- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:124.9-124.16
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
The author argues that the good is realized in humans only through the perfection of reason, explaining that infants and animals lack the good by nature, and that animals, while possessing sense, lack the concept of the future.
Quid ergo inter ista, quae rettuli, distat? In eo, quod inrationale est, numquam erit bonum. In eo, quod nondum rationale est, tunc esse bonum non potest. Esse in eo, quod rationale est1 sed inperfectum, iam potest bonum, sed non est.
What then is the difference between those things which I have related? In that which is irrational, there will never be a good. In that which is not yet rational, a good cannot exist at that time. In that which is rational but imperfect, a good can already exist, but it is not yet there.
Ita dico, Lucili: bonum non in quolibet corpore, non in qualibet aetate invenitur et tantum abest ab infantia, quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum.2 Ergo nec in tenero, modo coalescente corpusculo est. Quidni non sit? Non magis quam in semine.
I say this, Lucilius: the good is not found in just any body, nor in just any age, and it is as far removed from infancy as the last is from the first, as the perfected is from the beginning. Therefore, it is not in a tender, just now forming body either. Why indeed should it not be absent? No more than in a seed.
Hoc si dicas, aliquod arboris ac sati bonum novimus; hoc non est in prima fronde, quae emissa eum maxime solum rumpit. Est aliquod bonum tritici; hoc nondum est in herba lactente nec cum folliculo se exerit spica mollis, sed cum frumentum aestas et debita maturitas coxit. Quemadmodum omnis natura bonum suum nisi consummata non profert, ita hominis bonum non est in homine, nisi cum illi ratio perfecta est.
If you say this: we know some good of a tree and of a planted thing; this is not in the first leaf, which, having been sent forth, just now breaks the soil. There is some good of wheat; this is not yet in the milky blade, nor when the soft ear of corn thrusts itself out from the husk, but when summer and due maturity have cooked the grain. Just as every nature does not bring forth its own good unless perfected, so the good of man is not in man, except when reason is perfected in him.
Quod autem hoc bonum? Dicam: liber animus, erectus, alia subiciens sibi, se nulli. Hoc bonum adeo non recipit infantia, ut pueritia non speret, adulescentia inprobe speret; bene agitur cum senectute, si ad illud longo studio intentoque pervenit.3 Si hoc est bonum, et intellegibile est.
What moreover is this good? I will tell you: a free mind, upright, subjecting other things to itself, itself to none. Infancy is so far from receiving this good that childhood does not hope for it, and youth hopes for it improperly; it goes well with old age if it arrives at it by long and intent study. If this is the good, it is also intelligible.
" Dixisti," inquit, "aliquod bonum esse arboris, aliquod herbae; potest ergo aliquod esse et infantis." Verum bonum nec in arboribus nec in mutis animalibus; hoc, quod in illis bonum est, precario bonum dicitur. "Quod est? "inquis. Hoc, quod secundum cuiusque naturam est. Bonum quidem cadere in mutum animal nullo modo potest; felicioris meliorisque naturae est.4 Nisi ubi rationi locus est, bonum non est.
’You said,’ he says, ‘that there is some good of a tree, some of a herb; therefore there can be some of an infant also.’ But true good is neither in trees nor in mute animals; this which is called good in them is so called only precariously. ‘What is it?’ you ask. This: that which is according to the nature of each. Indeed, the good can in no way apply to a mute animal; it belongs to a happier and better nature. Unless there is room for reason, there is no good.
Quattuor hae naturae sunt, arboris, animalis, hominis, dei; haec duo, quae rationalia, sunt, eandem naturam habent, illo diversa sunt, quod alterum inmortale, alterum mortale est. Ex his ergo unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis. Cetera tantum in sua natura perfecta sunt, non vere perfecta, a quibus abest ratio. Hoc enim demum perfectum est, quod secundum universam naturam perfectum, universa autem natura rationalis est. Cetera possunt in suo genere esse perfecta.
These four natures there are: of tree, of animal, of man, of god; these two which are rational have the same nature, but they are different in this, that the one is immortal, the other mortal. Therefore, of these, nature perfects the good of the one—namely, of god—and care perfects the good of the other—of man. The others are only perfected in their own nature, not truly perfected, from which reason is absent. For that indeed is perfected which is perfected according to the universal nature, and the universal nature is rational. The others can be perfected in their own kind.
In quo non potest beata vita esse, nec id potest, quo beata vita efficitur, beata autem vita bonis efficitur. In muto animali non est beata vita nec id, quo beata vita efficitur, in muto animali bonum non est.
In that in which a happy life cannot exist, neither can that exist by which a happy life is effected; moreover, a happy life is effected by goods. In a mute animal there is no happy life, nor that by which a happy life is effected; therefore in a mute animal, there is no good.
Mutum animal sensu conprendit praesentia. Praeteritorum reminiscitur, cum id incidit, quo sensus admoneretur;5 tamquam equus reminiscitur viae, cum ad initium eius admotus est. In stabulo quidem nulla illi viae est quamvis saepe calcatae memoria. Tertium vero tempus, id est futurum, ad muta non pertinet.
A mute animal comprehends present things by sense. It remembers past things only when that occurs by which the sense is stimulated; just as a horse remembers a road when he has been brought to the beginning of it. Indeed, in the stable, he has no memory of the road, however often trodden. But the third time, that is, the future, does not pertain to mute animals.
- 124.9Esse in eo, quod rationale est sed inperfectum, iam potest bonum, sed non est.
Esse is a complementary infinitive dependent on potest, with bonum as the subject. The hyperbaton placing Esse at the very beginning of the sentence emphasizes the potentiality of the "existence" of the good in a rational but imperfect being.
- 124.10tantum abest ab infantia, quantum a primo ultimum, quantum ab initio perfectum.
A correlative construction using tantum... quantum... ("as much... as..."), with bonum from the previous clause continuing as the subject of abest. It expresses that the good is as far removed from infancy as the last is from the first, or the perfect from the beginning.
- 124.12bene agitur cum senectute, si ad illud longo studio intentoque pervenit.
bene agitur cum with the ablative is an impersonal idiom meaning "it goes well with someone" or "it is a fortunate thing for someone." Here, senectute (old age) is in the ablative.
- 124.13felicioris meliorisque naturae est.
The genitive phrase felicioris meliorisque naturae is used with est to denote possession or characteristic quality (genitive of characteristic/description). It signifies that the good belongs to, or is characteristic of, a happier and better nature.
- 124.16quo sensus admoneretur
The subjunctive imperfect admoneretur in the relative clause introduced by quo indicates a relative clause of characteristic (expressing the kind of thing by which the sense would be stimulated), rather than a mere historical fact.