- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:124.17-124.24
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Seneca explains that animals cannot possess true good because they lack a complete grasp of time. He urges humans to return to their unique good—perfected reason—rather than competing with animals in physical traits, and concludes the letter.
Quomodo ergo potest eorum videri perfecta natura, quibus usus perfecti temporis1 non est? Tempus enim tribus partibus constat, praeterito, praesente, venturo. Animalibus tantum quod gravissimum est intra cursum datum, praesens. Praeteriti rara memoria est nec umquam revocatur nisi praesentium occursu.
How then can the nature of those seem perfected, who do not have the use of perfected time? For time consists of three parts: past, present, and future. To animals, only that which is most significant within its course is given, the present. Memory of the past is rare and is never recalled except by the encounter with present things.
Non potest ergo perfectae naturae bonum in inperfecta esse natura, aut si natura talis hoc habet, habent et sata. Nec illud nego, ad ea, quae videntur secundum naturam, magnos esse mutis animalibus impetus2 et concitatos, sed inordinatos ac turbidos. Numquam autem inordinatum est bonum aut turbidum, " Quid ergo? "inquis, "muta animalia perturbate et indisposite moventur? "Dicerem illa perturbate et indisposite moveri, si natura illorum ordinem caperet;3 nunc moventur secundum naturam suam. Perturbatum enim id est, quod esse aliquando et non perturbatum potest; sollicitum est, quod potest esse securum. Nulli vitium est, nisi cui virtus potest esse; mutis animalibus talis ex natura sua motus est.
Therefore, the good of a perfected nature cannot exist in an imperfect nature, or if such a nature has this, planted things have it too. Nor do I deny that mute animals have great and excited impulses toward those things that seem according to nature, but they are inordinate and troubled. However, the good is never inordinate or troubled. ”What then?” you say, “do mute animals move in a troubled and disordered way?” I would say that they moved in a troubled and disordered way if their nature admitted of order; as it is, they move according to their own nature. For that is troubled which can at some time also be untroubled; that is anxious which can be secure. Vice belongs to no one except him to whom virtue can belong; to mute animals, such movement is according to their own nature.
Sed ne te diu teneam, erit aliquod bonum in muto animali, erit aliqua virtus, erit aliquid perfectum, sed nec bonum absolute nec virtus nec perfectum. Haec enim rationalibus solis contingunt, quibus datum est scire quare, quatenus, quemadmodum. Ita bonum in nullo est, nisi in quo ratio.
But not to hold you long, there will be some good in a mute animal, some virtue, something perfected, but neither good absolutely, nor virtue, nor perfected. For these fall to the lot of rational beings alone, to whom it is given to know why, to what extent, and how. Thus, the good is in nothing except that in which reason is.
Quo nunc pertineat ista disputatio quaeris, et quid animo tuo profutura sit? Dico: et exercet illum et acuit et utique aliquid acturum occupatione honesta tenet. Prodest autem etiam quo4 moratur ad prava properantes. Sed et illud dico: nullo modo prodesse possum magis, quam si tibi bonum tuum ostendo, si te a mutis animalibus separo, si cum deo pono.
You ask where that dispute of yours now points, and how it will profit your mind? I say: it both exercises it and sharpens it, and at any rate keeps it occupied with an honorable activity when it is about to do something. Moreover, it is also useful in that it delays those rushing toward what is depraved. But I also say this: in no way can I profit you more than if I show you your good, if I separate you from mute animals, if I place you with God.
Quid, inquam, vires corporis alis et exerces? Pecudibus istas maiores ferisque natura concessit. Quid excolis formam? Cum omnia feceris, a mutis animalibus decore vinceris. Quid capillum ingenti diligentia comis? Cum illum vel effuderis more Parthorum vel Germanorum modo vinxeris vel, ut Scythae solent, sparseris, in quolibet equo densior iactabitur iuba, horrebit in leonum cervice formonsior. Cum te ad velocitatem paraveris, par lepusculo non eris. vis tu5 relictis, in quibus vinci te necesse est, dum in aliena niteris, ad bonum reverti tuum?
Why, I say, do you nourish and exercise the strength of your body? Nature has granted greater strength to beasts of burden and wild beasts. Why do you cultivate your beauty? When you have done all, you are surpassed in beauty by mute animals. Why do you comb your hair with immense diligence? Whether you let it flow in the manner of the Parthians, or tie it in the German fashion, or scatter it as the Scythians are accustomed to do, a thicker mane will toss on any horse, and a more beautiful one will bristle on the neck of lions. When you have prepared yourself for speed, you will not be equal to a little hare. Will you not, leaving behind those things in which you must be surpassed while you strive in what belongs to another, return to your own good?
Quod est hoc? Animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens.6 Rationale animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? Perfecta ratio. An tu ad suum finem hanc evocas, in quantum potest plurimum crescere? Tunc beatum esse te iudica, cum tibi ex ea gaudium omne nascetur, cum visis, quae homines eripiunt, optant, custodiunt, nihil inveneris, non dico quod malis, sed quod velis.
What is this? A mind, of course, corrected and pure, an imitator of God, raising itself above human things, placing nothing of its own outside of itself. You are a rational animal. What then is the good in you? Perfected reason. Do you call this forth to its own end, so that it can grow as much as possible? Then judge yourself to be happy, when all joy shall rise for you from it, when, having seen those things which men snatch, wish for, and guard, you find nothing—I do not say that you prefer, but even that you want.
Brevem tibi formulam dabo, qua te metiaris, qua perfectum esse iam sentias: tunc habebis tuum, cum intelleges infelicissimos esse felices. VALE.
I will give you a brief rule by which to measure yourself, by which you may already feel that you are perfected: you will then have your own, when you understand that the happy are most unhappy. FAREWELL.
- 124.17perfecti temporis
"perfecti temporis" (of perfected time) is a genitive modifying "usus" (use, enjoyment). It denotes the "complete time" consisting of all three parts—past, present, and future—contrasted with the animals' incomplete grasp of time, which is limited to the present.
- 124.17nec illud nego, ... magnos esse ... impetus
The verb "nego" governs an accusative and infinitive construction ("magnos ... impetus ... esse"). "impetus" is an accusative plural, acting as the subject of the infinitive "esse". "mutis animalibus" is a dative of possession ("mute animals have...").
- 124.19Dicerem ... si ... caperet
A contrary-to-fact conditional sentence in the present, using the imperfect subjunctive ("dicerem", "caperet"). It expresses "I would say (that they moved in a troubled way) if their nature admitted of order (but it does not, so I do not say so)."
- 124.21quo
The neuter ablative singular of the relative pronoun or used adverbially. It is interpreted here as "in that / by the fact that" modifying "prodest", indicating the usefulness of delaying those rushing toward evil.
- 124.22vis tu
"vis tu" (the second person singular present indicative of "volo" with an interrogative force) is an idiomatic expression in Latin expressing a strong exhortation or urging akin to a command, rather than a mere question of willingness ("will you not...?" / "do you mind...?").
- 124.23nihil extra se sui ponens
"sui" is the genitive of the reflexive pronoun (or personal pronoun used reflexively), acting as a partitive genitive with "nihil" ("nothing of his own"). It means "placing nothing of one's own outside of oneself," i.e., seeking all value and good within.
