- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:85.19-85.24
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-06
Discusses why a happy life is perfect and unique in its quality, refuting the view that there are degrees of happiness, and introduces an objection to the Stoic proposition that a brave person is without fear.
Illud autem absurdum est, quod dicitur beatum quidem futurum vel sola virtute, non futurum autem perfecte beatum. Quod quemadmodum fieri possit,1 non reperio. Beata enim vita bonum in se perfectum habet, inexsuperabile. Quod si est, perfecte beata est. Si deorum vita nihil habet maius aut melius, beata autem vita divina est; nihil habet, in quod amplius possit attolli.
But that is absurd, which is said, that one will indeed be happy even by virtue alone, but will not be perfectly happy. How this can happen, I do not find. For a happy life has in itself a perfect good, which cannot be surpassed. If this is so, it is perfectly happy. If the life of the gods has nothing greater or better, and a happy life is divine; it has nothing to which it can be raised further.
Praeterea si beata vita nullius est indigens, omnis beata vita perfecta est eademque est et beata et beatissima. Numquid dubitas, quin beata vita summum bonum sit? Ergo si summum bonum habet, summe beata est. Quemadmodum summum bonum adiectionem non recipit (quid enim supra summum erit?), ita ne beata quidem vita,2 quae sine summo bono non est. Quod si aliquem magis beatum induxeris, induces et multo magis; innumerabilia discrimina summi boni facies, cum summum bonum intellegam, quod supra se gradum non habet.
Moreover, if a happy life is in need of nothing, every happy life is perfect, and the same is both happy and most happy. Do you doubt that a happy life is the highest good? Therefore, if it possesses the highest good, it is supremely happy. Just as the highest good does not admit addition (for what will be above the highest?), so neither does a happy life, which is not without the highest good. But if you introduce someone who is more happy, you will also introduce someone who is much more happy; you will make innumerable degrees of the highest good, whereas I understand the highest good to be that which has no step above itself.
Si est aliquis minus beatus quam alius, sequitur, ut hic alterius vitam beatioris magis concupiscet quam suam. Beatus autem nihil suae praefert. Utrumlibet ex his incredibile est:3 aut aliquid beato restare, quod esse quam quod est malit, aut id illum non malle, quod illo melius est. Utique enim quo prudentior est, hoc magis se ad id, quod est optimum, extendet et id omni modo consequi cupiet. Quomodo autem beatus est, qui cupere etiamnunc potest, immo qui debet?
If someone is less happy than another, it follows that this man will desire the life of the happier person more than his own. But a happy man prefers nothing to his own. Whichever of these you choose is incredible: either that something remains for the happy man which he would prefer to be rather than what he is, or that he does not prefer that which is better than what he has. For surely, the wiser he is, the more he will stretch himself toward that which is best, and will desire to attain it by all means. But how is he happy, who can still desire, or rather, who ought to?
Dicam, quid sit, ex quo veniat hic error: nesciunt beatam vitam unam esse. In optimo illam statu ponit qualitas sua, non magnitudo. Itaque in aequo est longa et brevis, diffusa et angustior, in multa loca multasque partes distributa et in unum coacta. Qui illam numero aestimat et mensura et partibus, id illi, quod habet eximium, eripit. Quid autem est in beata vita eximium? Quod plena est.
I will say what it is, from which this error comes: they do not know that a happy life is one. Its own quality, not its magnitude, places it in the best state. Therefore, long and short, widespread and narrower, distributed into many places and many parts, and gathered into one, are on an equal footing. He who estimates it by number and measure and parts, takes away from it that which it has as exceptional. But what is exceptional in a happy life? That it is full.
Finis, ut puto, edendi bibendique satietas est. Hic plus edit, ille minus; quid refert? Uterque iam satur est. Hic plus bibit, ille minus; quid refert? Uterque non sitit. Hic pluribus annis vixit, hic paucioribus; nihil interest, si tam illum multi anni beatum fecerunt quam hunc pauci. Ille, quem tu minus beatum vocas, non est beatus; non potest nomen inminui.
The limit, as I think, of eating and drinking is satiety. This man eats more, that man less; what does it matter? Both are already sated. This man drinks more, that man less; what does it matter? Neither is thirsty. This man lived for more years, this one for fewer; there is no difference, if many years made that one as happy as few years made this one. He whom you call less happy is not happy; the name cannot be diminished.
" Qui fortis est, sine timore est. Qui sine timore est, sine tristitia est. Qui sine tristitia est, beatus est." Nostrorum haec interrogatio est. Adversus hanc sic respondere conantur: falsam nos rem et controversiosam pro confessa vindicare,4 eum, qui fortis est, sine timore esse. "Quid ergo?" inquit, "fortis inminentia mala non timebit? Istuc dementis alienatique, non fortis est. Ille vero," inquit, "moderatissime timet, sed in totum extra metum non est."
”He who is brave, is without fear. He who is without fear, is without sadness. He who is without sadness, is happy.” This is the syllogism of our school. Against this they try to respond in this way: that we claim a false and controversial thing as admitted, namely, that he who is brave is without fear. “What then?” he says, “will the brave man not fear imminent evils? That belongs to a madman and an insane person, not to a brave man. But he indeed,” he says, “fears most moderately, but he is not entirely outside of fear.”
- 85.19Quod quemadmodum fieri possit
The sentence-initial relative pronoun Quod is a connecting relative (relative connection) referring to the content of the preceding sentence. possit is in the subjunctive present because it is the verb of the indirect question introduced by quemadmodum.
- 85.20ita ne beata quidem vita
In this clause, the predicate part adiectionem recipit (admits addition) from the preceding clause is omitted, yielding the meaning 'neither does a happy life (admit addition)'. ne... quidem expresses an additional negation 'not even' or 'neither'.
- 85.21Utrumlibet ex his incredibile est
The specific content of the indefinite pronoun utrumlibet (whichever of the two) is explained appositively by the two accusative with infinitive clauses (headed by restare and non malle) introduced by aut... aut. The verb malit is subjunctive in a relative clause of characteristic, indicating a subjective preference.
- 85.24falsam nos rem et controversiosam pro confessa vindicare
This is an accusative with infinitive clause (indirect discourse) explaining the content of conantur respondere, where nos is the subject accusative, vindicare is the infinitive, and falsam rem et controversiosam is its direct object. pro confessa is an idiomatic phrase meaning 'as admitted/accepted' (literally, 'for a confessed thing').