- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:116.1-116.8
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
Seneca defends the Stoic position of completely eradicating emotions, viewing them as diseases, against the Peripatetic view of moderation, and emphasizes the importance of self-control by rejecting excuses for our vices.
Utrum satius sit modicos habere adfectus an nullos, saepe quaesitum est. Nostri illos expellunt, Peripatetici temperant. Ego non video, quomodo salubris esse aut utilis possit ulla mediocritas morbi.1 Noli timere; nihil eorum, quae tibi non vis negari, eripio. Facilem me indulgentemque praebebo rebus, ad quas tenetis2 et quas aut necessarias vitae aut utiles aut iucundas putas; detraham vitium. Nam cum tibi cupere interdixero, velle permittam, ut eadem illa intrepidus facias, ut certiore consilio, ut voluptates ipsas magis sentias; quidni ad te magis perventurae sint, si illis imperabis, quam si servies?
Whether it is better to have moderate emotions or none at all, has often been asked. Our school banishes them, the Peripatetics temper them. I do not see how any moderation of a disease can be healthy or useful. Do not fear; I am snatching away nothing of those things which you do not wish to be denied to you. I shall show myself easy and indulgent toward those things to which you cling, and which you think either necessary, useful, or pleasant for life; I shall only withdraw the vice. For when I forbid you to desire, I shall permit you to will, so that you may do those very same things without fear, with surer counsel, and that you may feel the pleasures themselves more; why should they not come to you more, if you command them, than if you serve them?
" Sed naturale est," inquis, "ut desiderio amici torquear; da ius lacrimis tam iuste cadentibus. Naturale est opinionibus hominum tangi et adversis contristari; quare mihi non permittas hunc tam honestum malae opinionis metum? "Nullum est vitium sine patrocinio; nulli non initium verecundum est et exorabile, sed ab hoc latius funditur. Non obtinebis, ut desinat, si incipere permiseris.
”But it is natural,” you say, “to be tortured by the longing for a friend; give due right to tears falling so justly. It is natural to be touched by the opinions of men and to be saddened by adversity; why do you not permit me this so honorable fear of a bad reputation?” There is no vice without a defender; every vice has a modest and exorable beginning, but from this it spreads more widely. You will not obtain that it should end, if you permit it to begin.
Inbecillus est primo omnis adfectus. Deinde ipse se concitat et vires, dum procedit, parat; excluditur facilius quam expellitur. Quis negat omnis adfectus a quodam quasi naturali fluere principio? Curam nobis nostri natura mandavit, sed huic ubi nimium indulseris, vitium est. voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, grata nobis illius faceret accessio; suo veniat iure,3 luxuria est. Ergo intrantibus resistamus, quia facilius, ut dixi, non recipiuntur quam exeunt. "Aliquatenus," inquis, "dolere, aliquatenus timere permitte"; sed illud "aliquatenus "longe producitur nec ubi vis, accipit finem.
Every emotion is weak at first. Then it rouses itself and gathers strength as it proceeds; it is shut out more easily than it is expelled. Who denies that all emotions flow from a certain, as it were, natural principle? Nature has committed to us the care of ourselves, but when you indulge in this too much, it is a vice. Nature has mixed pleasure with necessary things, not that we should seek it, but that its addition should make those things without which we cannot live pleasant to us; if it should come by its own right, it is luxury. Therefore, let us resist them as they enter, because, as I have said, they are more easily not admitted than sent out. “Permit me to grieve to some extent, and to fear to some extent,” you say; but that “to some extent” is drawn out far, and does not accept an end where you wish.
Sapienti non sollicite custodire se tutum est, et lacrimas suas et voluptates ubi volet sistet; nobis quia non est regredi facile, optimum est omnino non progredi.
For the wise man, to guard himself is safe without anxiety, and he will stop his tears and his pleasures where he wishes; for us, since retreat is not easy, it is best not to progress at all.
Eleganter mihi videtur Panaetius respondisse adulescentulo cuidam quaerenti, an sapiens amaturus esset. "De sapiente," inquit, "videbimus; mihi et tibi, qui adhuc a sapiente longe absumus, non est committendum, ut4 incidamus in rem commotam, inpotentem, alteri emancupatam, vilem sibi. Sive enim non respuit, humanitate eius inritamur, sive contempsit, superbia accendimur. Aeque facilitas amoris quam difficultas nocet; facilitate capimur, cum difficultate certamus. Itaque conscii nobis inbecillitatis nostrae quiescamus. Nec vino infirmum animum committamus nec formae nec adulationi nec ullis rebus blande trahentibus."
Panaetius seems to me to have answered elegantly to a certain young man asking whether the wise man would love. “Concerning the wise man,” he said, “we shall see; for me and you, who are still far removed from the wise man, we must not commit ourselves to falling into a state turbulent, powerless, enslaved to another, worthless to itself. For if she does not reject us, we are provoked by her kindness, or if she despises us, we are inflamed by her pride. The ease of love harms as much as its difficulty; we are captured by ease, and we contend with difficulty. Therefore, conscious of our weakness, let us remain quiet. Nor let us commit our weak mind to wine, nor to beauty, nor to flattery, nor to any things that drag us flatteringly.”
Quod Panaetius de amore quaerenti respondit, hoc ego de omnibus adfectibus dico. Quantum possumus, nos a lubrico recedamus; in sicco quoque parum fortiter stamus.
What Panaetius answered to the inquirer about love, this I say about all emotions. As much as we can, let us withdraw from the slippery place; even on dry ground we stand none too firmly.
Occurres hoc loco mihi illa publica contra Stoicos voce: "Nimis magna promittitis, nimis dura praecipitis. Nos homunciones sumus, omnia nobis negare non possumus. Dolebimus, sed parum; concupiscemus, sed temperate; irascemur, sed placabimur." Scis, quare non possumus ista?
You will oppose me at this point with that common voice against the Stoics: “You promise too great things, you command too hard things. We are mere puny men, we cannot deny ourselves everything. We shall grieve, but only a little; we shall desire, but temperately; we shall be angry, but we shall be appeased.” Do you know why we cannot do those things?
Quia nos posse non credimus. Immo mehercules aliud est in re: vitia nostra quia amamus, defendimus et malumus excusare illa quam excutere. Satis natura homini dedit roboris, si illo utamur, si vires nostras colligamus ac totas pro nobis, certe non contra nos concitemus. Nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur.5 VALE.
Because we do not believe we can. Indeed, by Hercules, there is another thing in the matter: because we love our vices, we defend them and prefer to excuse them rather than shake them off. Nature has given enough strength to man, if we would use it, if we would collect our forces and rouse them all for us, certainly not against us. Unwillingness is the cause, inability is pretended. FAREWELL.
- 116.1mediocritas morbi
An oxymoronic expression meaning "moderation of a disease." Based on the Stoic premise that views emotions (adfectus) as aberrations of reason, i.e., "diseases (morbus)" of the soul, Seneca uses this ironic phrase to emphasize that there can be no such thing as a "moderate disease" and that they must be entirely eradicated.
- 116.1ad quas tenetis
The relative clause refers back to the antecedent "rebus." For "tenetis," there are variant readings in manuscripts and critical editions such as "tenderis" (toward which you tend) or "tenemini" (by which you are held). If we read "tenetis," it means "the things to which you cling or hold onto."
- 116.3suo veniat iure
A conditional or concessive subjunctive ("veniat"), meaning "if pleasure should come by its own right"—that is, not as a natural accessory to necessary actions, but as an independent, dominating end in itself.
- 116.5non est committendum, ut
An impersonal construction "non est committendum" followed by a noun clause of result with "ut." Literally, "it must not be allowed that...," expressing a strong warning against putting oneself in a situation where self-control is lost (the trap of love).
- 116.8Nolle in causa est, non posse praetenditur
A highly antithetical sentence structure. The substantivized infinitive "nolle" (unwillingness) is the subject of the first clause, and "non posse" (inability) is the subject of the second. "Praetenditur" is passive ("is pretended / put forward as a pretext"), creating a sharp contrast that exposes human self-deception: "unwillingness is the real cause, whereas inability is merely offered as an excuse."