- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
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- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg054.humanitext-grc1:3#1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
Aristotle argues that alteration occurs only in sensible things, demonstrating that the coming to be of shapes and the acquisition or loss of states (such as bodily and intellectual virtues) are only accidental changes resulting from the alteration of underlying matter, rather than alterations or generations in themselves.
Ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἀλλοιούμενα ἀλλοιούνται πάντα ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν,1 καὶ | μόνων τούτων ἔστιν ἀλλοίωσις ὅσα καθʼ αὐτὰ πάσχει ὑπὸ τούτων, | ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρήσωμεν. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων μάλιστα τοῖς | σχήμασι καὶ ταῖς μορφαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἕξεσι καὶ ταῖς τούτων ἀποβολαῖς καὶ λήψεσιν δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν τὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, | οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ οὐδʼ ἐν τούτοις, ἀλλὰ γίγνεται ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν ταῦτα (πυκνουμένης γὰρ ἢ μανουμένης ἢ θερμαινομένης ἢ ψυχομένης τῆς | ὕλης), ἀλλοίωσις δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. ἐξ οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, οὐ λέ|γομεν τὴν μορφήν,2 οὐδʼ ἐξ οὗ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πυραμίδος ἢ τῆς κλίνης, ἀλλὰ | παρωνυμιάζοντες τὸ μὲν χαλκοῦν τὸ δὲ κήρινον τὸ δὲ ξύλινον· τὸ δʼ ἀλ|λοιούμενον λέγομεν· τὸν γὰρ χαλκὸν ὑγρὸν εἶναι λέγομεν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ σκλη|ρόν (καὶ οὐ μόνον οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν χαλκόν), | ὁμωνύμως λέγοντες τῷ πάθει τὴν ὕλην. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐξ οὗ μὲν ἡ μορφὴ καὶ | τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ γεγονὸς ὁμωνύμως οὐ λέγεται τοῖς ἐξ ἐκείνου σχήμασιν, | τὸ δʼ ἀλλοιούμενον τοῖς πάθεσιν ὁμωνύμως λέγεται, φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μόνοις τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἡ ἀλλοίωσις. ἔτι καὶ ἄλλως ἄτοπον. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν τὸν | ἄνθρωπον ἠλλοιῶσθαι ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν λαβοῦσαν τέλος γελοῖον, εἰ τὴν τελείω|σιν τῆς οἰκίας, τὸν θριγκὸν ἢ τὴν κεραμίδα, φήσομεν ἀλλοίωσιν εἶναι, ⟨ἢ⟩ θριγ|κουμένης τῆς οἰκίας ἢ κεραμιδουμένης ἀλλοιοῦσθαι τὴν οἰκίαν. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ἕξε|σιν. αἱ γὰρ ἕξεις ἀρεταὶ καὶ κακίαι, ἀρετὴ δὲ πᾶσα καὶ κακία τῶν | πρός τι, καθάπερ ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν συμμετρία τις, τῶν | ἐντὸς ἢ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ ἡ ἰσχὺς τῶν | πρός τι. διαθέσεις γάρ τινες τοῦ βελτίστου πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον, λέγω δὲ τὸ | βέλτιστον τὸ σῶζον καὶ διατιθὲν περὶ τὴν φύσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ | καὶ αἱ κακίαι τῶν πρός τι,3 ταῦτα δὲ οὔτε γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὔτε γένεσις αὐ|τῶν οὐδʼ ὅλως ἀλλοίωσις, φανερὸν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅλως τὸ τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως | περὶ τὰς ἕξεις. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας. ἡ μὲν | γὰρ ἀρετὴ τελείωσίς τις (ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε μάλιστα τέλειόν ἐστιν, ὅταν | τύχῃ
That all things which are altered are altered by sensible things, and that alteration belongs only to those things which in themselves suffer from these, let us consider from the following. For among other things, alteration seems to belong especially to shapes and forms, and to states, and to the losses and acquisitions of these; but it is not in these either, rather these come to be when certain things are altered (for it is when the matter is condensed or rarified, or heated or cooled), but there is no alteration. For we do not call that out of which the form of the statue comes by the name of the form, nor that out of which the shape of the pyramid or of the bed comes by the name of the shape, but paronymously we call the one “brazen”, the other “waxen”, the other “wooden”. But we do speak of that which is altered; for we say that the bronze is liquid or hot or hard (and not only in this way, but we also call the liquid and the hot “bronze”), speaking of the matter homonymously with the affection. Since, then, that out of which the form and the shape and the generated thing come is not spoken of homonymously with the shapes made out of it, whereas that which is altered is spoken of homonymously with its affections, it is clear that alteration is only in sensible things. Moreover, from another point of view it is absurd. For to say that a man has been altered or a house having received its completion is ridiculous, if we are to say that the completion of the house—the coping or the tile—is an alteration, or that when the house is coped or tiled, the house is altered. It is clear, then, that alteration is not in things which come to be. For neither is it in states. For states are virtues and vices, and every virtue and vice is of the class of relative things, just as health is a certain symmetry of hot and cold things, either of those within or in relation to the surrounding environment. And likewise beauty and strength also belong to relative things. For they are certain dispositions of that which is in the best condition toward what is best, and I mean by “the best” that which preserves and disposes in accordance with nature. Since, then, virtues and vices are of relative things, and these are neither generations nor is there any generation of them nor any alteration at all, it is clear that alteration does not exist at all in respect of states. Nor indeed in respect of the virtues and vices of the soul. For virtue is a certain completion (for each thing is then most complete, when it happens to attain...).
- 245b3Ὅτι δὲ τὰ ἀλλοιούμενα ἀλλοιούνται πάντα ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
This ὅτι clause is a noun clause serving as the object of ἐκ τῶνδε θεωρήσωμεν (let us consider from the following) at the end of the sentence. Aristotle is presenting the main thesis of this chapter, i.e., that alteration occurs only in sensible things.
- 245b3ἐξ οὗ μὲν γὰρ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, οὐ λέγομεν τὴν μορφήν
Syntactically, the antecedent of ἐξ οὗ (that out of which) is omitted, and the entire relative clause ἐξ οὗ... serves as the object of λέγομεν. It means 'we do not call the material, out of which the form of the statue comes, by the name of the form.'
- 246b1τῶν πρός τι
A genitive of belonging/class, meaning 'belonging to the class of relative things (the category of relation).' It refers to the Aristotelian category of 'toward something' (πρός τι), signifying that virtues and vices are essentially relational.