise those things which impose a yoke upon us. They would not doubt what is fitting for a brave man, if they knew what bravery is. For it is not unthinking rashness, nor love of dangers, nor desire for formidable things; it is the knowledge of distinguishing what is evil and what is not. Bravery is most diligent in the protection of itself, and at the same time most patient of those things which have a false appearance of evils.
Quid ergo? Si ferrum intentatur cervicibus viri fortis, si pars subinde alia atque alia suffoditur, si viscera sua in sinu suo vidit, si ex intervallo, quo magis tormenta sentiat, reperitur et per adsiccata viscera recens demittitur sanguis, non timet? Istum tu dices nec dolere?" Iste vero dolet. Sensum enim hominis nulla exuit virtus. Sed non timet; invictus ex alto dolores suos spectat. Quaeris quis tunc animus illi sit? Qui aegrum amicum adhortantibus.4
”What then? If a sword is pointed at the neck of a brave man, if one part after another is repeatedly stabbed, if he sees his own entrails in his own lap, if after an interval, so that he may feel the torments more, he is visited again and fresh blood is poured through his dried entrails, does he not fear? Will you say that such a man does not even feel pain?” He indeed feels pain. For no virtue strips away human sensation. But he does not fear; unconquered, he looks down upon his pains from on high. Do you ask what his mind is then? It is like that of those who encourage a sick friend.
" Quod malum est, nocet. Quod nocet, deteriorem facit. Dolor et paupertas deteriorem non faciunt; ergo mala non sunt." "Falsum est," inquit, "quod proponitis; non enim, si quid nocet, etiam deteriorem facit. Tempestas et procella nocet gubernatori, non tamen illum deteriorem facit."
”That which is evil, harms. That which harms, makes a person worse. Pain and poverty do not make a person worse; therefore they are not evils.” “What you propose is false,” he says; “for it is not the case that if something harms, it also makes a person worse. A storm and a tempest harm a pilot, yet they do not make him worse.”
Quidam e Stoicis ita adversus hoc respondent: deteriorem fieri gubernatorem tempestate ac procella, quia non possit id, quod proposuit, efficere nec tenere cursum suum; deteriorem illum in arte sua non fieri, in opere fieri. Quibus Peripateticus "ergo," inquit, "et sapientem deteriorem faciet paupertas, dolor et quicquid aliud tale fuerit. Virtutem enim illi non eripiet, sed opera eius inpediet."
Some of the Stoics respond in this way against this: that the pilot does become worse by the storm and tempest, because he cannot accomplish what he proposed, nor keep his course; that he does not become worse in his art, but in his work. To whom the Peripatetic says: “Therefore, poverty, pain, and whatever else of that kind there may be, will also make the wise man worse. For they will not snatch away his virtue, but they will hinder its works.”
Hoc recte diceretur, nisi dissimilis esset gubernatoris condicio et sapientis. Huic5 enim propositum est in vita agenda non utique, quod temptat, efficere, sed omnia recte facere. Gubernatori propositum est utique navem in portum perducere. Artes ministrae sunt, praestare debent, quod promittunt. Sapientia domina rectrixque est; artes serviunt vitae, sapientia imperat.
This would be said rightly, if the condition of the pilot and of the wise man were not different. For to the latter, the purpose in conducting life is not by all means to accomplish what he attempts, but to do all things rightly. To the pilot, the purpose is by all means to bring the ship into harbor. The arts are handmaidens; they must perform what they promise. Wisdom is mistress and ruler; the arts serve life, wisdom commands.
- 85.25stulti et amentis est
Genitive of characteristic or property with the copula est, meaning "it is characteristic of a fool and a madman."
- 85.27nobis
Dative of agent used with the gerundive veniendum in an impersonal passive periphrastic construction. The relative pronoun ad quod refers implicitly to death in this context.
- 85.28eorum, quibus falsa species malorum est
The genitive of the demonstrative pronoun eorum is an objective genitive governed by the superlative adjective patientissima. The relative pronoun quibus in the relative clause is a dative of possession.
- 85.29Qui aegrum amicum adhortantibus.
A highly elliptical construction. It is to be understood as Qui [animus est] adhortantibus [aegrum amicum], where animus is supplied from the preceding question, and the present participle adhortantibus functions as a dative of possession.
- 85.32Huic
Dative of the demonstrative pronoun hic, referring to the latter of the two previously mentioned persons (gubernatoris and sapientis), i.e., the wise man.