- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:117.1-117.8
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Seneca explains and disputes the Stoic paradox proposed by Lucilius, which claims that "wisdom is a good, but to be wise is not a good," arguing that the two are inseparably connected.
Multum mihi negotii concinnabis et, dum nescis, in magnam me litem ac molestiam inpinges, qui mihi tales quaestiunculas ponis,1 in quibus ego nec dissentire a nostris salva gratia nec consentire salva conscientia2 possum. Quaeris, an verum sit, quod Stoicis placet, sapientiam bonum esse, sapere bonum non esse. Primum exponam, quid Stoicis videatur; deinde tunc dicere sententiam audebo.
You will cook up a lot of trouble for me and, without knowing it, you will drive me into a great dispute and annoyance, you who pose such petty questions to me, in which I can neither dissent from our school without losing favor, nor agree with them without losing my conscience. You ask whether it is true, as the Stoics hold, that wisdom is a good, but to be wise is not a good. First I shall explain what the Stoics think; then, only then, shall I dare to state my opinion.
Placet nostris, quod bonum est, corpus esse, quia quod bonum est, facit: quidquid facit, corpus est. Quod bonum est, prodest. Faciat autem aliquid oportet, ut prosit; si facit, corpus est. Sapientiam bonum esse dicunt; sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere.3
It is agreed among our school that what is good is a body, because what is good acts; whatever acts is a body. What is good is beneficial. But it must do something in order to be beneficial; if it does, it is a body. They say that wisdom is a good; it follows that it is necessary to say that it is also corporeal.
At sapere non putant eiusdem condicionis esse. Incorporale est et accidens alteri, id est sapientiae; itaque nec facit quidquam nec prodest. ' "Quid ergo? "inquit, "non dicimus, bonum est sapere? "Dicimus referentes ad id, ex quo pendet, id est ad ipsam sapientiam.
But they do not think that to be wise is of the same condition. It is incorporeal and an accident to another, that is, to wisdom; and therefore it neither does anything nor is beneficial. ‘ “What then?”’ someone says, ‘ “do we not say that to be wise is a good?”’ We do say so, but by referring it to that on which it depends, that is, to wisdom itself.
Adversus hos quid ab aliis respondeatur, audi, antequam ego incipio secedere et in alia parte considere. "Isto modo," inquiunt, "nec beate vivere bonum est. velint nolint, respondendum est beatam vitam bonum esse, beate vivere bonum non esse."
Hear what is answered by others against these men, before I begin to secede and take my seat on another side. “In that way,” they say, “to live happily is not a good either. Whether they wish it or not, they must answer that a happy life is a good, but to live happily is not a good.”
Etiamnunc nostris illud quoque opponitur: "vultis sapere. Ergo expetenda res est sapere. Si expetenda res est, bona est." Coguntur nostri verba torquere et unam syllabam expetendo interponere, quam sermo noster inseri non sinit.4 Ego illam, si pateris, adiungam. "Expetendum est," inquiunt, "quod bonum est: expetibile, quod nobis contingit, cum bonum consecuti sumus. Non petitur tamquam bonum, sed petito bono accedit."
Furthermore, this is also opposed to our school: “You wish to be wise. Therefore, to be wise is a thing to be desired. If it is a thing to be desired, it is good.” Our school is forced to twist words and insert a single syllable into ‘expetendum’, which our language does not allow to be inserted. I will add it, if you allow. “What is to be desired (expetendum),” they say, “is what is good; what is desirable (expetibile) is what falls to our lot when we have attained the good. It is not sought as a good, but it is added when the good is sought.”
Ego non idem sentio et nostros iudico in hoc descendere, quia iam primo vinculo tenentur et mutare illis formulam non licet. Multum dare solemus praesumptioni omnium hominum, et apud nos veritatis argumentum est aliquid omnibus videri. Tamquam deos esse inter alia hoc colligimus, quod omnibus insita de dis opinio est nec ulla gens usquam est adeo extra leges moresque proiecta, ut non aliquos deos credat. Cum de animarum aeternitate disserimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet consensus hominum aut timentium inferos aut colentium. Utor hac publica persuasione: neminem invenies, qui non putet et sapientiam bonum et sapere.
I do not feel the same way, and I judge that our school descends to this because they are already bound by their first chain and are not allowed to change their formula. We are accustomed to give much weight to the presupposition of all men, and among us it is a proof of truth that something seems so to everyone. For instance, we infer that gods exist from this, among other things, that an opinion about the gods is engrained in everyone, nor is there any nation anywhere so cast out beyond laws and customs as not to believe in some gods. When we discuss the immortality of souls, the consensus of men who either fear the underworld or worship it has no small weight with us. I make use of this public conviction: you will find no one who does not think both that wisdom is a good and that to be wise is too.
Non faciam, quod victi solent, ut provocem ad populum; nostris incipiamus armis confligere. Quod accidit alicui, utrum extra id, cui accidit, est an in eo, cui accidit? Si in eo est, cui accidit, tam corpus est quam illud, cui accidit. Nihil enim accidere sine tactu potest; quod tangit, corpus est. Si extra est, posteaquam acciderat, recessit. Quod recessit, motum habet. Quod motum habet, corpus est. Speras me dicturum non esse aliud cursum, aliud currere, nec aliud calorem, aliud calere, nec aliud lucem, aliud lucere; concedo ista alia esse, sed non sortis alterius.5
I shall not do what the defeated are accustomed to do, namely, appeal to the people; let us begin to fight with our own weapons. Does that which happens to something exist outside that to which it happens, or inside that to which it happens? If it is in that to which it happens, it is as much a body as that to which it happens. For nothing can happen without contact; and what touches is a body. If it is outside, after it had happened, it withdrew. What has withdrawn has motion. What has motion is a body. You expect that I will say that running is not one thing and to run another, nor heat one thing and to be hot another, nor light one thing and to shine another; I grant that those things are different, but not of a different category.
Si valetudo indifferens est, et valere indifferens est; si forma indifferens est, et formonsum esse. Si iustitia bonum est, et iustum esse. Si turpitudo malum est, et turpem esse malum est, tam mehercules quam, si lippitudo malum est, lippire quoque malum est. Hoc ut scias, neutrum esse sine altero potest. Qui sapit, sapiens est; qui sapiens est, sapit. Adeo non potest dubitari, an quale illud sit, tale hoc sit, ut quibusdam utrumque unum videatur atque idem,
If health is an indifferent thing, to be healthy is also indifferent; if beauty is indifferent, to be beautiful is also indifferent. If justice is a good, to be just is also a good. If baseness is an evil, to be base is also an evil, just as, by Hercules, if blear-eyedness is an evil, to be blear-eyed is also an evil. That you may know this, neither can exist without the other. He who is wise is a wise man; he who is a wise man is wise. So little can it be doubted whether the latter is of the same nature as the former, that to some people both seem to be one and the same,
- 117.1qui mihi tales quaestiunculas ponis
The relative pronoun qui with the indicative verb ponis expresses a causal or explanatory reason on the part of the speaker for the statement in the main clause ("you who pose...", i.e., "since you pose...").
- 117.1salva gratia nec consentire salva conscientia
Idiomatic ablative absolute constructions where the adjective salvus ("safe, preserved") agrees with the nouns gratia ("favor") and conscientia ("conscience") in the ablative feminine singular, meaning "with favor/conscience preserved" or "without losing favor/conscience."
- 117.2sequitur, ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere
The impersonal verb sequitur introduces an ut-clause with the subjunctive sit. Inside this clause, illam (referring to sapientiam, "wisdom") is the accusative object of the active infinitive dicere, paired with the predicate accusative corporalem ("corporeal"), forming a double accusative construction ("to say that she is also corporeal").
- 117.5quam sermo noster inseri non sinit
The relative pronoun quam (accusative feminine singular) refers to unam syllabam ("a single syllable"). The verb sinit ("allows") takes an accusative-with-infinitive construction, meaning "which our language (sermo noster) does not allow [that syllable] to be inserted (passive infinitive inseri)."
- 117.7concedo ista alia esse, sed non sortis alterius
sortis alterius ("of another lot/nature") is a genitive of description (or quality) modifying ista (understood with an omitted esse), indicating that although these activities are distinct, they do not belong to a different category or logical status.