- Source
- Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Vol 1-3. Gummere, Richard Mott, editor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1917-1925.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:latinLit:phi1017.phi015.humanitext-lat2:109.1-109.10
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-08
In response to the question of whether wise men can benefit one another, Seneca argues that they indeed bring mutual benefit by exercising virtues together, sharing new insights, and uplifting each other through friendship.
An sapiens sapienti prosit1 scire desideras. Dicimus plenum omni bono esse sapientem2 et summa adeptum; quomodo prodesse aliqui possit summum habenti bonum, quaeritur. Prosunt inter se boni; exercent enim virtutes et sapientiam in suo statu continent. Desiderat uterque aliquem, cum quo conferat, cum quo quaerat.
You desire to know whether a wise man benefits a wise man. We say that the wise man is full of every good and has attained the highest; how anyone can benefit one who possesses the highest good is the question. Good men benefit each other; for they exercise their virtues and keep wisdom in its own state. Each desires someone with whom to compare, with whom to seek.
Peritos luctandi usus exercet; musicum, qui paria didicit, movet. Opus est et sapienti agitatione virtutum:3 ita quemadmodum ipse se movet, sic movetur ab alio sapiente.
Practice exercises those skilled in wrestling; a musician is moved by one who has learned equal skills. There is need also for the wise man of the exercise of virtues: thus, just as he moves himself, so he is moved by another wise man.
Quid sapiens sapienti proderit? Impetum illi dabit, occasiones actionum honestarum commonstrabit. Praeter haec aliquas cogitationes suas exprimet: docebit, quae invenerit. Semper enim etiam a sapiente restabit, quod inveniat et quo animus eius excurrat.
What will a wise man benefit a wise man? He will give him an impulse, he will point out opportunities for honorable actions. Besides these, he will express some of his thoughts: he will teach what he has found. For there will always remain, even for a wise man, something to find and where his mind may run ahead.
Malus malo nocet facitque peiorem, iram eius incitando, tristitiae adsentiendo, voluptates laudando, et tunc maxime laborant mali, ubi plurimum vitia miscuere, et in unum conlata nequitia est. Ergo ex contrario bonus bono proderit. "Quomodo? "inquis.
A bad man harms a bad man and makes him worse, by inciting his anger, by agreeing with his sadness, by praising his pleasures, and then bad men suffer most, when they have mixed their vices most, and their wickedness is gathered into one. Therefore, on the contrary, a good man will benefit a good man. ‘How?’ you say.
Gaudium illi adferet, fiduciam confirmabit, ex conspectu mutuae tranquillitatis crescet utriusque laetitia. Praeterea quarumdam illi rerum scientiam tradet; non enim omnia sapiens scit. Etiam si sciret, breviores vias rerum aliqui excogitare posset4 et has indicare, per quas facilius totum opus circumfertur.
He will bring him joy, confirm his confidence, and from the sight of mutual tranquility the gladness of both will grow. Besides, he will hand down to him the knowledge of certain things; for a wise man does not know everything. Even if he did, someone could devise shorter ways for things and point these out, through which the whole work is more easily carried around.
Proderit sapienti sapiens, non scilicet tantum suis viribus, sed ipsius, quem adiuvat. Potest quidem ille etiam relictus sibi explicare partes suas; nihilominus adiuvat etiam currentem hortator. "Non prodest sapienti sapiens, sed sibi ipse. Hoc scias: detrahe illi vim propriam, et ille nihil aget."
A wise man will benefit a wise man, obviously not only by his own strength, but by that of the one whom he helps. Indeed, even left to himself, he can unfold his own parts; nevertheless, an encourager helps even one who is running. ‘A wise man does not benefit a wise man, but benefits himself. Know this: take away his own power, and he will do nothing.’
Illo modo dicas licet5 non esse in melle dulcedinem: nam ipse ille, qui esse debeat, ita aptatus lingua palatoque est ad eiusmodi gustum, ut illa talis sapor capiat, aut offendetur. Sunt enim quidam, quibus morbi vitio mel amarum videatur. Oportet utrumque valere, ut et ille prodesse possit et hic profuturo idonea materia sit. "
In that way you might as well say that there is no sweetness in honey; for he himself, who is to eat it, is so fitted in tongue and palate for that kind of taste, that those organs catch such a flavor, or will be offended. For there are some to whom, by the defect of disease, honey seems bitter. Both must be healthy, so that both the former can benefit and the latter can be suitable material for one who is to benefit.
Si in summum," inquit, "perducto calorem6 calefieri supervacuum est, et in summum perducto bonum supervacuum est si qui prosit. Numquid instructus omnibus rebus agricola ab alio instrui quaerit? Numquid armatus miles, quantum in aciem exituro satis est tuti, amplius arma desiderat? Ergo nec sapiens; satis enim vitae instructus, satis armatus est."
’If,’ he says, ‘it is superfluous for one brought to the highest heat to be warmed , it is also superfluous for one brought to the highest good if anyone benefits him. Does the farmer, equipped with all things, seek to be equipped by another? Does the armed soldier, as much as is enough for safety for one going out into battle, desire more weapons? Therefore, neither does the wise man; for he is sufficiently equipped, sufficiently armed for life.’
Ad haec respondeo: et qui in summo est calore, opus est calore adiecto, ut summum teneat. "Sed ipse se," inquit, "calor continet." Primum multum interest inter ista, quae comparas; calor enim unus est, prodesse varium est. Deinde calor non adiuvatur adiectione caloris, ut caleat; sapiens non potest in habitu mentis suae stare, nisi amicos aliquos similes sui admisit, cum quibus virtutes suas communicet.
To this I reply: even he who is in the highest heat needs added heat to keep the highest. ‘But,’ he says, ‘heat maintains itself.’ First, there is a great difference between those things which you compare; for heat is single, but benefiting is diverse. Next, heat is not helped by the addition of heat in order to be warm; but the wise man cannot stand in the state of his mind unless he has admitted some friends similar to himself, with whom he may share his virtues.
Adice nunc, quod omnibus inter se virtutibus amicitia est. Itaque prodest, qui virtutes alicuius paris sui amat amandasque invicem praestat. Similia delectant; utique ubi honesta sunt et probare ac probari sciunt.
Add now that there is friendship among all virtues with each other. Therefore he benefits who loves the virtues of his equal, and in turn offers his own as worthy of love. Similar things delight; especially when they are honorable and know how to approve and be approved.
- 109.1An sapiens sapienti prosit
An indirect question clause with the present active subjunctive prosit, serving as the complement to the infinitive scire, which is the object of the verb desideras. The particle an, though typically introducing the second alternative in double questions, here introduces a single indirect question meaning 'whether'.
- 109.1plenum omni bono esse sapientem
An accusative and infinitive construction (A.C.I.) introduced by dicimus, where sapientem is the subject accusative and plenum esse is the infinitive. Omni bono is the ablative of plenty, governed by the adjective plenum.
- 109.2Opus est et sapienti agitatione virtutum
The idiom 'opus est' constructed with a dative (sapienti) of the person who needs and an ablative (agitatione) of the thing needed: 'the wise man also has need of the exercise of virtues'.
- 109.5Etiam si sciret, ... posset
A contrary-to-fact conditional sentence in the present, using the imperfect subjunctives sciret and posset in both the protasis and the apodosis: 'even if he knew (which he does not), he would be able to devise'.
- 109.7dicas licet
The impersonal verb licet used with the subjunctive dicas (without ut): 'you may say' or 'one might as well say'. The phrase non esse in melle dulcedinem is an accusative and infinitive clause functioning as the object of dicas.
- 109.8in summum perducto calorem
A striking hyperbaton where the perfect passive participle perducto (dative singular, functioning substantively as 'to one who has been brought') is inserted between the preposition in and its noun calorem (accusative). The prepositional phrase is 'into the highest heat'.